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ABSTRACT 
    Since the invention of public -key cryptography, numerous public-key 
cryptographic systems 
have been proposed. Public key cryptography based their security in solving hard 
mathematical 
problems. Elliptic curve cryptography, independently introduced by Koblitz and 
Miller in the 80's. Elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) based their security in solving 
the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem(ECDLP). The absence of sub-
exponential-time algorithm for ECDLP benefit ECC to offer the same security 
level compared with traditional public key cryptosystems such as RSA, Diffe-
Hellman (DH) key exchange and Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) with much 
smaller key bit size. This advantages is more attractive on constrained 
environments, since shorter key sizes leads to less computing times, less power and 
storage requirements. Among the most time consuming operation of ECC is the 
scalar multiplication and it dominates the execution time of any ECC. It has been 
shown that precomputations of elliptic-curve points improve the performance of 
the scalar multiplication especially in cases where the elliptic-curve point P is 
fixed. 
 
  In this thesis, we propose three improvements for fixed-base comb scalar 
multiplications methods. Based on the work of Lim and Lee, and Tsaur and Chou, 
we propose an improvement 
of Tsaur and Chou method. We make use of a width w non-adjacent form 
representation and restrict the number of rows of the comb to be greater than or 
equal w On the other hand, based on the work of Joye and Tunstall, we proposed 
two efficient regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithms 
using fixed base comb method. The first method represents the scalar k in m=2w   
(where w > 1) radix representation using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent and 
divide the scalar into v blocks. The second method represents the scalar k in base 2 
using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent-recoding and the scalar is divided into 
w× v blocks according to the method of Lim and Lee. 
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   As a result, our improvement of Tsaur and Chou shows a significant reduction in 
the number of required elliptic curve point addition operation. The computational 
complexity is reduced by 33% to 38% compared to Tsaur and Chou method even 
for devices that have limited resources. Moreover, we proved that Tsaur and Chou 
method is not more efficient than lim and lee method. 
 
    Both of our regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithms 
have a constant run time which ensure the resistance against timing attacks. 
Moreover, the proposed algorithms does not make use of any dummy operations 
which provides additional resistance against safe-error fault attacks. In addition to 
that, by using randomization techniques and change the randomization of each pre-
computed point after getting the point in the table our proposed methods are 
resistance to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and second order DPA attacks. 
Moreover, by using randomized linearly transformed coordinate our regular 
methods are resistant to RPA, ZPA and Geiselmann-Steinwandt's attacks. 
Compared to related work, our second regular method provides best performance. 
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ABSTRACT
Since the invention of public -key cryptography, numerous public-key cryptographic systems
have been proposed. Public key cryptography based their security in solving hard mathemat-
ical problems. Elliptic curve cryptography, independently introduced by Koblitz and Miller
in the 80’s. Elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) based their security in solving the elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem(ECDLP). The absence of sub-exponential-time algorithm
for ECDLP benefit ECC to offer the same security level compared with traditional public
key cryptosystems such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exechange and Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) with much smaller key bit size. This advantages is more attractive on
constrained environments, since shorter key sizes leads to less computing times, less power
and storage requirements. Among the most time consuming operation of ECC is the scalar
multiplication and it dominates the execution time of any ECC. It has been shown that pre-
computations of elliptic-curve points improve the performance of the scalar multiplication
especially in cases where the elliptic-curve point P is fixed.
In this thesis, we propose three improvements for fixed-base comb scalar multiplications
methods. Based on the work of Lim and Lee, and Tsaur and Chou, we propose an improve-
ment of Tsaur and Chou method. We make use of a width-ω non-adjacent form representation
and restrict the number of rows of the comb to be greater than or equal ω. On the other
hand, based on the work of Joye and Tunstall, we proposed two efficient regular SPA resis-
tant elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithms using fixed base comb method. The first
method represents the scalar k in m = 2ω (where ω > 1) radix representation using Joye and
Tunstall regular exponent and divide the scalar into v blocks. The second method represents
the scalar k in base 2 using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent-recoding and the scalar is
divided into ω × v blocks according to the method of Lim and Lee.
i
As a result, our improvement of Tsaur and Chou shows a significant reduction in the
number of required elliptic-curve point addition operation. The computational complexity
is reduced by 33 % to 38 % compared to Tsaur and Chou method even for devices that have
limited resources. Moreover, we proved that Tsaur and Chou method is not more efficient
than lim and lee method.
Both of our regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithms have a
constant run time which ensure the resistance a gainst timing attacks. Moreover, the proposed
algorithms does not make use of any dummy operations which provides additional resistance
against safe-error fault attacks. In addition to that, by using randomization techniques and
change the randomization of each pre-computed point after getting the point in the table
our proposed methods are resistance to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and second order
DPA attacks. Moreover, by using randomized linearly transformed coordinate our regular
methods are resistant to RPA, ZPA and Geiselmann-Steinwandt’s attacks. Compared to
related work, our second regular method provides best performance.
ii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Public key cryptosystems based their security on the difficulty of solving a mathematical prob-
lem. Examples of such problems are Integer Factorization Problem (IFP), Discrete Logarithm
Problem (DLP), and Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). The Progress in
computing finite field discrete logarithms and in factoring integers force public key cryp-
tosystems based on IFP or DLP to be implemented using longer and even longer key size.
On the other hand, based on the difficulty of ECDLP in 1987 Koblitz [52] and Miller [66]
independently proposed using the group of points on elliptic curves defined over a finite
field to implement the discrete logarithm cryptosystems. Two advantages they found that
for each prime power there is only one multiplicative group, but there are many elliptic
curve groups, and the absence of sub-exponential-time algorithm for elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem (if the elliptic curve E is suitably chosen) [53].
The absence of sub-exponential-time algorithm for ECDLP benefit the elliptic curve cryp-
tosystems (ECC) to offer the same security level compared with traditional public key cryp-
tosystems such as RSA [80], DH [23], and DSA [47] with much smaller key bit size. For
example, an elliptic curve over a 160-bit field gives the same level of security as a 1024-bit
RSA modulus or Diffie-Hellman prime. As the security level increases the difference be-
comes even more exciting. For example, 512-bit ECC is currently equivalent in security to
15,360-bit RSA/DH/DSA. Table 1.0.1 compares the key sizes for three different approaches
to encryption for comparable levels of security against brute-force attacks.
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Table 1.0.1: Key sizes for equivalent security levels (in bits) against Burte-force attacks.
Symmetric Encryption RSA and Diffie-Hellman Elliptic Curve
80 1024 160
112 2048 224
128 3072 256
192 7680 384
256 15360 512
(source:Avi Kak, lecture 14, Lecture Notes on Computer and Network Security, June 9,
2010)
Statement of the Problem
Given a positive integer k and a point P on an elliptic curve E over a finite field Fq, the
problem (scalar multiplication problem) is to compute Q = kP . A single scalar/point multi-
plication is performed through a combination of point additions and doublings.
Cryptosystem based on elliptic curve, such as key agreement, signature generation, signing
and verification involves scalar multiplication. Computing elliptic-curve scalar multiplication
is the most time consuming operation in any elliptic-curve cryptosystem. Thus, the speed of
scalar multiplication plays an important role in the efficiency of whole system [34] [53].
Motivation and Objective
Since ECC offer the same security level compared with traditional public key cryptosystems
with a smaller key size, ECC can be implemented with much smaller parameters. This
advantages is more attractive on constrained environments, since shorter key sizes leads to
less computing times, less power and storage requirements. To have significant performance,
elliptic curve scalar multiplication must be implemented efficiently. The efficiency of ECC
has been improved over decades and still an active area of research.
The implementation of ECC on constrained devices can lead to side channel analy-
sis (SCA) attacks if the elliptic curve scalar multiplication is not resistant to SCA [38] [69].
The aims of this thesis are to propose an efficient elliptic curve scalar multiplication method,
and an efficient and simple power analysis and safe error fault attacks resistant elliptic curve
scalar multiplication method based on existing methods.
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Methodology
In the last decades, it has been shown that pre-computations of elliptic-curve points improve
the performance of scalar multiplication especially in cases where the elliptic-curve point P
is fixed. Based on the work of Lim and Lee [59], and Tsaur and Chou [92] we prove that
Tsaur and Chou method is not more efficient than Lim and Lee [59] method as the authors
claimed. Moreover, we propose an improvement to Tsaur and Chou method. Our proposed
method makes use to a fixed-base comb technique, represents the scalar k in a width-ω NAF
representation and we restrict the number of rows of the comb to be greater than or equal ω.
On the other hand, based on the work of Joye and Tunstall [48], we proposed two efficient
regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithm using fixed base comb
method. The first method represents the scalar k in m = 2ω (where ω > 1) radix representa-
tion using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent and divide the scalar into v blocks. The second
method represents the scalar k in base 2 using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent-recoding
and the scalar is divided into ω × v blocks according to the method of Lim and Lee.
Thesis Layout
We begin this thesis with basics and description of previous work related to this research.
Thus, Chapter 2 summarizes description of elliptic curve , main elliptic curve operations and
provide most of basic elliptic curve scalar multiplication methods found in the literature. In
addition, recent research in scalar multiplication that act as basis for Chapter 3, Chapter 4
and Chapter 5 is introduced.
In Chapter 3, we prove that Tsaur and Chou method is not more efficient than Lim and
Lee method as the authors claimed. Moreover, we propose an improvement of Tsaur and
Chou method. Regarding constraint devices we give a suitable choices for the number of the
rows h and v that make our method best if the storage is available for 2 to 50 elliptic curve
points.
In Chapter 4, we propose an efficient regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multi-
plication algorithm using fixed base comb method. Our method makes use of a fixed-base
comb technique and represents the scalar k in m = 2ω radix representation using Joye and
Tunstall [48] regular exponent recoding method. Our proposed method is resistant against
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SPA, timing, and safe-error fault attacks. Moreover, by using randomization techniques our
proposed method is even resistant to DPA attacks.
In Chapter 5, we propose a more efficient regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multi-
plication algorithm using fixed base comb method. In our method the scalar k is represented
in base 2 using Joye and Tunstall [48] regular exponent-recoding. Then, the scalar is divided
into ω× v blocks according to the method of Lim and Lee[59]. Also as our method in Chap-
ter 4, our proposed method is resistant against SPA, timing, and safe-error fault attacks.
Moreover, by using randomization techniques our proposed method is even resistant to DPA
attacks. Compared to related work, our method in this chapter provides best performance.
To the best of our knowledge our methods in Chapter 5 and this chapter are the only regular
SPA resistant fixed-base scalar multiplication methods.
Chapter 6 is an application chapter, we make use of our proposed methods in Chapter 3,
Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 to implement Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm(ECDSA),
Tripartite DiffieHellman key exchange(TDH) and Certificateless Two-party Authenticated
Key Agreement (CTAKA) protocol without pairings.
In Chapter 7, we give our conclusions about our overall work, and makes suggestions for
future work. Finally, in the appendix, we give examples to illustrate our methods, and basics
background on bilinear pairings. .
4
Chapter 2
Basics and Literature Review
This chapter provides formal definition for a general elliptic curve defined over a field Fq in
Weierstrass form. The group law of points forming an elliptic curve make the points forming
an elliptic curve into additively abelian group. The group law is defined by a chord -and-
tangent rule for adding two point in E(Fq) to give a third point in E(Fq). Also, in this
chapter the elliptic curve scalar multiplication, the core operation in any ECC is presented,
and most of the basics methods that were introduced in the literature to enhance the scalar
multiplication are presented.
This research has considered curves over Fp. In the finite field Fp multiplication, inversion,
addition, and subtraction have different computational costs. Following the literature, in this
thesis we assume that M represent the cost of one field multiplication, S the cost of one field
doubling and I the cost of one field inversion. Also, when p is a large prime, it is often
assumed that (i) I ∼ 100M , (ii) S = 0.8M , and (iii) the cost of field additions/subtractions
can be neglected [6, 32].
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2.1 we introduce Weierstrass
form. Group law of point on an elliptic curve is presented in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3
different coordinates of an elliptic curve that used to represent elliptic curve points are
presented. An overview of most of existing elliptic curve scalar multiplication are presented
in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 provides an introduction to side channel attacks. Finally, in
Section 2.7 recent elliptic curve scalar multiplication methods are presented.
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2.1 Weierstrass Form
Definition 2.1.1 An elliptic curve E over a field Fq is defined by a generalized Weierstrass
equation
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6 (2.1.1)
where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ Fq. Weierstrass equation is non-singular if and only if for all x1, y1 ∈
F¯q 1 satisfying equation (2.1.1), the partial derivatives 2y1 + a1x1 + a3 and 3x21 + 2a2x1 +
a4 − a1y1 do not vanish simultaneously. The discriminant2 of the elliptic curve E is zero if
and only if the elliptic curve E is singular. If L is any extension field of Fq, then the set of
L-rational points on E is
E(L) = {(x, y) ∈ L× L : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6} ∪O
where O is the point at infinity(it serves as the identity of the group of points E(Fq )).
Simplified equation of generalized Weierstrass equation can be obtained depending on the
characteristic3 of the field Fq. If the characteristic of the field Fq is not 2, then we can divide
by 2 and complete the square to get
y21 = x
3 + a´2x
2 + a´4x+ a´6
where y1 = y +
a1x
2 +
a3
2 and with some constants a´2, a´4, a´6. If the characteristic is also
not 3, then we can let x1 = x+
a´2
3 and obtain the simplified Weierstrass equation
y21 = x
3
1 + ax1 + b (2.1.2)
(for more details we refer the reader to [94]).
In the rest of this thesis we consider simplified Weierstrass equation , so for simplicity we
refer to equation (2.1.2) as Weierstrass equation.
1Algebraic closure of Fq
2 Discriminant of a polynomial is the product of squares of the differences of the polynomial roots.
3Characteristic of a field K is the number of times that we must add the multiplicative identity element
in order to get the additive identity element of the field K
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2.2 Group Law
In this section we give a complete addition algorithm for a general elliptic curve given in
Weierstrass form over Fq, standard references are[87],[34],[94].
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a field Fq. Adding two points in Fq is defined by
chord-and-tangent rule to give a third point in Fq. To obtain addition and doubling formula
for affine coordinate, we assume that P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2) (non of the points is
the infinity) are two points on an elliptic curve E given by the equation y2 = x3 + ax + b,
addition of P1 and P2 is obtained by drawing a line L throw P1 and P2, it will intersect the
curve E in a third point P´3, reflect P´3 across the x-axis to obtain P3. We define
P1 + P2 = P3
Addition of the two points P1 and P2 is shown graphically for a curve over the real number
in Figure 2.2. To double a point P1 we draw a tangent line throw P1, it will intersect the
Figure 2.2.1: Adding Points on an Elliptic Curve
(source: [94])
curve E in another point P´3, reflect P´3 across the x-axis to obtain P3. We define
2P1 = P3
Now, we summarize the group law as follows:
• Identity: the infinity point O is the identity and it satisfies P +O = O + P = P .
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• Negation(or inversion): if P = (x, y) ∈ E(Fq), then (x, y) + (x,−y) = O, so the
point (x,-y) is the inverse of P and is denoted as −P .
• Addition: let P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2) ∈ E(Fq). If P1 6= ±P2, then P1 + P2 =
(x3, y3), where
x3 = (
y2 − y1
x2 − x1 )
2 − x1 − x2 and y3 = ( y2 − y1
x2 − x1 )(x1 − x3)− y1. (2.2.1)
• Doubling: let P = (x1, y1) ∈ E(Fq), where P 6= −P . Then 2P = (x3, y3) where
x3 = (
3x1
2 + a
2y1
)2 − 2x1 and y3 = (3x1
2 + a
2y1
)(x1 − x3)− y1. (2.2.2)
It can easily be seen that point doubling cost 1I + 2M + 2S, whereas addition of two
points cost 1I + 2M + 1S [34].
A complete addition algorithm (algorithm that can handel all pair of input points) on
all elliptic curve defined by Weierstrass equation E : y2 = x3 + ax + b over E(Fq) with
charE(Fq) 6= 2, 3 can be given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Complete addition law for short Weierstrass form in affine coordinates
Require: P1, P2 ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: P1 + P2.
1: If P1 = O return P2.
2: Else if P2 = O return P1.
3: Else if x1 = x2.
4: If y1 6= y2 return O.
5: Else if y1 = 0 return O.
6: Else m = (3x21 + a)/(2y1).
7: Else m = (y1 − y2)/(x1 − x2).
8: x3 = m
2 − x1 − x2.
9: y3 = m(x1 − x3)− y1.
10: Return (x3, y3)
Algebraic proof of associativity law is given in projective coordinate in [94]. Therefore, the
addition law, negation law and the point at infinity (as considered as the identity elements)
make the elliptic curve point E(Fq) an additive abelian group.
The addition formula and the doubling formula of elliptic curve on a general Weierstrass
form are different operations and so can be distinguished from side-channel analysis as we will
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see later. However, in 2002 Brier and Joye [13] introduced the first unified4 addition formula.
In the same year Izu and Takagi [46] proposed a chosen ciphertext attack combined with the
side channel attack to the ELGamal cryptosystems using Briers-Joye’s formula. Therefore,
Briers-Joye’s formula has no longer use.
Definition 2.2.1 Group order: Let E be an elliptic curve over a field Fq, order of E over
Fq is the number of points in E(Fq), and is denoted as #E(Fq).
Theorem 2.2.1 Hasse: Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq. Then
q + 1− 2√q ≤ #E(Fq) ≤ q + 1 + 2√q.
The interval [q + 1− 2√q, q + 1 + 2√q] is called Hasse interval. (For proof see ref [94] )
Definition 2.2.2 Order of point: Let E be an elliptic curve over a field Fq and P ∈ E(Fq),
order of P over Fq is the smallest positive integer 1 ≤ r ≤ #E(Fq) such that rP = O, and
is denoted as ordE(P ). (rP is the process of adding P to itself r times, it is known as scalar
multiplication)
2.3 Coordinates of an Elliptic Curve
When elliptic curve points are represented in Affine coordinate [87] ((x, y) coordinate), both
elliptic curve operations(addition or doubling) require inversion over a field Fp, the relative
cost of inversion over a field Fp is significantly more expensive than multiplication, there-
fore, different coordinate system which requires a greater number of multiplication but no
inversion is used and the speed of point addition and doubling is different from one coordi-
nate system to another. Example of such system are Homogenous projective coordinate[56],
Jacobian coordinate([18], [21]), Chudnovsky Jacobian coordinate [18] and Modified Jacobian
coordinate [20].
In the following subsections, we give details of these systems, standard references are [87],[34],
and [94].
4Unified formula in which the same formula apply equally to add two different points or to double a point.
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Theorem 2.3.1 Isomorphism classes of elliptic curve: Let K = Fq be a finite field with
char(K)6= 2 or 3, the elliptic curves:
E1 : y
2 = x3 + ax+ b
E2 : y
2 = x3 + a´x+ b´
defined over K are isomorphic over K if and only if there exists u ∈ K∗ such that u4a´ = a
and u6b´ = b. The admissible change of variables (x, y)→ (u2x, u3y) transform E1 to E2.
Definition 2.3.1 Let K be a field and let c and d be positive integers, an equivalence relation
∼ on the set K3 \ {(0, 0, 0)} of nonzero triples over K is defined by
(X1, Y1, Z1) ∼ (X2, Y2, Z2)
if there exist λ ∈ K∗ such that X1 = λcX2, Y1 = λdY2 and Z1 = λZ2.
The equivalence class containing (X,Y, Z) ∈ K3 \ {(0, 0, 0)} is
(X : Y : Z) = {(λcX,λdY, λZ) : λ ∈ K∗}
(X : Y : Z) is called a projective point and (X,Y, Z) is called a representative of the
projective point (X : Y : Z). Since any element in the equivalence class can serves as its a
representative, then if Z 6= 0, then ( XZc , YZd , 1) is the only representative with Z−coordinate
equal to 1 of the projective point (X : Y : Z). Thus we have a one to one correspondence
between the set of projective points
P ∗(K) = {(X : Y : Z) : X,Y, Z ∈ K,Z 6= 0}
and the set of affine points
A(K) = {(x, y) : x, y ∈ K}
where x = XZc and y =
Y
Zd
.
The set of projective points
P (K)0 = {(X : Y : Z) : X,Y, Z ∈ K,Z = 0}
10
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is called the line at infinity.
2.3.1 Homogenous projective coordinates
In this system each point (x, y) on the curve y2 = x3 + ax+ b is represented with the triplet
(X,Y, Z) which corresponds to the affine point (X/Z, Y/Z) with Z 6= 0. These triples satisfy
the homogenous projective equation ZY 2 = X3 + aXZ2 + bZ3. The identity element is
represented by (0 : 1 : 0), it is obtained by setting Z = 0 in the homogenous projective
equation. The negative of (X : Y : Z) is (X : −Y : Z). For all nonzero number λ,
(X : Y : Z) = (λX : λY : λZ). Addition and doubling formula are obtained by substituting
x = X/Z and y = Y/Z in the addition and doubling formula in affine coordinate and clearing
denominators.
2.3.2 Jacobian coordinates
In this system each point (x, y) on the curve y2 = x3 + ax+ b is represented with the triplet
(X,Y, Z) which corresponds to the affine point (X/Z2, Y/Z3) with Z 6= 0. These triples
satisfy the projective equation Y 2 = X3 + aXZ4 + bZ6. The identity element is represented
by (1 : 1 : 0). The negative of (X : Y : Z) is (X : −Y : Z). For all nonzero number λ,
(X : Y : Z) = (λ2X : λ3Y : λZ). Addition and doubling formula are obtained by substituting
x = X/Z2 and y = Y/Z3 in the addition and doubling formula in affine coordinate and
clearing denominators. Chudnovsky and Chudnovsky [18] presented an explicit formulas for
group operations in Jacobian coordinates. Chudnovsky and Chudnovsky noted that, when
a = −3 doubling is faster. Jacobian coordinates offer a faster doubling and a slower addition
than projective coordinates.
Bernstein and Lange [6] built an updated database of explicit formula that are reported
in the literature together with their own optimizations.
2.3.3 Chudnovsky Jacobian coordinates
In Jacobian coordinate, in order to make an addition faster the Jacobian point (X : Y : Z)
is internally represented by (X : Y : Z : Z2 : Z3) and is named as Chudnovsky Jacobian
coordinate [18].
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2.3.4 A Modified Jacobian coordinates
In Jacobian coordinate, a fastest doubling can be yield when the jacobian point(X : Y : Z)
is represented by (X : Y : Z : aZ4). This representation named as A Modified Jacobian
coordinate [21].
2.4 Scalar Multiplication
The scalar multiplication is the most time consuming operation in elliptic curve cryptography
based protocol, which compute kP for a given point P ∈ E(Fq) and a scalar k such that
1 ≤ k < ordE(P ). It is performed throw a combination of point addition and doubling.
There are many proposals given in literature which provide improvements for different kind
of scenarios: (1) both the scalar and the base point are unknown, (2) the scalar is fixed, and
(3) the base point is fixed [19, 34].
In the following sections, we describe methods where both the point P and the multiplier
k are unknown in a prior, followed by methods where the scalar is fixed. Standard references
are [19] [34] and [30].
In the rest of this chapter we assume that A and D represent the costs for elliptic curve
point addition and doubling, respectively.
2.4.1 Binary method
The Binary method also often referred as (double-and-add). It is based on the equality
[(kl−1...ki+1ki)2]P = 2[(kl−1...ki+1)2]P ) + [ki]P. It scans the binary bits of the scalar k either
from left-to-right or right-to-left. A point doubling operation is performed at every loop
iteration whereas point addition is only performed if the scalar bit value ki is 1. It therefore
achieves a density of 1/2 which results in a computational complexity of l2A+lD. Algorithm 2
is used to compute kP using left to right binary method.
2.4.2 2r-ary Method
2r-ary method is a generalization of the binary method. It has been proposed by Brauer [11]
in 1939. The idea is to slice the representation of the scalar k into pieces and to process r
digits at a time. For this, k is represented in a base 2r where r > 1. The method scans
12
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Algorithm 2 Left-to-right binary method
Require: k = (kl−1...k0)2, P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: kP .
1: Q = O.
2: For i = l − 1 downto 0 do.
3: Q = 2Q.
4: If ki = 1 then Q = Q+ P .
5: ReturnQ.
Algorithm 3 Left-to-right 2r-ary method
Require: A parameter r ≥ 1, a nonnegative integer k = (kl−1...k0)2r , and P ∈ E(Fq)
Ensure: kP
1: Compute Pi = iP for all i ∈ {1, 3, ..., 2r − 1}.
2: Q = O and i = l − 1.
3: While i ≥ 0 do
4: (s, u) = σ(ki)
5: For j = 1 to r − s do Q = 2Q.
6: If ki 6= 0 then Q = Q+ Pu.
7: For j = 1 to s do Q = 2Q.
8: i = i− 1.
9: Return Q.
the bits either from left-to-right or from right-to-left. It requires extra memory(for pre-
computation of all Pi = iP for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3..., 2r}) but it significantly improve the speed
of scalar multiplication. To reduce the a mount of pre-computation define a function σ by
σ(0) = (r, 0) and σ(z) = (s, u), where z = 2su and u is an odd integer, then using the fact
that 2s(2r−sQ+ uP ) = 2rQ+ kiP , algorithm 3 from [19] can be used to compute kP using
2r-ary method.
2.4.3 Sliding window method
An efficient variant of the 2r−ary method is the sliding window method introduced by
Thurber [90] in 1973. By pre-computing iP for i ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7, ..., 2ω − 1}, one can move a
width-ω window across the scalar k and search for the first non-zero bit. After finding the
bit, the window is placed such that the value of the window is odd, skipping consecutive zero
entries after a nonzero bit ki is processed.
Algorithm 4 from [19] is used to compute kP using sliding window method. In Algo-
rithm 4, in the while loop in the body of else statement the index i is fixed while the loop
finds the longest substring (ki...ks) of length less than or equal to ω such that u = (ki...ks)
13
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Algorithm 4 Sliding window method
Require: A parameter ω ≥ 1, a nonnegative integer k = (kl−1...k0)2, and P ∈ E(Fq)
Ensure: kP
1: Compute Pi = iP for all i ∈ {1, 3, ..., 2ω − 1}.
2: Q = O ; i = l − 1.
3: While i ≥ 0 do .
4: If ki = 0 then Q = 2Q and i = i− 1.
5: Else.
6: s = max{i− ω + 1, 0}.
7: While ks = 0 do s=s+1.
8: For j = 1 to i− s+ 1 do Q = 2Q.
9: u = (ki...ks)2.
10: Q = Q+ Pu; i = s− 1.
11: Return Q.
is odd, and since i− s+ 1 is less than ω, then u belongs to the set of pre-computed values.
2.4.4 Non-Adjacent Form (NAF) Representations
The density of the prior described methods can be further reduced by using a signed-digit
representation. The advantage of this representation is that the cost of computing the inverse
of elliptic-curve points, e.g. −P , comes almost for free. Booth [9] proposed in 1951 to expand
the coefficients in the representation of the scalar k from {0, 1}. to {−1, 0, 1}. However,
the disadvantage of his proposal has been that the representation is not unique. Thus,
Reitwiesner [78] proposed to apply a Non-Adjacent Form (NAF) representation in 1960. A
NAF representation of a positive integer k is k =
∑l−1
i=0 ki2
i where ki ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, each
nonzero coefficient ki is odd , kl−1 6= 0 and no two consecutive digits ki are nonzero. It is a
canonical representation with the fewest number of non-zero digits for a given scalar k. The
expected number of non-zero bits in a NAF is l/3 as shown by Morain and Olivos [72]. The
runtime complexity of a binary NAF method is therefore approximately l3A+ lD (cf. [10] and
[72]).
A generalization of NAF is the width-ω NAF, proposed by Solinas [88] in 2000. For the
width-ω NAF, the scalar k is represented by
k =
l−1∑
i=0
ki2
i (2.4.1)
In this representation |ki| < 2ω−1, each nonzero coefficient ki is odd, kl−1 6= 0, and at
14
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Algorithm 5 Width-ω NAF representation of a positive integer k
Require: Window width w and a positive integer k.
Ensure: Width-ω NAF(k).
1: i = 0.
2: While k > 0 do
3: If k is odd then
4: b ≡ k mod 2ω.
5: If b ≥ 2ω−1 then
6: b = b− 2ω.
7: k = k − b.
8: Else b = 0.
9: ki = b; i = i+ 1; k = k/2.
10: Return (ki−1, ki−2, ..., k1, k0).
most one of any ω consecutive digits is nonzero. Algorithm 5 can be used to obtain the
width-ω NAF of a positive integer k and is denoted by NAFω(k)(NAF2(k)=NAF(k)).
In order to perform the scalar multiplication using width-ω NAF, the points P, 3P, ..., (2ω−1−
1)P are pre-computed and the scalar multiplication is performed in the evaluation phase as
shown in Algorithm 6. The average density of non-zero bits among all width-ω NAFs is
asymptotically 1/(1 + ω) [72]. The expected runtime of Algorithm 6 is therefore
[1D + [2ω−2 − 1]A] + [ l
ω + 1
A+ lD]. (2.4.2)
2.4.5 Fractional window method
A common drawback of sliding window method and window method is that, the number
of pre-computed value may be dictated by memory limitations. The window method need
Algorithm 6 Width-ω NAF method for scalar multiplication
Require: Window width-ω, positive integer k and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: Q = kP .
1: Use Algorithm 5 to compute NAFω(k) =
∑l−1
i=0 ki2
i.
2: Compute Pi = iP for all i ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7, ..., 2ω−1 − 1}.
3: Q = O.
4: For i = l − 1 downto 0 do
5: Q = 2Q.
6: If ki 6= 0 then
7: If ki > 0 then Q = Q+ Pki .
8: Else Q = Q− P−ki .
9: Return (Q).
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storage for 2ω−2 element, hence memory may be wasted if the available memory is not a
power of 2. Mo¨ller [70] introduced Fractional window method which eliminate this problem by
making use of space that remain unused in sliding window and window methods. To describe
Mo¨ller [70] method, let ω ≥ 2 be an integer and m an odd integer such that 1 ≤ m ≤ 2ω − 3.
The signed fractional window representation for a positive integer k is
k =
l−1∑
i=0
ki2
i
where ki ∈ {0}
⋃
B,where B = {±1,±3, ...,±(2ω +m)}.
Let the mapping digit: {0, 1, 2, ..., 2ω+2} → B⋃{0} be defined as follows:
1. If x is even, then digit(x)=0.
2. else if 0 < x ≤ 2ω +m, then digit(x) = x
3. else if 2ω +m < x < 3.2ω −m, then digit(x) = x− 2ω+1
4. else let digit(x) = x− 2ω+2.
Algorithm 7 from [70] is used to represent a positive integer k into signed fractional window
representation.
Algorithm 7 Fractional window representation of a positive integer k
Require: Window width ω, odd integer 1 ≤ m ≤ 2ω − 3, positive integer k and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: Fractional window representation of k.
1: d = k mod 2ω+2.
2: c = bk/2ω+2c.
3: i = 0.
4: While d 6= 0 ∨ c 6= 0 do.
5: ki=digit(d).
6: d = d− ki.
7: i = i+ 1.
8: d = (c mod 2) .2ω+1 + d/2.
9: c = bc/2c.
10: Return (ki−1, ki−2, ..., k1, k0).
Mo¨ller [70] showed that the average density of non zero digit using fractional window
representation with parameters ω and m is
1
ω + m+12ω + 2
(2.4.3)
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Algorithm 8 Fractional window method for scalar multiplication
Require: Window width ω, odd integer 1 ≤ m ≤ 2ω − 3, positive integer k and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: kP .
1: Use Algorithm 7 to compute fractional window representation Fω,m(k) =
∑l−1
i=0 ki2
i.
2: Compute Pi = iP for all i ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7, ..., 2ω +m}.
3: Q = O.
4: For i = l − 1 downto 0 do
5: Q = 2Q.
6: If ki 6= 0.
7: If ki > 0 then Q = Q+ Pki .
8: else Q = Q− P−ki .
9: ReturnQ.
The expected running time of Algorithm 8 is
l
ω + m+12ω + 2
A+ lD. (2.4.4)
2.4.6 Montgomery scalar multiplication
In 1987 Montgomery [71] described a technique for a special type of curve (Montgomery
curve)in large characteristic.
Definition 2.4.1 Montgomery form: Let EM be an elliptic curve expressed in Montgomery
form, that is
EM : By
2 = x3 +Ax2 + x
Montgomery’s technique is based on the fact that the sum of two points whose difference
is a known point can be calculated without the y-coordinate of the two points. Therefore, the
arithmetic on EM relies on an efficient x-coordinate only computation, and the y-coordinate
is recovered by a simple formula [71]. In 2002 Brier and Joye [14] generalized Montgomery’s
idea to any curve in short Weierstrass equation.
Let P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2) two points on elliptic curve E : y
2 = x3 + ax+ b and
D = P2 − P1 = (xD, yD). Let (x3, y3) be the sum of P1 + P2, then x3 is given by
x3 =
−4b(x1 + x2) + (x1x2 − a)2
x(x1 − x2)2 (2.4.5)
Furthermore, if y1 6= 0 then the the x−coordinate of 2P1, say x4, can be expressed from the
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Algorithm 9 Montgomery ladder method for computing x(kP )
Require: k = (kl−1...k0)2, P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: x(kP ).
1: R0 = O;R1 = P .
2: For i = l − 1 downto 0 do.
3: b = ki;x(R1−b) = x(R1−b +Rb)
4: x(Rb) = x(2Rb).
5: Return R0.
x−coordinate of P1 as
x4 =
(x21 − a)2 − 8bx1
4(x31 + ax1 + b)
(2.4.6)
Using Algorithm 9 we can compute the x−coordinates of kP (registerR0) and the x-coordinates
of (k + 1)P (register R1). To recover y-coordinate of kP , let (x1, y1) the coordinates of
Q = kP, (xD, yD) the coordinates of P and x2 the x-coordinate of (k + 1)P , if yD 6= 0, then
we have
y1 =
2b+ (a+ xDx1)(xD + x1)− x2(xD − x1)2
2yD
(2.4.7)
From Algorithm 9, it can easily seen that Montgomery ladder implicitly offers security
against simple power analysis attacks [54, 55, 64], since it performs the same curve operations
in every loop iteration. In addition to that, the Montgomery ladder has a very regular
structure and does not use dummy operations, this prevents fault-injection based safe-error
attacks [98, 99].
For a field of characteristic 2, in 1999, Lopez and Dahab [61] showed that all curve can
be turned into Montgomerys.
2.4.7 Fixed base windowing methods
When the base point P is fixed, the efficiency of scalar multiplication can be improved
by pre-computations. The first idea which was proposed by Yao [97] in 1976 is to pre-
compute every multiple 2iP where 0 < i < l . If theoretically all 2iP points are pre-
computed, the complexity of scalar multiplication is reduced to only l2A (without the need
of any doublings). A slightly improved form is the fixed-base windowing technique that was
proposed by Brickell et al. (BGMW) [12]. In BGMW method the scalar k is represented in
18
CHAPTER 2. BASICS AND LITERATURE REVIEW
base 2ω (i.e k = (Kd−1, ...,K1,K0)2ω), d = dl/ωe, where l is the bit length of the scalar k.
Therefore, we can write kP as
kP =
d−1∑
i=0
Ki2
ωiP =
2ω−1∑
j=1
(j
d−1∑
i:Ki=j
2ωiP ) =
2ω−1∑
j=1
jQj ,
where Qj =
∑
i:Ki=j
2ωiP for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2ω − 1. The value of ∑2ω−1j=1 jQj can be
efficiently computed as follows:
2ω−1∑
j=1
jQj = Q2ω−1 + (Q2ω−1 +Q2ω−2) + ...+ (Q2ω−1 +Q2ω−2 + ...+Q1)
Algorithm 10, from [34] can be used to compute scalar multiplication. The runtime complexity
is reduced to (2ω + d− 3)A.
Algorithm 10 Fixed base windowing method for scalar multiplication
Require: Window width ω, d = dl/ωe, k = (Kd−1, ...,K1,K0)2ω and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: kP .
1: Compute Pi = 2
ωiP , 0 ≤ i ≤ d− 1.
2: A = O;B = O.
3: For j = 2ω − 1 downto 1 do .
4: For each i for which Ki = j do :B = B + Pi.
5: A = A+B.
6: Return(A).
Similarly, a NAF windowing technique can be applied which further reduces the com-
plexity to approximately (2
ω+1
3 + d − 2)A, where d = d(l + 1)/ωe. Algorithm 11, from [34]
can be used to compute scalar multiplication using Fixed base NAF windowing method for
scalar multiplication.
2.4.8 Fixed-Base Comb Methods
The main idea of fixed-base comb methods is to represent the scalar k as a binary matrix of
h rows and v columns. The matrix is then processed column-wise from right-to-left or from
left-to-right.
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Algorithm 11 Fixed base NAF windowing method for scalar multiplication
Require: Window width ω, positive integer k and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: kP .
1: Compute Pi = 2
ωiP , 0 ≤ i ≤ d(l + 1)/ωe.
2: Compute NAF(k) =
∑l−1
i=0 ki2
i.
3: d = dl/ωe.
4: By padding NAF(k) on the left with zeros if necessary, write (kl−1, ..., k1, k0) =
Kd−1||...||K1||K0 where each Ki is a {0,±1}−string of length d.
5: If ω is even then I = (2ω+1 − 2)/3; else I = (2ω+1 − 1)/3
6: A = O,B = O.
7: For j = I downto 1 do .
8: For each i for which Ki = j do :B = B + Pi.
9: For each i for which Ki = −j do :B = B − Pi.
10: A = A+B.
11: Return(A).
Lim and Lee Method
In 1994, Lim and Lee [59] introduced a comb technique that divides the scalar k into h blocks
Ki from right-to-left, for 0 ≤ i ≤ h − 1, of equal size a = d lhe (we pad zeros if necessary).
Then, subdivide each block Ki from up-to-down into v subblocks ki,j of equal size b = dav e,
where 0 ≤ j ≤ v − 1. We can rewrite the h blocks of k in terms of a binary matrix, i.e.
k =

K0
...
Ki
...
Kh−1

=

k0,v−1 · · · k0,j · · · k0,0
...
...
...
ki,v−1 · · · ki,j · · · ki,0
...
...
...
kh−1,v−1 · · · kh−1,j · · · kh−1,0

=
v−1∑
j=0
h−1∑
i=0
ki,j2
jb2ia, (2.4.8)
Let P0 = P and Pi = 2
aPi−1 = 2iaP for 0 < i < h. Then, we can rewrite kP as
kP =
v−1∑
j=0
h−1∑
i=0
ki,j2
jb2iaP =
v−1∑
j=0
h−1∑
i=0
ki,j2
jbPi,
Since Ki is of size a, we can let Ki = ei,a−1...ei,1ei,0 be the binary representation of Ki
for all 0 ≤ i < h, and hence ki,j = ei,jb+b−1...ei,jb+1ei,jb is the binary representation of ki,j ,
therefore
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kP =
b−1∑
t=0
2t(
v−1∑
j=0
h−1∑
i=0
ei,jb+t2
jbPi),
Suppose that the following values are pre-computed and stored for all 1 ≤ s < 2h and
1 ≤ j ≤ v − 1,
G[0][s] = eh−1Ph−1 + ...+ e1P1 + e0P0,
G[j][s] = 2b(G[j − 1][s]) = 2jbG[0][s],
(2.4.9)
where the index s is equal to the decimal value of eh−1...e1e0. Therefore, we can rewrite
kP as follows
kP =
b−1∑
t=0
2t(
v−1∑
j=0
G[j][Ij,t]), (2.4.10)
where Ij,t is the decimal value of eh−1,jb+t...e0,jb+t (0 ≤ t < b).
Now we can use the left-to-right binary method to compute kP using these pre-computed
values. The number of elliptic-curve operations in the worst case is a+ b− 2, and since Ij,t is
of size h, we may assume that the probability of Ij,t being zero is
1
2h
and Ij,t occurs a times,
thus the expected number of elliptic-curve operations is reduced to (1− 1
2h
)a+ b− 2.
2.4.9 Direct doubling method.
When the multiplier k is a power of 2, Sakai and Sakurai [81] introduced an efficient method
to compute kP = 2rP (r ≥ 1) on elliptic curves over Fp. Given a point P = (x1, y1) ∈ Fp,
their method compute 2rP directly. Algorithm 12 from [81] illustrates their method in affine
coordinates.
In Table 2.4.1 and Table 2.4.2 we give a comparison of required numbers of multipli-
cation(M), squaring (S)and Inversion (I) required to performed the scalar multiplication
k = 2rP between direct doubling and separate r doublings methods in both affine and Jaco-
bian coordinates [81].
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Algorithm 12 Sakai-Sakurai method for direct doubling
Require: A positive integer r such that k = 2r and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: k = 2rP
1: A1 = x1, B1 = 3x
2
1 + a and C1 = −y1.
2: For i = 2 to r.
3: Ai = B
2
i−1 − 8Ai−1C2i−1.
4: Bi = 3A
2
i + 16
i−1a(
∏i−1
j=1Cj)
4.
5: Ci = −8C4i−1 −Bi−1(Ai − 4Ai−1C2i−1).
6: Compute Dr = 12ArC
2
r −B2r .
7: Compute x2r =
B2r−8ArC2r
(2r
∏r
i=1 Ci)
2 .
8: Compute y2r =
8C4r−BrDr
(2r
∏r
i=1 Ci)
3 .
9: Return x2r and y2r .
Table 2.4.1: Complexity Comparison between doubling and direct doubling in affine coordi-
nates
Method S M I
Direct Doubling 4r + 1 4r + 1 1
Separate r Doubling 2r 2r r
2.5 Side Channel Attacks
Side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks have been first introduced by Kocher et al. [54, 55, 64]
in 1996. By monitoring physical characteristics of a given implementation, e.g. the power
consumption or the timing behavior, an attacker is able to extract secret information such as
the ephemeral key or private key in asymmetric primitives. In this section we will present the
Simple Power Analysis(SPA), Differential Power Analysis(DPA), second order DPA, RPA,
ZPA and Geiselmann-Steinwandt’s attacks.
2.5.1 Simple Power Analysis attacks (SPA)
Simple Power Analysis attacks are based on the analysis of a single execution of the algo-
rithm. This type of attack is particularly efficient on elliptic curve cryptosystems, because
Table 2.4.2: Complexity Comparison between doubling and direct doubling in Jacobian co-
ordinates
Method S M
Direct Doubling 4r 4r − 2
Separate r Doubling 4r 4r
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the operations of doubling and addition of points are intrinsically different. Several counter-
measures against the SPA are proposed in the literature. They can mainly be put in four
categories.
• Repeating the same pattern of instructions, whatever the processed data. In [22], Coron
proposes the use double-and-add always method as a simple countermeasure. Corn’s
method involves a use of dummy point addition operation if the scalar bit is set to
0 in the binary method. In [98, 99] it has been shown that Coron’s double-and-add
always method actually prevents SPA attacks but becomes vulnerable to safe-error
fault attacks.
• The use of curves of specific form. Such countermeasures have been proposed for the
Hessian form [49], for the Jacobi form [58, 8], for the Montgomery form [74, 75] and for
the Edward form [24, 7]. The disadvantage, it is not fully general for example Jacobi
and Edward forms have always a point of order 4 and Hessian form a point of order
3. This implies that the order of the corresponding elliptic curve is a multiple of 4 and
3 respectively, while standard curve recommended by American National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) or [SECG00] are curves of prime cardinality over a
large prime field.
• The use of a unified addition formula on Weierstrass form [45, 14, 8, 27].
• The countermeasures based on Montgomery ladder method [51, 14, 91]
2.5.2 Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
Differential Power Analysis(DPA) attacks are based on statistical analysis of the execution
of the algorithm several times. Elliptic curve cryptosystem have the advantage of almost
always using a new random ephemeral secrete integer in the double and add algorithm for
each run of a protocol, thus, DPA attack on ECC is harder to mount[58]. To completely
secure ECC against DPA several countermeasures are proposed in the literature. They can
mainly be put in four categories.
• Adding a multiple of the order of the curve before performing the scalar multiplication.
• Using different key-expansion methods [77, 44, 50]
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• Randomize points representation [22, 50].
• Randomize the underlying curve [22, 50].
2.5.3 Second Order(DPA)
A Second order DPA was proposed by Okeya and Sakurai [73], is the side channel attack which
uses two different leaked data that correspond to two different intermediate values during the
execution. Okey and Sakurai’s attacks against Mo¨ller’s [69] window method finds out the use
of same elliptic points, and restricts candidates of the secret scalar value. To secure ECC a
gainst second order DPA, Hedabou et al.[38] suggested to change the randomization of each
pre-computed point after getting the point in the table.
2.5.4 RPA, ZPA and Geiselmann-Steinwandt’s attacks
The Refined Power Analysis(RPA) attack was proposed by Goubin [31]. He discovered that
for many elliptic curves, the previously mentioned DPA countermeasure of the scalar mul-
tiplication are not sufficient if an attacker can choose the point P to enter into the point
multiplication algorithm. Goubin uses special points, which are often exists in the standard
curves to deduce the bits of the secret key. He noted that randomizing points with zero
coordinate ((x, 0) or (0, y)) yields points that still possess a zero coordinate.
The Zero value Point Analysis (ZPA) attack was proposed by Akishita and Takagi [1]
as an extension of Goubin’s [31] attack. They noted that even if a point has no zero-value
coordinate, the auxiliary registers might take zero-value, when the adding and doubling
operations are performed by the scalar multiplication. They investigated that these zero-
value registers cannot be randomized in Jacobian coordinates or in the isomorphic class, and
some conditions required for the zero-value attack depend on the explicit implementation of
the addition formula. Also, they mentioned that in order to resist ZPA attacks, we have to
care how to implement the addition formula.
In [43] Itoh et al., proposed two countermeasures, the Randomized Linearly-transformed
Coordinates (RLC) and the Randomized Initial Point (RIP) against DPA including RPA and
ZPA. Then, Mamiay et al. [62] improved the efficiency. Later, Itoh et al. [101] improved RIP
in another direction. Generally RIP works as follow, make use of a random initial point R,
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computes dP +R, subtracts R, and gets dP . Therefore, by using a RIP at each execution of
exponentiation, any point or any register used in addition formulae changes at each execution.
In [28], Geiselmann and Steinwandt proposed attack which exploit the points with a zero
coordinate. Geiselmann and Steinwandt’s attacks breaks the SPA-resistant width-ω method,
and will be efficient against the fixed base comb method, since it uses a precomputated table,
even if the usual randomization techniques are used [39].
2.6 Countermeasures for Preventing Comb Method Against
SCA attacks
SPA attacks on a fixed base comb method such as proposed by Lim and Lee [59] , and Tsaur
and Chou [92] allow to detect some information on the bits of the secret scalar. All of this
methods perform an addition and doubling operation for a non zero column. Therefore, it is
expected that an attacker can determine the zero column by observing a suitable side channel
(e.g., the power consumption) during the execution of the algorithm.
In this section we present the countermeasures for preventing fixed base comb method
proposed by Hedabou et al. [38, 39] and Feng et al. [25, 16]. To simplify the comparison with
the original method of Lim and Lee[59], we rewrite the algorithm of Lim and Lee when the
scalar k =
∑l−1
i=0 ki2
i with ki ∈ {0, 1} is represented by a matrix of ω rows and d = d lω e
column. Also, when P being an elliptic curve point, for all (bω−1, .., b1, b0) ∈ Zω2 , we define
[bω−1, .., b1, b0]P = b0 + b12d + b222d + ...+ bω−12(ω−1)d.
Algorithm 13 from [38] illustrate Lim and Lee method.
2.6.1 HPB’S Comb Method
Hedabou et al. [38] proposed the first SCA resistant fixed-base comb method that is based
on the work of Lim and Lee [59]. Their main idea is to construct a new sequence of bits
representing the scalar k from its bit-string as introduced by Lim and Lee, so that all the
new bit strings are different from zero. For an odd scalar k, their method represent the scalar
k as in the original method of Lim and Lee as k = Kω−1||...||K1||K0, then, they initialized
s0 = 1, and generated a new sequence of bit strings (Ki, si) as
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Algorithm 13 Lim and Lee method
Require: A positive integer k = (kl−1, ..., k1, k0)2, an elliptic curve point P and a window
width ω such as ω ≥ 2 .
Ensure: kP
1: d = d lω e.
2: Precomputation: compute [bω−1, .., b1, b0]P for all (bω−1, .., b1, b0) ∈ Zω2 .
3: By padding k on the left with 0’s if necessary, write k = Kω−1||...||K1||K0,
where each Kj is a bit-string of length d. Let Kji denote the i-th bit of K
j .
4: Q = [Kω−1l−1 , ...,K
1
l−1,K
0
l−1]P .
5: For i from d− 2 to 0 do
6: Q = 2Q.
7: Q = Q+ [Kω−1i , ...,K
1
i ,K
0
i ]P .
8: Return Q.
(Ki, si) = (Ki−1, si−1)
(Ki−1, si−1) = (Ki−1,−si−1)
if Ki = 0 and
(Ki, si) = (Ki, si−1)
(Ki−1, si−1) = (Ki−1, si−1)
otherwise.
Since all the new sequence are different from 0, then, their algorithm perform addition
and doubling in each iteration.
In [39], Hedabou et al. proposed a second SPA resistant fixed base method. Their method
also assume an odd scalar k, and represent k as k =
∑l−1
i=0 ki2
i with ki ∈ {−1, 1} by exploiting
the facts 1 = 11¯1¯...1¯, where 1¯ = −1, and applies the original comb method to the new
representation. The new sequence generated by this method can be represented by Ki =
[bω−1, .., b1, b0], where bi ∈ {−1, 1}, 0 ≤ i < ω.
Hedabou et al. [38, 39] suggested to replace k´ = k+ 1 if the scalar k is even and subtract
P from the result. Also, they suggested to replace k by k´ = k + 2 when k is odd and to
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Table 2.6.1: Runtime complexity and storage cost of Hedabou et al. [38, 39] methods.
Method d Average cost Storage cost
Hedabou et al.[38] d lω e dA+ dD 2ω − 1
Hedabou et al.[39] d lω e dA+ dD 2ω−1
Table 2.6.2: Runtime complexity and storage cost of Feng et al. [25, 16] methods.
Method d Average cost Storage cost
Feng et al. [25] d l+1ω e dA+ dD 2ω−1
Feng et al. [16] d lω e dA+ (d− 1)D 2ω−1
subtract 2P from the result so as to make the algorithm regular. In Table 2.6.1, we give
average cost and storage cost for Hedabou et al. methods. Compared with the original comb
method, Hedabou et al. [39] stores about half of precomputed points, but the time cost in
the precomputation stage is a little higher(which in not a problem since precomputation is
performed once, because the base point is fixed in the comb methods).
2.6.2 Feng et al.’s Comb Method
In [25, 16] Feng et al. proposed a novel comb-recoding algorithm which converts an integer
to a sequence of signed odd-only comb bit-columns, then, they proposed several comb meth-
ods, both SPA-nonresistant and SPA-resistant, for point multiplication. Their methods [25]
(which can be referred to as signed LSB-set), generate a signed sequenceKi = ±[cω−1, .., c1, 1],
where ci ∈ {0, 1}, 0 ≤ i < ω. By adding dummy operations, they modified their method to
SPA resistant method.
Feng et al. [16] method which is known as signed MSB-set generates a signed sequence
Ki = ±[cω−1, .., c1, c0], where cω−1 ∈ {−1, 1} and ci ∈ {0, cω−1}, 0 ≤ i < ω−1. In Table 2.6.2
we give the average cost and storage cost for Feng et al. methods. Compared with the
original comb method, Feng et al. [25, 16] methods stores about half of precomputed points,
and the signed MSB-set is more efficient than the signed LSB-set if l is divisible by ω.
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2.7 Recent Advances
In [92] Tsaur and Chou proposed a new fixed-base comb method by using a Non-Adjacent
Form (NAF) representation for the scalar and applying the Sakai and Sakurai [81] method
for direct doubling. Tsaur and Chou [92] claimed that their method is more efficient than
Lim and Lee [59] method. However, in this thesis, in Chapter 3 we prove that Tsaur and
Chou method is not more efficient than Lim and Lee method. Moreover, we propose an
improvement of Tsaur and Chou method by using width-ω NAF representation. Our pro-
posed method provides a significant reduction in the number of required elliptic-curve point
addition operations. In practice, a speed improvement by 33 % to 38 % is achieved. Consid-
ering side channel attacks, our proposed method in Chapter 3 is not resistant to side channel
attacks.
Various countermeasures against side channel analysis attacks have been proposed in the
literature such as [22, 98, 99, 49, 58, 8, 74, 75, 24, 7, 45, 14, 27]. More countermeasures were
proposed by using recoding representation of the scalar. In [69], Mo¨ller proposed an SPA
resistant window method based on 2ω-ary window method where each digit that is equal
to zero is replaced with −2ω, and the next most significant digit is incremented by one.
In [76], Okey and Takagi proposed a SPA resistant scalar multiplication based on width-ω
NAF method. They generated a scalar sequence with fixed pattern. However, In [82], Sakai
and Sakura proposed methods of attacks on the exponent recoding for width-ω NAF [88] and
signed/unsigned fractional window representation [70]. They noted that to achieve a regular
exponentiation algorithm(or scalar multiplication algorithm) any recoding that is used also
needs to be regular.
Recently, in [48], Joye and Tunstall proposed methods of recoding exponent/scalar to
allow for regular implementations of m-ary algorithm. Their proposed method make use of
both signed and unsigned exponent/scalar digits. In this thesis, in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5
we propose two efficient regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithm
using fixed base comb method. In Chapter 4 we represents the scalar k in m = 2ω (where
ω > 1) radix representation using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent and divide the scalar
into v blocks. Whereas, in Chapter 5 we represents the scalar k in base 2 using Joye and
Tunstall [48] regular exponent recoding and the scalar is divided into ω× v blocks according
to the method of Lim and Lee.
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Improved Fixed-base Comb
Method
Computing elliptic-curve scalar multiplication is the most time consuming operation in any
elliptic-curve cryptosystem. In the last decades, it has been shown that pre-computations
of elliptic-curve points improve the performance of the scalar multiplication especially in
cases where the elliptic-curve point P is fixed. The first suggestion was made by Yao [97]
in 1976, and improved by Brickell, Gordon, McCurley, and Wilson (BGMW) [12]. Another
improvement was proposed by Lim and Lee [59] in 1994. They proposed a more flexible pre-
computation technique for speeding up the computation of exponentiation. Later in 2005,
Tsaur and Chou [92] proposed a new fixed-base comb method by using a Non-Adjacent Form
(NAF) representation for the scalar and applying the Sakai and Sakurai [81] method for direct
doubling. Tsaur and Chou claimed that their method is more efficient than Lim and Lee [59]
method.
In this chapter, we review Tsaur and Chou method and prove that Tsaur and Chou
method is not more efficient than Lim and Lee method. Moreover, we propose an improve-
ment of Tsaur and Chou method. Our proposed method makes use of a fixed-base comb
technique and represents the scalar k in a width-ω NAF representation. Furthermore, we
restrict the number of rows of the comb to be greater than or equal ω. As a result, our
proposed method provides a significant reduction in the number of required elliptic curve
point additions operations. In practice, a speed improvement by 33 % to 38 % is achieved.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1 we review Tsaur and
Chou method. In Section 3.2 we give a comparison of Lim-Lee and Tsaur-Chou methods
and we prove that Tsaur and Chou method is not more efficient than Lim and Lee method.
We introduce our proposed Improved Fixed-base Comb Method for Scalar Multiplication in
Section 3.3. Discussion and results of our method compared with Tsaur-Chou method are
presented in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5 we give a conclusion. Finally, in Example 1 in the
Appendix we give example to illustrate our method.
3.1 Tsaur and Chou Method
In 2005, Tsaur and Chou [92] proposed a fixed-base comb method as an enhancement of
Lim-Lee [59] by applying a NAF representation of the scalar k. Furthermore, they divided
the scalar k into h × v blocks from up-to-down and then from right-to-left. Moreover, they
used a special doubling operation proposed by Sakai and Sakurai [81] which increases the
performance in addition.
To introduce Tsaur and Chou method, let k be an l-bit scalar represented in NAF. First,
we divide k from up-to-down into a blocks of equal size h = d lae. Thus we can write k as
follows
k = ca−1ca−2...c1c0 =
a−1∑
z=0
cz2
zh, (3.1.1)
Then, from right to left we divide the h× a blocks into h× v blocks, each of size b = dav e.
Let P0 = P and Pj = 2
hbPj−1 = 2jhbP for 0 < j < v. Therefore we can rewrite kP as
follows
kP = ca−1ca−2...c1c0P =
a−1∑
z=0
cz2
zhP =
b−1∑
t=0
2th(
v−1∑
j=0
cjb+t2
jhbP ), (3.1.2)
where cjb+t = eh−1,jb+t...e1,jb+te0,jb+t is the NAF representation. Suppose that the fol-
lowing values are precomputed and stored for all 1 ≤ i ≤∑dh2 ei=1 2h−2i+1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ v − 1
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G[0][i] = eh−12h−1P + eh−22h−2P + ...+ e0P,
G[j][i] = 2hb(G[j − 1][i])
= 2jhbG[0][i],
where the index i is equal to the decimal value of eh−1...e1e0. Therefore, we can rewrite
kP as follow
kP =
b−1∑
t=0
2th(
v−1∑
j=0
G[j][Ij,t]), (3.1.3)
where Ij,t is the decimal number of eh−1,jb+t...e1,jb+te0,jb+t (0 ≤ t < b).
Algorithm 14 from [92] can be use to compute the Scalar multiplication kP .
We know that NAF is always sparse, hence in the worst case the probability of Ij,t being
zero is 1
2h
and Ij,t occurs a times, thus the number of elliptic-curve operations in the worst
case is
(1− 1
2h
)a+ b− 2. (3.1.4)
And the expected number of elliptic-curve operations required is
(1− (2
3
)h)a+ b− 2 (3.1.5)
on average.
3.2 Comparison between Lim-Lee and Tsaur-Chou Methods
In Table 3.2.1 we give a comparison between Lim-Lee and Tsaur-Chou methods in the average
cost, worst cost and number of pre-computation as given by Tsaur and Chou [92] .
Tsaur and Chou wrote their cost in term of number of elliptic curve point operations as
Lim and Lee, it seems that Tsaur and Chou consider direct doubling as doubling. However,
the elliptic curve operations of Lim-Lee method are additions and doublings, whereas in
Tsaur-Chou method are additions and direct doubling (computation of Q = 2hQ using Sakai
and Sakurai [81]). The cost of a doubling and direct doubling of Q = 2hQ are not equal(in
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Algorithm 14 Tsaur and Chou method for scalar multiplication
Require: Positive integers h, v, k = (kl−1, ..., k1, k0)NAF and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: Q = kP .
1: a = d lhe and b = dav e.
2: Compute G[0][i] and G[j][i] for all 1 ≤ i ≤∑dh2 ei=1 2h−2i+1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ v − 1.
3: Q = O.
4: For t = b− 1 downto 0 do
5: If h = 1 then
6: Q = 2Q.
7: Else
8: Use Algorithm 12 to compute Q = 2hQ.
9: For j = v − 1 downto 0 do
10: Ij,t = (eh−1,jb+t...e1,jb+te0,jb+t)NAF .
11: If Ij,t > 0 then
12: Q = Q+G[j][Ij,t].
13: Else if Ij,t < 0
14: ´Ij,t = −Ij,t.
15: Q = Q−G[j][ ´Ij,t].
16: Return (Q).
Table 3.2.1: Runtime complexity of Lim-Lee and Tsaur-Chou methods.
Method Worst cost Average cost Storage cost
Lim-Lee [59] a+ b− 2 (1− (12)h)a+ b− 2 (2h − 1)v
Tsaur-Chou [92] (1− (12)h)a+ b− 2 (1− (23)h)a+ b− 2
∑dh
2
e
i=1 2
h−2i+1v
both affine or projective coordinates), so the comparison can not be made in term of number
of elliptic curve operations, we must obtain the cost in term of elliptic curve operations
(addition, doubling and direct doubling).
The average cost of Lim-Lee [59] in term of point additions and doublings is given by
((1− (1
2
)h)a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D. (3.2.1)
Now, the average cost of Tasur-Chou [92] method in term of additions and direct doubling
is given by
((1− (2
3
)h)a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D∗ (3.2.2)
where D∗ is the cost of one direct doubling Q = 2hQ, which is more efficient than separate
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h doublings.
D∗ = (4h+ 1)S + (4h+ 1)M + 1I. (3.2.3)
To simplify the comparison let v = 1, so we have a = b. Now, the difference between Lim-Lee
and Tsaur-Chou methods in the average cost is given by
Difference of average(lim-Tasur) = ((
2
3
)h − (1
2
)h)aA+ (a− 1)(D −D∗) (3.2.4)
Now, substitute the costs A = 2M + 1S + 1I, D = 2M + 2S + 1I and D∗ = (4h + 1)S +
(4h+ 1)M + 1I, moreover assume M = S
Difference of average(lim-Tasur) = ((
2
3
)h − (1
2
)h)(3M + 1I)a+ (a− 1)((4M + 1I)− ((8h+ 2)M + 1I))
= ((
2
3
)h − (1
2
)h)(3M + 1I)a+ (a− 1)(2− 8h)M (3.2.5)
When h = 1, Tsaur-Chou method is identical to classical NAF method and Lim-Lee is
identical to the binary method, therefor Tsaur-Chou method is more efficient than Lim and
Lee method and the difference between the two methods is in the number of points addition
and is given by
Difference of average(lim-Tasur) = ((
2
3
)− (1
2
))(3M + 1I)a (3.2.6)
In Table 3.2.2 we give the difference between Lim-Lee and Tsaur-Chou methods in the
average cost for a 160-bit scalar multiplication. The difference is given for 2 ≤ h ≤ 16, and
for 1I = 100, 80, 70, 65, 60M .
By having a look at Table 3.2.2 we notice that when h = 2 the difference is negative when
I ≤ 65M . However, when h ≥ 3 the difference is negative for all values of I against M and
so we can conclude that Tsaur-Chou method is not more efficient than Lim-Lee method as
the authors claimed.
In our comparison when didn’t consider the storage required for pre-computation. It is
very clear from Table 3.2.1 the storage cost is reduced in Tsaur-Chou method. Therefore in
limited environment we must consider the storage cost in the comparison.
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Table 3.2.2: The difference between Lim-Lee and Tsaur-Chou methods in the average cost
for a 160-bit scalar multiplication.
h I=100M I=80M I=70M I=65M I=60M
2 496.2222222 185.1111111 29.55555556 -48.22222222 -126
3 -213.25 -398.25 -490.75 -537 -583.25
4 -613.6728395 -721.6975309 -775.7098765 -802.7160494 -829.7222222
5 -846.9588477 -911.2386831 -943.3786008 -959.4485597 -975.5185185
6 -995.3049769 -1034.274884 -1053.759838 -1063.502315 -1073.244792
7 -1067.855778 -1091.184753 -1102.849241 -1108.681484 -1114.513728
8 -1105.668884 -1119.713761 -1126.736199 -1130.247418 -1133.758638
9 -1145.394299 -1154.0556 -1158.386251 -1160.551576 -1162.716901
10 -1143.030534 -1148.267323 -1150.885718 -1152.194915 -1153.504113
11 -1186.892619 -1190.21444 -1191.875351 -1192.705807 -1193.536262
12 -1211.238057 -1213.327755 -1214.372603 -1214.895028 -1215.417452
13 -1217.283361 -1218.587563 -1219.239663 -1219.565714 -1219.891764
14 -1205.841537 -1206.649006 -1207.05274 -1207.254607 -1207.456474
15 -1177.447192 -1177.942883 -1178.190728 -1178.314651 -1178.438574
16 -1132.447605 -1132.749041 -1132.899759 -1132.975118 -1133.050477
3.3 Improved Fixed-base Comb Method
In this section we propose an enhancement of Tsaur-Chou [92] method. In our proposed
method, the scalar k is represented in NAFω. Furthermore, it is divided into ω × v blocks
from up-to-down and then from right-to-left as in the method of Tsaur-Chou. In order
to illustrate our method, let k be represented in NAFω with size l. First, we divide k into
a = d lω e blocks of equal size ω (we pad the last block with aω−l zeros if necessary), therefore,
we can write k as follows
k = Ka−1Ka−2...K1K0 =
a−1∑
d=0
Kd2
dω, (3.3.1)
where 0 ≤ d < a.
Then, each block Kd is a column of ω bits (K0 represents the first ω bits, K1 the second
ω bits, ... , and Ka−1 the last ω bits), i.e.
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k =
[
Ka−1...Kd...K0
]
=

ka−1,(a−1)ω · · · kd,dω · · · k0,0
...
...
...
ka−1,(a−1)ω+i · · · kd,dω+i · · · k0,i
...
...
...
ka−1,(a−1)ω+(ω−1) · · · kd,dω+(ω−1) · · · k0,ω−1

. (3.3.2)
Note that, for each element kd,dω+i in the matrix the first subscript d indicates the column,
whereas the second subscript dω+ i indicates the exact bit index from NAFω(k). To simplify
the notation in the following we write kd,dω+i as kd,i.
From right to left we divide the ω × a blocks into ω × v blocks, each of size b = dav e, i.e.
k =
[
Ka−1...Ka−b · · · Kjb+b−1...Kjb · · · Kb−1...K0
]
=

ka−1,0...ka−b,0 · · · kjb+b−1,0...kjb,0 · · · kb−1,0...k0,0
...
...
...
ka−1,i...ka−b,i · · · kjb+b−1,i...kjb,i · · · kb−1,i...k0,i
...
...
...
ka−1,ω−1...ka−b,ω−1 · · · kjb+b−1,ω−1...kjb,ω−1 · · · kb−1,ω−1...k0,ω−1

.
kP = Ka−1Ka−2...K1K0P =
v−1∑
j=0
b−1∑
t=0
(Kjb+t2
tω)2jbωP =
b−1∑
t=0
2tω
v−1∑
j=0
Kjb+t2
jbωP, (3.3.3)
where Kjb+t = kjb+t,ω−1...kjb+t,0 is width-ω NAF representation. The maximum value of
Kjb+t is (2
ω−1 − 1)2ω−1.
Suppose that the following values are pre-computed and stored for all s ∈ {1, 2, 22, 23, ..., 2ω−1}, 0 <
j ≤ v − 1 and d ∈ {1, 3, ..., 2w−1 − 1}
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Algorithm 15 Proposed width-ω NAF method for scalar multiplication
Require: Positive integers ω, v, k = (kl−1, ..., k1, k0)NAFω and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: Q = kP .
1: a = d lω e and b = dav e.
2: Compute G[0][sd] and G[j][sd] for all s ∈ {1, 2, 22, 23, ..., 2ω−1}, 0 < j ≤ v − 1 and
d ∈ {1, 3, 5, ..., 2w−1 − 1}.
3: Q = O.
4: For t = b− 1 downto 0 do
5: If ω = 1 then
6: Q = 2Q.
7: Else
8: Use Algorithm 12 to compute Q = 2ωQ.
9: For j = v − 1 downto 0 do
10: Ij,t = (kjb+t,ω−1...kjb+t,0)NAFω .
11: If Ij,t > 0 then
12: Q = Q+G[j][Ij,t].
13: Else if Ij,t < 0
14: Q = Q−G[j][−Ij,t].
15: Return (Q).
G[0][sd] = eω−12ω−1P + eω−22ω−2P + ...+ e0P = sdP,
G[j][sd] = 2ωb(G[j − 1][sd])
= 2jωbG[0][sd] = 2jωbsdP,
where the index sd is equal to the decimal value of (eω−1...e1e0). Therefore, we can
rewrite kP as follows
kP =
b−1∑
t=0
2tω(
v−1∑
j=0
G[j][Ij,t]) (3.3.4)
where Ij,t is the decimal value of kjb+t,ω−1...kjb+t,0. Algorithm 15 can be used to compute
kP using the proposed method.
From [72], we know that the average density of non-zero digits among all width-ω NAF
of length l is approximately 1/(ω + 1), therefore, we can assume that the probability of Ij,t
being zero on average is (ω/(ω + 1))ω, hence the average cost of our proposed method is
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Table 3.4.1: Runtime complexity of Tsaur-Chou, and our proposed method.
Method Worst cost Average cost Storage cost
Tsaur-Chou [92] (1− (12)h)a+ b− 2 (1− (23)h)a+ b− 2
∑dh
2
e
i=1 2
h−2i+1v
Proposed (1− (ω−1ω )ω)a+ b− 2 (1− ( ωω+1)ω)a+ b− 2 ω2ω−2v
(1− ( ω
ω + 1
)ω)a+ b− 2. (3.3.5)
On the other hand, the density of non-zero digits among all width-ω NAF of length l in
the worst case is 1/ω, therefore, we can assume that the probability of Ij,t being zero is at
most ((ω − 1)/ω)ω, hence the cost of our proposed method in the worst case is
(1− (ω − 1
ω
)ω)a+ b− 2. (3.3.6)
3.4 Discussion and Results
In Table 3.4.1, we give a runtime-complexity comparison of Tsaur-Chou, and our proposed
method. We compare the runtime in terms of worst-runtime cost, average-runtime cost, and
memory-storage cost. By having a look at the table, one can notice that when h = ω = 2, our
proposed method and Tsaur-Chou method are identical. When h = ω = 3, the worst cost
of our proposed method is equal to the average cost of Tsaur-Chou method. Furthermore,
when h = ω > 3, the worst cost of our proposed method is less than the average cost of
Tsaur-Chou method. For fixed values of h and v, the term b − 2 is fixed for both methods
for fixed key-bit size of the scalar in average cost and worst cost.
In Table 3.4.2 and Figure 3.4.1, we analyze the number of non-zero columns for Tsaur-
Chou, and our proposed method. Values are given for different block sizes h and a 160-bit
scalar multiplication. For our method and in order to simplify the comparison, we have
chosen h = ω. It shows that our method performs best in both the average-cost and the
worst-cost scenario. In particular, by evaluating the performance for all possible block sizes
2 ≤ h ≤ 15, we obtain an improvement by 33 % to 38 % (for the worst and average case).
For a fixed value of h, we noticed that the number of pre-computations (storage cost) is
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increased in our proposed method. In devices with limited resources (memory), in most cases
we found a suitable choice of h, the window size ω and v, which makes our method best. In
order to illustrate this, we assume that the scalar has a bit size of 160 bits. First, we will fix
the window size ω to be equal h and then, depending on the available memory, we choose
h and v. For example, if storage is available for 5 elements and if we apply the Tsaur-Chou
method, we have two choices: (1) h = 2 and v = 2 (the cost1 is 84), or (2) h = 3 and v = 1
(the cost is 90). Now, using our proposed method, we have only one choice, i.e. h = 2 and
v = 2 (the cost is 84). This coincides with what we previously noted.
If storage is available for 18 elements and if we use the Tsaur-Chou method, one can
choose between three choices: (1) h = 2 and v = 9 (the cost is 52), (2) h = 3 and v = 3 (the
cost is 49), or (3) h = 4 and v = 1 (the cost is 72). For our proposed method, there are only
two choices, i.e. (1) h = 2 and v = 9 (the cost is 52) or (2) h = 3 and v = 3 (the cost is 48).
Thus, we will choose h = 3 and v = 3 which has a minimum cost of 48. In Table 3.4.3, we
give the suitable choices of h and v when the available storage vary from 2 to 50 elements.
1The cost is measured in terms of number of elliptic-curve point addition operation.
Table 3.4.2: Number of non-zero columns for different block sizes h of Tsaur-Chou, and our
proposed method for a 160-bit scalar multiplication.
h Tsaur-Chou Tsaur-Chou Proposed Proposed
worst average worst average
2 61 45 61 45
3 48 38 38 32
4 39 33 29 25
5 32 29 23 20
6 27 25 18 17
7 23 22 16 14
8 21 21 14 13
9 18 18 12 12
10 17 17 12 11
11 15 15 10 10
12 14 14 10 9
13 13 13 9 9
14 12 12 8 8
15 11 11 8 7
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Figure 3.4.1: Comparison of Tsaur-Chou [92], and our proposed method for a 160-bit scalar
multiplication.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proved that Tsaur-Chou [92] method is not more efficient than Lim-
Lee method, moreover we have proposed an improvement of Tsaur and Chou method. By
comparing our method with previous work, it shows that when h = ω = 2 our proposed
method and Tsaur-Chou method are identical, when h = ω = 3 the worst cost of our
proposed method is equal to the average cost of Tsaur-Chou method, and when h = ω > 3
the worst cost of our proposed method is less than the average cost of Tsaur-Chou method.
Our proposed method made a significant reduction in the number of required elliptic curve
point addition operations. In practice, a speed improvement by 33 % to 38 % is achieved.
For pre-computations, if storage space is disregarded, our proposed method is the best
choice and we can define h ≥ ω, otherwise ω = h. There is always a suitable choice for h and
v which make our method best. In Table 3.4.3, we gave the suitable choices of h and v when
the available storage vary from 2 to 50 elements.
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Table 3.4.3: Runtime complexity of Tsaur-Chou and our proposed method for different
available storage elements (2-50) and suitable choices of h and v for 160-bit key size.
Available Tsaur-Chou Proposed
storage method method
elements h v costs AUSa h v costs AUSa
2-3 2 1 124 2 2 1 124 2
4-5 2 2 84 4 2 2 84 4
6-7 2 3 70 6 2 3 70 6
8-9 2 4 64 8 2 4 64 8
10-11 2 5 60 10 2 5 60 10
12-13 2 6 57 12 2 6 57 12
3 2 57 12
14 2 7 55 14 2 7 55 14
15 3 3 54 15 2 7 55 14
16-17 2 8 54 16 2 8 54 16
18-19 2 9 52 18 3 3 48 18
20-23 3 4 50 20 3 3 48 18
24 3 4 50 20 3 4 44 24
25-29 3 5 47 25 3 4 44 24
30-34 3 6 45 30 3 5 41 30
35 3 7 44 35 3 5 41 30
36-39 3 7 44 35 3 6 39 36
40-41 4 4 42 40 3 6 39 36
42-47 4 4 42 40 3 7 38 42
45 3 9 42 45
48-49 4 4 42 40 3 8 37 48
50 4 5 40 50 3 8 37 48
aThe term AUS is referred to the number of elements actually used to store.
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Chapter 4
Regular SPA resistant Fixed-base
Comb Method
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks allow an adversary to reveal the secret key in a cryp-
tographic device by observing side-channel information such as the computing time or the
power consumption. In elliptic-curve cryptography, a particular target of an SPA attack is
the secret scalar k used within the scalar-multiplication algorithm. In this chapter we pro-
pose a regular SPA resistant fixed-base comb method. In our proposed method the scalar is
represented using Joye and Tunstall [48] regular exponent recoding method, then is divided
into v blocks. The proposed algorithm has a constant run time which ensures the resistance
against timing attacks. Moreover, the proposed method does not make use of any dummy
operations which provides additional resistance against safe-error fault attacks.
4.1 Introduction
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks are a kind of side-channel attacks and are amongst
the most powerful attacks on elliptic curve cryptography based implementations. An attack
can target the scalar multiplication to extract the secret scalar bit-by-bit by exploiting the
run time of the algorithm or specific power-consumption patterns that are caused by the
implementation. A common way to implement the scalar multiplication is the fixed-base
comb method, which is typically used in applications where the base point is fixed.
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SPA attacks on a fixed base comb method such as proposed by Lim and Lee [59] ,Tsaur
and Chou [92] and our proposed method(MHH) in [67] allow to detect some information on the
bits of the secret scalar. All of this methods perform an addition and doubling operation for
a non zero column. Therefore, it is expected that an attacker can determine the zero column
by observing a suitable side channel (e.g., the power consumption) during the execution of
the algorithm.
Various countermeasures against side-channel analysis attacks have been proposed in the
literature such as [22, 98, 99, 49, 58, 8, 74, 75, 24, 7, 45, 14, 27]. Hedabou et al. [38] proposed
the first SCA resistant fixed-base comb method that is based on the work of Lim and Lee [59].
Then, more SCA resistant fixed-base comb methods were proposed such as Hedabou et al. [39]
and Feng et al. [25, 16] methods.
More countermeasures have been proposed by using recoding representations of the scalar.
In [69], Mo¨ller proposed an SPA-resistant window method based on the 2ω-ary window
method, where each digit that is equal to zero is replaced with −2ω, and the next most
significant digit is incremented by one. Also in [76], Okeya and Takagi proposed a SCA re-
sistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication based on width-ω NAF method. However, in [82],
Sakai and Sakura pointed that the known side channel attacks and countermeasures for
public key cryptosystems were against the main stage of the modular exponentiation (or
the point multiplication on an elliptic curve). They proposed methods of attacks on the
exponent(scalar) recoding for width-ω NAF [88] and signed/unsigned fractional window rep-
resentation [70]. They noted that to achieve a regular exponentiation algorithm(or scalar
multiplication algorithm) any recoding that is used also needs to be regular.
In order to resist a SCA attacks in a point multiplication algorithm, the algorithm must
be regular and the recoding algorithm also must be regular. A regular algorithm execute
the same instructions in the same order for any input value. In this chapter, we propose
a regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithm using fixed base comb
method. Our method makes use of a fixed-base comb technique and represents the scalar k
in m = 2ω radix representation using Joye and Tunstall [48] regular recoding method, then
the multiplier is divided into v blocks. The proposed method has a constant run time which
ensure the resistance against timing attacks, moreover, the proposed method dose not make
use of any dummy operation. Therefore, it is resistant to safe-error fault attacks.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we review some of scalar
recoding methods. In Section 4.3, we review Joye and Tunstall [48] regular exponent recoding
method. We propose a SPA resistant fixed-base comb method in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5,
we convert our proposed method in section 4.4 to a regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar
multiplication algorithm. In Section 4.6, we compare our method with related methods.
Conclusions are drawn in Section 4.7. Finally, in Example 2 in the appendix we give an
example to illustrate our method.
4.2 Scalar Recoding Methods
Various countermeasures against side channel analysis attack have been proposed in the
literature, we described some of them in Chapter 2. More countermeasures were proposed by
using recoding representation of the scalar. In this section we review some of exponent/scalar
recoding algorithm found in the literature.
In [69], Mo¨ller proposed an SPA resistant window method based on 2ω-ary window method,
where each digit that is equal to zero is replaced with −2ω, and the next most significant digit
is incremented by one. For an integer k =
∑a−1
i=0 di2
iω with di ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2ω − 1}, Mo¨ller’s
method converts the representation of the scalar k to
k =
a´−1∑
i=0
d´i2
iω with d´i ∈ B = {−2ω,±1,±2, ...,±(2ω − 1)}.
where a´ = a or a+ 1.
The recoding algorithm is expressed recursively with two auxiliary values ci and ti, 0 ≤
ci ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ ti ≤ 2ω + 1. Set c0 = 0, and for 0 ≤ i ≤ a+ 1 let
ti = di + ci
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Algorithm 16 2ω-ary method using Mo¨ller’s recoding method
Require: Window width-ω, nonnegative integer k and P ∈ E(Fq)
Ensure: kP
1: Compute k = (d´a´−1, ..., d´1, d´0)2ω using Mo¨ller’s recoding method.
2: Compute Pi = iP for all i ∈ {−2ω, 1, 2, ..., 2ω−1 − 1, 2ω−1}.
3: Q = O.
4: For i = a´− 1 to 0 do .
5: Q = 2ωQ.
6: d´ = |d´i|
7: If d´i > 0 then Q = Q+ Pd´
8: else Q = Q− Pd´.
9: Return Q.
and
(ci+1, d´i) = {
(1,−2ω) if ti = 0
(0, ti) if 0 < ti ≤ 2ω−1
(1,−2ω + ti) if 2ω−1 < ti < 2ω
(2,−2ω) if ti = 2ω
(1, 1) if ti = 2
ω + 1
Note that the equation ci+1.2
ω + d´i = ti.
Algorithm 16 can be used to compute kP using Mo¨ller’s recoding method [69].
The cost of Algorithm 16 is
(a− 1)A+ ω(a− 1)D if a´ = a
or
aA+ ωaD if a´ = a+ 1.
and the number of pre-computation is 2ω−1 + 1.
In [76], Okeya and Takagi proposed a SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication
based on width-ω NAF method. They generated a scalar sequence with fixed pattern. Their
recoding representation make use of an odd digits B = {±1,±3, ...,±2ω − 1} and it assume
an odd scalar . For an odd scalar k, Okeya and Takagi’s method convert the representation
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Algorithm 17 SPA Resistant Odd Only m−ary Recoding Algorithm for Odd Scalar
Require: An odd n-bit integer k =
∑a−1
i=0 di2
iω with di ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2ω − 1} and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: k =
∑a−1
i=0 d´i2
iω with d´i ∈ B = {±1,±3, ...,±(2ω − 1)}.
1: For i = 0 to a− 1 do
2: if di is odd then d´i = di.
3: if di is even then d´i = di + 1 and d´i−1 = d´i−1 − 2ω.
4: Return (d´a−1, ...d´1, d´0)2ω .
of the scalar k =
∑a−1
i=0 di2
iω with di ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2ω − 1} to
k =
a−1∑
i=0
d´i2
iω with d´i ∈ B = {±1,±3, ...,±(2ω − 1)}.
The recoding works in right to left and it consist, at step i, substitute d´i = di + 1 and
d´i−1 = d´i−1 − 2ω whenever di is even. Since by assumption d0 is odd and the recoding work
from the least to most significant digits, d´i−1 is always odd and greater than zero at step i.
Therefore, if at step i, di is even then the updated value of d´i−1 = d´i−1 − 2ω ∈ B.
Okeya and Takagi’s recoding method is equivalent to the recoding method developed
independently by Feng et al. [25]. Feng et al. method is explained in Algorithm 17.
In [82], Sakai and Sakura proposed methods of attacks on the exponent recoding for width-
ω NAF [88] and signed/unsigned fractional window representation [70]. They noted that to
achieve a regular exponentiation algorithm(or scalar multiplication algorithm) any recoding
that is used also needs to be regular.
In [48], Joye and Tunstall proposed methods of recoding exponent/scalar to allow for
regular implementations of m-ary algorithm. Their proposed method make use of both
signed and unsigned exponent/scalar digits.
4.3 Joye and Tunstall Singed Digit Recoding Method
As presented in [48], the recoding method of Joye and Tunstall assumes an odd integer, which
is not a loss of generality as an even scalar k can be replaced by k + r where r is the group
order (which is usually a prime). Joye and Tunstall recoding method takes some scalar k
and computes its m = 2ω radix representation (dl−1, ..., d1, d0)m with digits that takes odd
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Algorithm 18 Joye and Tunstall (Odd) Signed-Digit Recoding Algorithm
Require: Odd positive integer k and a positive integer ω.
Ensure: k = (da−1, ..., d1, d0)2ω with di ∈ {±1,±3, ...,±(2ω − 1)} and di odd.
1: i = 0.
2: While (k > 2ω) do
3: di = (k mod 2
ω+1)− 2ω.
4: k = (k − di)/2ω.
5: i = i+ 1.
6: Return (da−1, ..., d1, d0)2ω .
values in {−(m− 1), ...,−1, 1, ...,m− 1},
k =
l−1∑
i=0
dim
i with di ∈ B = {±1,±3, ...,±(m− 1)} and di odd.
The recoding method rely on the observation that any odd integer in the range [0, 2m) can
be written as
1 = m+ (−(m− 1))
3 = m+ (−(m− 3))
...
m− 1 = m+ (−1)
m+ 1 = m+ (1)
...
2m− 3 = m+ (m− 3)
2m− 1 = m+ (m− 1)
The algorithm is given in Algorithm 18. Algorithm 19 shows the scalar multiplication to
compute kP for an odd positive integer k. The cost of Algorithm 19 is
(a− 1)A+ (a− 1)ωD.
and the number of required pre-computations is 2ω−1.
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Algorithm 19 Left-to-right 2ω-ary method using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent-
recoding method.
Require: Odd positive integer k, window width ω and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: kP .
1: Compute k = (da−1, ..., d1, d0)2ω using Algorithm 18.
2: Compute Pi = iP for all i ∈ {1, 3, ..., 2ω − 1}.
3: Q = O.
4: For i = a− 1 to 0 do
5: Q = 2ωQ.
6: d = |di|.
7: If di > 0 then Q = Q+ Pd
8: else Q = Q− Pd.
9: Return Q.
4.4 SPA Resistant Fixed-base Comb Method
In this section we propose an SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithm using
fixed base comb method by using regular scalar representation. A regular representation of
the scalar k is obtained by using signed digit recoding method of Joye and Tunsall’s [48]
described in Algorithm 18.
k = (da−1...di...d0)2ω =
a−1∑
i=0
di2
iω with di ∈ B = {±1,±3, ...,±(m− 1)} and di odd.
Since Joye and Tunsall regular signed digit representation of the scalar k is in base 2ω,
we can treat any digit di for all 0 ≤ i ≤ a − 1 as a column of ω bits. Only the first bit is
non zero and hold the value of di. In this case we can assume that the multiplier is already
is divided into ω × a blocks. We can rewrite the blocks of k in terms of a matrix, i.e.,
k =

da−1 · · · di · · · d0
...
...
...
0 · · · 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
0 · · · 0 · · · 0

. (4.4.1)
Then, as in the method Tasur and Chou [92] from right-to-left we divide the ω× a blocks
into ω × v blocks each of size b. Variables b and v are chosen such that a = b ∗ v(so as to
a void any padding, since padding with zeros will result in a zero column which destroy the
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regularity of the algorithm) i.e.
k =

da−1...da−b · · · djb+b−1...djb · · · db−1...d0
...
...
...
0 · · · 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
0 · · · 0 · · · 0

. (4.4.2)
kP = Dv−1Dv−2...D1D0P =
v−1∑
j=0
Dj2
jωbP
where
Dj = (djb+b−1...djb)2ω =
b−1∑
t=0
djb+t2
tω
Let P0 = P and Pj = 2
ωbPj−1 = 2jωbP for 0 < j < v. Therefore, we can rewrite kP as
follows
kP = Dv−1Dv−2...D1D0P =
v−1∑
j=0
Dj2
jωbP =
b−1∑
t=0
2tω(
v−1∑
j=0
djb+t2
jωbP ) =
b−1∑
t=0
2tω(
v−1∑
j=0
djb+tPj),
(4.4.3)
The maximum value of djb+t is (2
ω − 1). Suppose that the following values are pre-
computed and stored for all 1 ≤ s ≤ 2ω − 1 and 0 < j ≤ v − 1 :
G[0][s] = sP,
G[j][s] = 2ωb(G[j − 1][s])
= 2jωbG[0][s],
Therefore, we can rewrite kP as follows
kP =
b−1∑
t=0
2tω(
v−1∑
j=0
G[j][djb+t]) (4.4.4)
Algorithm 20 can be used to compute kP using the proposed method.
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Algorithm 20 SPA resistant fixed-base comb method.
Require: Odd positive integer k, window width ω and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: Q = kP .
1: Compute 2ω-digit regular representation k =
∑a−1
i=0 di2
iω with di ∈ B =
{±1,±3, ...,±(2ω − 1)} and di odd using Algorithm 18.
2: Choose two positive integers b and v such that a = bv.
3: Compute G[0][s] and G[j][s] for all s ∈ {1, 3, 5, ..., 2ω − 1} and 0 < j ≤ v − 1.
4: Q = O.
5: For t = b− 1 downto 0 do
6: Q = 2ωQ.
7: For j = v − 1 downto 0 do
8: d = |djb+t|.
9: If djb+t > 0 then Q = Q+G[j][d]
10: Else Q = Q−G[j][d].
11: Return (Q).
The cost of Algorithm 20 is
(a− 1)A+ (b− 1)ωD.
and the number of pre-computation is 2ω−1v.
4.5 Regular SPA Resistant Fixed-base Comb Method
Algorithm 20 is constrained for odd positive integers and also it is not fully regular because
it uses an if condition. In fact, such conditions allow safe-error attacks to be performed to
reveal bits of the secret key. In this section, we generalize it to any positive integer and
rewrite it in a regular way.
Hedabou et al. [39] suggested to replace k´ = k + 1 if the scalar k is even and subtract P
from the result. Also, they suggested to replace k by k´ = k+2 when k is odd and to subtract
2P from the result so as to make the algorithm regular. Notice that bit length of k´ will be
greater than or equal to bit length of k. To avoid the growth of k´ bit length, we prefer to
replace k by k´ = k − 1 if k is even and by k´ = k − 2 otherwise, and to add P or 2P to the
result. Because k is a large integer, k´ = k − 1 or k − 2 is greater than zero.
In order to avoid the conditional statement in the loop iteration of Algorithm 20, as
suggested in [79], we can replace Lines 9 and Lines 10 in Algorithm 20 by
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si = sign(djb+t)
G[j][d] = (−1)si⊕sn[j][d]G[j][d]
sn[j][d] = si
Q = Q+G[j][d].
Where sign(x) = 1 if x < 0 and 0 otherwise, and sn[j][d] is a binary variable to keep track
of the current sign of G[j][d] for every d ∈ {1, 3, 5, ..., 2ω − 1} and 0 < j ≤ v − 1, sn[j][d] are
initialize to zeros.
Also, as suggested in [79] we can implement P = (−1)bP , where b ∈ {0, 1} in a regular
form without using any dummy operation with a cost of 3 field additions.
R0 = Y
R1 = −Y
Y = Rb +R1−b −R1⊕b
Algorithm 21 is a regular version of algorithm 20 that can be used to compute kP using the
proposed method.
The cost of Algorithm 21 is
a´A+ ((b− 1)ω + 1)D (4.5.1)
In the same way we rewrite Algorithm 19 in a regular way as explained in Algorithm 22.
The cost of Algorithm 22 is
a´A+ ((a´− 1)ω + 1)D (4.5.2)
In order to prevent DPA attacks, we further make use of randomization techniques as
proposed by Coron [22]. Further note, since we are using a pre-computed table, Okeya and
Sakurai’s second-order DPA attack [73] can be applicable to our method. To prevent our
proposed method against this attack, we change the randomization of each pre-computed
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Algorithm 21 Regular SPA resistant fixed-base comb method.
Require: Positive integer k, window width ω and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: Q = kP .
1: r = k(mod2).
2: k´ = k − 2r
3: Compute 2ω-digit regular representation k´ =
∑a´−1
i=0 di2
iω with di ∈ B =
{±1,±3, ...,±(2ω − 1)} and di odd using Algorithm 18.
4: Choose two positive integers b and v such that a´ = bv.
5: Compute G[0][s] and G[j][s] for all s ∈ {1, 3, 5, ..., 2ω − 1} and 0 < j ≤ v − 1.
6: Q = O.
7: For t = b− 1 downto 0 do
8: Q = 2ωQ.
9: For j = v − 1 downto 0 do
10: d = |djb+t|.
11: si = sign(djb+t)
12: G[j][d] = (−1)si⊕sn[j][d]G[j][d].
13: sn[j][d] = si.
14: Q = Q+G[j][d].
15: Compute G[0][2].
16: Q=Q+G[0][r+1]
17: Return (Q).
point after getting the point in the table as suggested by Hedabou et al.[38]. Moreover, by
using randomized linearly transformed coordinate as proposed by Itoh el al. [43] and suggested
for fixed-base comb method by Hedabou et al. [39], our proposed method is resistance to RPA,
ZPA and Geiselmann-Steinwandt’s attacks.
4.6 Comparison with Related Work
In this section we compare our proposed method with related methods. In Table 4.6.1 we
give a comparison between Mo¨ller, Okeya-Takagi, left-to-right 2ωary method using Joye and
Tunstall regular recoding and our proposed regular fixed-base comb methods. We compare
the average-runtime cost, memory-storage cost, resistant to SPA and regularity of the algo-
rithm. By having a look at the table, When v = 1, Okeya-Takagi, left-to-right 2ωary using
Joye and Tunstall regular recoding and our proposed regular fixed-base comb methods are
identical in the average cost and storage cost. On the other hand, when v > 1 our proposed
fixed-base comb method is more efficient than the other methods. Left-to-right 2ωary using
Joye and Tunstall regular recoding and our proposed regular fixed-base comb methods are
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Algorithm 22 Regular left-to-right 2ω-ary method using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent
recoding method
Require: Positive integer k, window width ω and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: kP
1: r = k(mod2).
2: k´ = k − 2r
3: Compute k = (dl−1, ..., d1, d0)2ω using Algorithm 18.
4: Compute Pi = iP for all i ∈ {1, 3, ..., 2ω − 1}.
5: Q = O.
6: For i = l − 1 to 0 do .
7: Q = 2ωQ.
8: d = |di|
9: si = sign(di).
10: Pd = (−1)si⊕sn[d].
11: sn[d] = si.
12: Q = Q+ Pd.
13: Compute P2 = 2P
14: Q = Q+ P1+r
15: Return Q.
regular. Although we notice that the number of pre-computations (storage cost) is increased
in our proposed regular fixed-base comb method, in devices with limited resources (memory),
in most cases we found a suitable choice of the window size ω and v, which makes our method
best. In order to illustrate this, we assume that the scalar has a bit size of 160 bits. For
example, if storage is available for 4 elements and if we apply the left-to-right 2ωary method
using Joye and Tunstall regular recoding method we will choose ω = 3 with cost 54A+160D.
Now, using our proposed method we choose ω = 2 and v = 2 with cost 80A+ 79D.
If storage is available for 12 elements and if we apply the left-to-right 2ωary method using
Joye and Tunstall regular recoding method we will choose ω = 4 with cost 40A+157D. Now,
using our proposed method we choose ω = 3 and v = 3 with cost 54A+52D. Also we noticed
that when using our proposed method depending on the available memory it is better to use
small value of ω and bigger value of v, a counter example is when the storage available for
12 elements, with our method when ω = 4 and v = 1 the cost is 40A+ 157D, and when we
choose ω = 3 and v = 3 the cost 54A+ 52D. Also, in left-to-right 2ωary method using Joye
and Tunstall regular recoding method we notice that memory may be wasted if the available
memory is not a power of 2.
In Table 4.6.2 we give a comparison of Lim-Lee [59], Tsaur-Chou [92], our method MHH [67],
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Table 4.6.1: Runtime complexity and storage cost of Mo¨ller, Okeya-Takagi, left-to-right 2ωary
method using Joye and Tunstall regular recoding and our proposed methods .
Method Average cost Storage cost Resistant to Regular
SPA
Mo¨ller [69] (a− 1)A+ (a− 1)ωD 2ω−1 + 1 Yes No
Okeya-Takagi [76] aA+ ((a− 1)ω + 1)D 2ω−1 Yes No
L-to-R 2ω-ary Joye aA+ ((a− 1)ω + 1)D 2ω−1 Yes Yes
and Tunstall [48]
Proposed aA+ ((b− 1)ω + 1)D 2ω−1v Yes Yes
Replacing a by a+ 1 for Mo¨ller method if the case a´ = a+ 1 occurs.
and a by a− 1 for our proposed and left-to-right methods if the case a´ = a− 1 occurs.
Hedabou et al. [38, 39], Feng et al. [25, 16], and our proposed regular SPA fixed-base comb
methods. We compare the average-runtime cost, memory-storage cost, and resistant to SPA.
By having a look at the table, we noticed that Lim-Lee, Tsaur-Chou and our MHH methods
were not SPA resistant. For fixed values of ω the cost of Hedabou et al. [38, 39], Feng et
al. [25, 16], is less than the cost of our proposed method. However, we noticed that even
there is no enough memory it is better to choose small value of ω and bigger value of v, and
when v > ω the cost of our proposed method is less than that of all other method.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed an efficient regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar
multiplication algorithm using fixed base comb method. In our proposed method the scalar
is represented using Joye and Tunstall’s regular exponent recoding method. Our proposed
method is resistant against SPA, timing, and safe-error fault attacks. Moreover, by using
randomization techniques and changing the randomization of each pre-computed point after
getting the point in the table our proposed method is even resistant to DPA and second-order
DPA attacks.
In Table 4.6.1 and Table 4.6.2, we gave a comparison between Mo¨ller, Okeya-Takagi, left-
to-right 2ωary method using Joye and Tunstall regular recoding, Lim-Lee, Tsaur-Chou, MHH,
Hedabou et al., Feng et al. and our proposed regular fixed-base comb methods. From the
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Table 4.6.2: Runtime complexity and storage cost of Lim-Lee, Tsaur-Chou, MHH, Hedabou
et al., Feng et al. and our proposed methods .
Method Average cost Storage cost Resistant to
SPA
Lim-Lee [59] ((1− (12)ω)a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D (2ω − 1)v No
Tsaur-Chou [92] ((1− (23)ω)a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D∗
∑dω
2
e
i=1 2
ω−2i+1v No
our method MHH [67] ((1− ( ωω+1)ω)a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D∗ ω2ω−2v No
Hedabou et al.[38] aA+ aD 2ω − 1 Yes
Hedabou et al.[39] aA+ aD 2ω−1 Yes
Feng et al. [25] aA+ aD 2ω−1 Yes
Feng et al. [16] aA+ (a− 1)D 2ω−1
Proposed aA+ ((b− 1)ω + 1)D 2ω−1v Yes
Replacing a by a− 1 for our proposed method if the case a´ = a− 1 occurs.
D∗ is the cost of 2hQ using Sakai and Sakurai [81] direct doubling method.
tables we conclude that left-to-right 2ωary method using Joye and Tunstall regular recoding
and our proposed method are the only regular methods. When v = 1, Okeya-Takagi, left-to-
right 2ωary method using Joye and Tunstall’s regular recoding and our proposed regular fixed-
base comb methods are identical. However, when v > 1 our proposed fixed-base comb method
is more efficient than Okeya-Takagi, left-to-right 2ωary method using Joye and Tunstall’s
regular recoding. For fixed values of ω the cost of Hedabou et al., Feng et al., is less than
the cost of our proposed method. However, we noticed that even there is no enough memory
it is better to choose small value of ω and bigger value of v, and when v > ω the cost of our
proposed method is less than that of all other method.
For pre-computations, if storage space is disregarded, our proposed method is the best
choice. However, in devices with limited storage there is always a suitable choice for ω and
v which make our method best.
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Chapter 5
Improved Regular SPA resistant
Fixed-base Comb Method
In this chapter, we propose a more efficient regular SPA resistant elliptic-curve scalar mul-
tiplication algorithm using the fixed-base comb method. Our method represents the scalar
k in base 2 using Joye and Tunstall [48] regular exponent-recoding. The scalar k is divided
into ω × v blocks according to the method of Lim and Lee[59]. The proposed algorithm has
a constant run time which ensures the resistance against timing attacks. In addition to that,
the proposed method does not make use of any dummy operations and is therefore resistant
to safe-error fault attacks. Moreover, by using randomization techniques [22], change the
randomization of each pre-computed point after getting the point in the table[38]. , and us-
ing randomized linearly transformed coordinate our proposed method is resistance to DPA,
second order DPA, RPA, ZPA and Geiselmann-Steinwandt’s attacks. Compared to related
work, our method provides best performance.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we propose our improved
SPA-resistant elliptic-curve scalar multiplication algorithm using the fixed-base comb tech-
nique. In Section 5.2, we convert our proposed method in Section 5.1 to improved regular
SPA-resistant elliptic-curve scalar multiplication algorithm. In Section 5.3, we compare our
proposed method with related work. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.4. Finally, in the
appendix we give an example to illustrate our method.
55
CHAPTER 5. IMPROVED REGULAR SPA RESISTANT FIXED-BASE COMB
METHOD
5.1 Improved SPA-Resistant Fixed-base Comb Method
In this section, we propose improved SPA-resistant elliptic-curve scalar multiplication al-
gorithm using fixed-base comb method. For this, we make use of the exponent-recoding
technique of Joye and Tunstall [48] and represent the scalar in base 2. Furthermore, we di-
vide the scalar into ω × v blocks from right-to-left and then from up-to-down according to
the proposal of Lim and Lee [59]. To illustrate our method, let k be represented in base 2
with size l, i.e.,
k =
l−1∑
i=0
ki2
i with ki ∈ {−1, 1}.
We divide the scalar k into ω blocks Ki from right-to-left, for 0 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, of equal size
a = lω (ω is chosen such that l = aω to a void any padding with zero, although padding with
zero will just add zeros in the last row, and the value of the column will still be non zero).
Then, subdivide each block Ki from up-to-down into v subblocks ki,j of equal size b, where
0 ≤ j ≤ v − 1. b is chosen such that a = bv to avoid any padding with zero column. We can
rewrite the ω blocks of k in terms of a matrix, i.e.,
k =

K0
...
Ki
...
Kω−1

=

k0,v−1 · · · k0,j · · · k0,0
...
...
...
ki,v−1 · · · ki,j · · · ki,0
...
...
...
kω−1,v−1 · · · kω−1,j · · · kω−1,0

=
v−1∑
j=0
ω−1∑
i=0
ki,j2
jb2ia. (5.1.1)
Let P0 = P and Pi = 2
aPi−1 = 2iaP for 0 < i < ω. Then, we can rewrite kP as
kP =
v−1∑
j=0
ω−1∑
i=0
ki,j2
jb2iaP =
v−1∑
j=0
ω−1∑
i=0
ki,j2
jbPi.
Since Ki is of size a, we can let Ki = ei,a−1...ei,1ei,0 be the representation Ki using Joye
and Tunstall recoding in base 2 for all 0 ≤ i < ω, and hence ki,j = ei,jb+b−1...ei,jb+1ei,jb is
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Algorithm 23 Improved SPA-resistant fixed-base comb method.
Require: Odd positive integer k, positive integer ω and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: Q = kP .
1: Compute base 2 Joye and Tunstall regular representation k =
∑l−1
i=0 ki2
i with ki ∈ {−1, 1}
using Algorithm 18.
2: Set a = d lω e and choose two positive integers b and v such that a = bv.
3: Compute G[0][s] and G[j][s] for all 1 ≤ j ≤ v − 1 and all values of s, where s =
(eω−1eω−2...e0)2, ei ∈ {−1, 1} and eω−1 = 1.
4: Q = O.
5: For t = b− 1 downto 0 do
6: Q = 2Q.
7: For j = v − 1 downto 0 do
8: Ij,t = eω−1,jb+t...e1,jb+te0,jb+t.
9: I = |Ij,t|.
10: If Ij,t > 0 then Q = Q+G[j][I]
11: Else Q = Q−G[j][I].
12: Return (Q).
the Joye and Tunstall recoding in base 2 representation of ki,j , therefore
kP =
b−1∑
t=0
2t(
v−1∑
j=0
ω−1∑
i=0
ei,jb+t2
jbPi).
Suppose that the following values are pre-computed and stored for all 1 ≤ j ≤ v − 1 and
all values of s, where s = (eω−1eω−2...e0)2, ei ∈ {−1, 1} and eω−1 = 1:
G[0][s] = eω−1Pω−1 + eω−2Pω−2 + ...+ e0P0,
G[j][s] = 2b(G[j − 1][s]) = 2jbG[0][s],
(5.1.2)
Therefore, we can rewrite kP as follows
kP =
b−1∑
t=0
2t(
v−1∑
j=0
G[j][Ij,t]), (5.1.3)
where Ij,t = (eω−1,jb+t...e1,jb+te0,jb+t)2.
Now we can use the left-to-right binary method to compute kP using these pre-computed
values. Algorithm 23 can be used to compute kP using the proposed method.
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From Algorithm 23, the value Ij,t is not equal to zero for all bit string (eω−1,jb+t...e1,jb+te0,jb+t)2,
thus, for every loop iteration one point doubling and one point addition is preformed. There-
fore, the cost of Algorithm 23 is
(a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D.
If the bit length l of the multiplier k is divisible by ω (i.e., no padding), then the number of
pre-computation is equal to 2ω−1v, otherwise it is (2ω−1 + 2ω−2)v.
5.2 Improved Regular SPA-Resistant Fixed-base Comb Method
Algorithm 23 is constrained for odd positive integers and also it is not fully regular because
it uses an if condition. In the same way as we did in Section 4.5 in Chapter 4 we generalize
our proposed method given in Algorithm 23 and rewrite it in a regular form.
We replace k by k´ = k − 1 if k is even and by k´ = k − 2 otherwise. We also, replace
Lines 10 and Lines 11 in Algorithm 23 by
si = sign(Ij,t)
G[j][I] = (−1)si⊕sn[j][I]G[j][I]
sn[j][I] = si
Q = Q+G[j][I],
where sign(x) = 1 if x < 0 and 0 otherwise, and sn[j][I] is a binary variable to keep track
of the current sign of G[j][I] for every I and 0 < j ≤ v − 1, sn[j][I] are initialized to zeros.
Also we implement P = (−1)bP , where b ∈ {0, 1} in a regular form as
R0 = Y
R1 = −Y
Y = Rb −R1⊕b +R1−b.
As we did in the previous chapter, in order to prevent Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
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Algorithm 24 Improved regular SPA-resistant fixed-base comb method.
Require: Positive integers k and ω, and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: Q = kP .
1: r = k( mod 2).
2: k´ = k − 2r
3: Compute base 2 Joye and Tunstall regular representation k´ =
∑l´−1
i=0 ki2
i with ki ∈ {−1, 1}
using Algorithm 18.
4: Set a = d l´ω e and choose two positive integers b and v such that a = bv.
5: Compute G[0][s] and G[j][s] for all 1 ≤ j ≤ v − 1 and all values of s, where s =
(eω−1eω−2...e0)2, ei ∈ {−1, 1} and eω−1 = 1.
6: Q = O.
7: For t = b− 1 downto 0 do
8: Q = 2Q.
9: For j = v − 1 downto 0 do
10: Ij,t = eω−1,jb+t...e1,jb+te0,jb+t.
11: ´Ij,t = f(Ij,t).
12: I = | ´Ij,t|.
13: si = sign( ´Ij,t)
14: G[j][I] = (−1)si⊕sn[j][I]G[j][I].
15: sn[j][I] = si.
16: Q = Q+G[j][I].
17: Set G[0][1] = P and G[0][2] = 2P .
18: Q=Q+G[0][r+1]
19: Return (Q).
attacks, we further make use of randomization techniques as proposed by Coron [22], and since
we are using a pre-computed table, Okeya and Sakurai’s second-order DPA attack [73] can be
applicable to our method. To prevent our proposed method against this attack, we change the
randomization of each pre-computed point after getting the point in the table as suggested
by Hedabou et al.[38]. Moreover, by using randomized linearly transformed coordinate as
proposed by Itoh el al. [43] and suggested for fixed-base comb method by Hedabou et al. [39],
our proposed method is resistance to RPA, ZPA and Geiselmann-Steinwandt’s attacks.
Algorithm 24 is a regular version of Algorithm 23 that can be used to compute kP using
the proposed method.
The cost of Algorithm 24 is
aA+ bD. (5.2.1)
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Table 5.3.1: Runtime complexity and storage cost of Mo¨ller, Okey-Takagi, left-to-right 2ωary
method using Joye and Tunstall regular recoding, and our proposed method.
Method Average cost Storage cost SPA Regular
secure
Mo¨ller [69] (a− 1)A+ (a− 1)ωD 2ω−1 + 1 Yes No
Okey-Takagi [76] aA+ ((a− 1)ω + 1)D 2ω−1 Yes No
L-to-R 2ω-ary Joye aA+ ((a− 1)ω + 1)D 2ω−1 Yes Yes
and Tunstall [48]
Proposed aA+ bD 2ω−1v Yes Yes
Replacing a by a+ 1 for Mo¨ller method if the case a´ = a+ 1 occurs. Replacing a by a− 1
for our proposed method if the case l´ = l − 1 and l´ divide ω occurs.
5.3 Comparison with Related Work
In this section, we compare our proposed method with related methods. We compare the
average-runtime cost, memory-storage cost, resistance to SPA attacks, and the regularity of
the algorithm in general.
In Table 5.3.1, we give a comparison between Mo¨ller, Okey-Takagi, left-to-right 2ωary
method using Joye and Tunstall regular-recoding, and our proposed improved regular SPA-
Resistant fixed-base comb methods. By having a look at the table, all of the methods are
SPA resistant. When ω > 1, it is very clear from the table that the cost of our proposed
method is less than the cost of Mo¨ller, Okey-Takagi and the usual left-to-right 2ω-ary using
Joye and Tunstall regular-exponent methods even when v = 1.
The methods of Mo¨ller and Okey-Takagi are not regular because the recoding algorithms
used in both methods are not regular. So it may be possible to construct attacks on the
recoding algorithm as noted by Sakai and Sakura [82]. As opposed, our proposed method
and the usual left-to-right 2ω-ary method using Joye and Tunstall’s methods make use of a
regular-recoding algorithm and the scalar-multiplication algorithms as given in Algorithm 24
and Algorithm 22 are secured against those attacks.
In Table 5.3.2, we give a comparison of Lim-Lee [59], Tsaur-Chou [92], our method MHH [67],
Hedabou et al. [38, 39], Feng et al. [25, 16], our regular SPA resistant method in Chapter 4
in section 4.5, and our proposed method in this chapter. We compare the average-runtime
cost, memory-storage cost, and resistance to SPA attacks. By having a look at the table, we
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Table 5.3.2: Runtime complexity and storage cost of Lim-Lee, Tsaur-Chou, Hedabou et al.,
Feng et al. and our proposed methods.
Method Average cost Storage cost SPA
secure
Lim-Lee [59] ((1− (12)ω)a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D (2ω − 1)v No
Tsaur-Chou [92] ((1− (23)ω)a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D∗
∑dω
2
e
i=1 2
ω−2i+1v No
Our method MHH [67] ((1− ( ωω+1)ω)a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D∗ ω2ω−2v No
Hedabou et al.[38] aA+ aD 2ω − 1 Yes
Hedabou et al.[39] aA+ aD 2ω−1 Yes
Feng et al. [25] aA+ aD 2ω−1 Yes
Feng et al. [16] aA+ (a− 1)D 2ω−1 Yes
Our Regular aA+ ((b− 1)ω + 1)D 2ω−1v Yes
SPA resistant(Chapter 4)
Improved Regular(this chapter) aA+ bD 2ω−1v Yes
SPA resistant(this Chapter
Replacing a by a− 1 for our proposed method if the case l´ = l − 1 and l´ divide ω occurs.
D∗ is the cost of 2hQ for the direct-doubling method proposed by Sakai and Sakurai [81].
noticed that Lim-Lee, Tsaur-Chou , and our MHH methods are not SPA resistant. When
v = 1, the costs of Hedabou et al. [38, 39], Feng et al. [25], and our proposed method in this
chapter in section 5.2 are equal and greater then the cost of Feng et al. [25] by one point
doubling, but the method of Feng et al. [16] uses dummy operation so it might lead to safe
error fault attacks. On the other hand we replace a by a− 1 for our proposed method if the
case l´ = l − 1 and l´ divide ω occurs and in that case our proposed method is more efficient
than all of the SPA methods given in Table 5.3.2. Compared to our method in Chapter 4,
the cost of our proposed method in this chapter in section 5.2 is less than that of the our
proposed one in section 4.5.
5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed an efficient regular SPA-resistant elliptic curve scalar-multiplication
algorithm using fixed-base comb method. In our proposed method the scalar is represented
in base 2 using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent-recoding method, then is divided into
ω × v blocks as in the method of Lim and Lee. Our proposed method is resistant against
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SPA, timing, and safe-error fault attacks. Moreover, by using randomization techniques and
changing the randomization of each pre-computed point after getting the point in the table
our proposed method is even resistant to DPA and second-order DPA attacks. In addition to
that, by using randomized linearly transformed coordinate our proposed method is resistant
to RPA, ZPA and Geiselmann-Steinwandt’s attacks.
In Table 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, we gave a comparison between our proposed method and related
work. From Table 5.3.1, we conclude that when ω > 1 our proposed method ” improved
regular SPA-Resistant fixed-base comb method” is more efficient than Mo¨ller, Okey-Takagi
and the usual left-to-right 2ω-ary using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent methods even
when v = 1.
From Table 5.3.2, we noticed that when v = 1, the costs of Hedabou et al. [38, 39], Feng
et al. [25], and our proposed method in this chapter in section 5.2 are equal and greater then
the cost of Feng et al. [25] by one point doubling, but the method of Feng et al. [16] uses
dummy operation so it might lead to safe error fault attacks. On the other hand we replace
a by a − 1 for our proposed method if the case l´ = l − 1 and l´ divide ω occurs and in that
case our proposed method is more efficient than all of the SPA methods given in Table 5.3.2.
Compared to our method in Chapter 4, the cost of our proposed method in this chapter in
section 5.2 is less than that of our proposed one in section 4.5.
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Chapter 6
Applications:Elliptic Curve
Cryptosystems
In this chapter we make use of our proposed methods in Chapter 3 , Chapter 4 and Chapter 5
in different elliptic curve cryptosystems. In every elliptic curve cryptosystem we must select
the domain parameters for the elliptic curve. For elliptic curve over prime field Fp the
domain parameter consist of p, a, b,G, n and h. Where p is the prime number defined for
finite field Fp, a and b are the parameters defining the curve given in short Weierstrass form
y2 = x3 + ax + b mod p, G = (xG, yG) is the generator point, n is the order of the elliptic
curve point G and h is the cofactor where h = #E(Fp)/n. #E(Fp) is the number of points
on an elliptic curve. The scalar for point multiplication is chosen as a number between 0 and
n− 1.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 6.1 we consider Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm(ECDSA). Tripartite Diffie Hellman key exchange(TDH) is pre-
sented in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3 we present a Certificateless Two-party Authenticated
Key Agreement (CTAKA) protocol without pairings.
6.1 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm(ECDSA)
Digital signature schemes are designed to provide the digital counterpart to handwritten sig-
natures. Security services provided by digital signature are data integrity (the assurance that
data has not been altered by unauthorized or unknown means), data origin authentication
63
CHAPTER 6. APPLICATIONS:ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEMS
Algorithm 25 Key Pair Generation
Require: Elliptic curve domain parameter p, a, b,G, n and h.
Ensure: Public key Q and private key d.
1: Select a random or pseudo-random integer d in the interval [1, n− 1].
2: Compute Q = dG.
3: Return Q and d.
Algorithm 26 ECDSA Signature Generation
Require: Elliptic curve domain parameter p, a, b,G, n, h, private key d, and a message m.
Ensure: A signature (r, s) for the message m.
1: Select a random or pseudo-random integer k in the interval [1, n− 1].
2: Compute kG = (x1, y1) and convert x1 to an integer x¯1.
3: Compute r = x1 mod n. If r=0, then go to Line 1.
4: Compute k−1 mod n.
5: Compute SHA-1(m) and convert this bit string to an integer e.
6: Compute s = k−1(e+ dr) mod n. If s = 0 then go to Line 1.
7: Return (r, s).
(the assurance that the source of data is as claimed), and non-repudiation (the assurance
that an entity cannot deny previous actions or commitments).
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is the elliptic curve analogue of
the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). DSA was accepted in 1998 as an ISO (International
Standards Organization) standard (ISO 14888-3), accepted in 1999 as an ANSI (American
National Standards Institute) standard (ANSI X9.62), and accepted in 2000 as an IEEE
(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) standard (IEEE 1363-2000) and a FIPS
standard (FIPS 186-2). [47].
ECDSA consist of three algorithms:
• Key pair generation(Algorithm 25): It generates two keys, private key which is a pseudo-
random integer d ∈ [1, n− 1] and public key Q = dG.
• Signature Generation(Algorithm 26): It uses the client’s private key d and a per signa-
ture random (or pseudo-random) integer to generate the signature.
• Signature Verification(Algorithm 27): It uses the client’s public key to verify the signa-
ture.
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Algorithm 27 ECDSA Signature Verification
Require: Elliptic curve domain parameter p, a, b,G, n, h, public key Q, a message m, and a
signature (r, s).
Ensure: Accept the signature if and only if v = r.
1: Verify that r and s are integers in the interval [1, n− 1].
2: Compute SHA-1(m) and convert this bit string to an integer e.
3: Compute ω = s−1 mod n.
4: Compute u1 = eω mod n and u2 = rω mod n.
5: Compute X = u1G+ u2Q.
6: If X = O, then reject the signature. Otherwise, convert the x−coordinate x1 of X to an
integer x¯1, and compute v = x¯1 mod n.
7: Accept the signature if and only if v = r.
6.2 Tripartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange(TDH)
It is well known that Diffie-Hellman [23] key exchange enables two parties Alice and Bob to
agree on a shared key in one round. Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange is the elliptic
curve analogue of Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman protocols
can be viewed as a one-round protocol because the two exchanged messages are independent
of each other [65] as explained below:
• Alice and Bob agree on p, a, b,G, n and h as a domain parameters for Elliptic curve
and make the domain parameter public, for example posting it in a public directory.
• Alice picks a secret integer a ∈ {1, n− 1}, computes A = aG and sends A to Bob.
• Bob picks a secret integer b ∈ {1, n− 1}, computes B = bG and sends B to Alice.
• Finally, Bob and Alice again use their secret integers to compute the shared key k =
abG. Alice computes aB = abG, whereas Bob computes bA = baG = abG.
The protocol can easily be extended to three parties, as illustrated in the following two
rounds [65]:
Round 1
• Alice, Bob and Chris agree on p, a, b,G, n and h as a domain parameters for Ellip-
tic curve and make the domain parameter public, for example posting it in a public
directory.
• Alice picks a secret integer a ∈ {1, n− 1}, computes A = aG and sends A to Chris.
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• Chris picks a secret integer c ∈ {1, n− 1}, computes C = cG and sends C to Bob.
• Bob picks a secret integer b ∈ {1, n− 1}, computes B = bG and sends B to Alice.
Round 2
• Alice computes AB = aB = abG and sends AB to Chris.
• Chris computes CA = cA and sends CA = caG to Bob.
• Bob computes BC = bC = bcG and sends BC to Alice.
• Finally, Bob, Chris and Alice again use their secret integers to compute the shared key
k = abcG. Alice computes aBC = abcG, Bob computes bCA = bcaG = abcG, whereas
Chris computes cAB = cabG = abcG.
In 2000 Joux proposed the first pairing1 -based one-round tripartite key agreement pro-
tocol. However, in 2004 Verhuel modified Joux protocol. Joux and Verhuel used bilinear
pairing on (G1, GT ) for which the BDHP is intractable.
To describe the protocol, Alice, Bob and Chris agree on p, a, b,G, n and h as a domain
parameters for Elliptic curve. Also they agree on a modified bilinear pairing eˆl : G1 → GT ,
where G1 =< P > be additive groups of order l with identity element O, P ∈ E(Fp),
and GT be a multiplicative group of order l with identity 1. The point P is chosen such
that the ECDLP in G1 is not practically possible and assume there exists a distortion map
D : P → D(P ) such that P and D(P ) are independent. Then, the protocol is described as
follows:
• Alice randomly selects a secret integer a ∈ {1, l−1} and broadcasts the point QA = aP
to the other two parties.
• Similarly and simultaneously, Bob and Chris broadcast the points QB = bP and QC =
cP .
• Using the public points QA, QB and QC Alice can compute the shared key k =
eˆl(QB, QC)
a = eˆl(bP, cP )
a = eˆl(P, P )
abc, Bob computes the shared key k = eˆl(QA, QC)
b =
eˆl(aP, cP )
b = eˆl(P, P )
abc and Chris computes the shared key k = eˆl(QA, QB)
c =
eˆl(aP, bP )
b = eˆl(P, P )
abc.
1See the Appendix for background on pairing
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If an adversary can solve the DLP in Fp, then he can breaks tripartite Diffie-Hellman key
exchange [40]. For example, the adversary can use Alice’s public point QA and the public
point P to compute y = eˆl(QA, P ) and x = eˆl(P, P ). Notice that
y = eˆl(QA, P ) = eˆl(aP, P ) = eˆl(P, P )
a = xa
so, if the adversary can solve the DLP in Fp , the adversary can obtain the secret a, by
symmetry the adversary can obtain the secrets b and c, and hence the adversary can compute
the shared key k = eˆl(P, P )
abc. Therefor, the security of tripartite DiffieHellman key exchange
rely on the difficulty of the DLP in Fp.
6.3 Certificateless Two-party Authenticated Key Agreement
protocol(CTAKA)
All symmetric key encryption schemes rely on the use of shared key. Exchanging keys re-
main big problem in insecure networks. To eliminate the problem of exchanging keys, a lot
of key agreement schemes have been proposed in the literature. In this section we give a brief
introduction to certificateless public key cryptography, then we give some of existing certifi-
cateless key agreement protocols, moreover, we introduce He and Chen [36] certificateless key
agreement protocols.
6.3.1 Certificateless Public Key Cryptography (CL-PKC)
In 2003 Al-Riyami and Paterson [2] introduced the concept of Certificateless Public Key
Cryptography (CL-PKC) to overcome the key escrow limitation of the Identity-Based Pub-
lic Key Cryptography (ID-PKC) and certificate management in Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). In CL-PKC a trusted third party called Key Generation Center (KGC) supplies a user
with partial private key, the user then combine the partial private key with a secret value
(unknown to the KGC) to obtain his full private key. In this way the KGC does not know
users private keys. Then the user combines the same secret value with the KGC’s public
parameters to compute his public key.
Compared to identity based cryptography public key cryptography (ID-PKC), the trust
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assumptions made of the trusted third party in CL-PKC are much reduced. In ID-PKC,
users must trust the Private Key Generator (PKG) not to abuse its knowledge of private
keys in performing passive attacks, while in CL-PKC, users need only trust the KGC not to
actively propagate false public keys [2].
In CL-PKC users can generate more than one pair of key (private and public) for the same
partial private key. To guarantee that KGC does not replace user’s public keys Al-Riyami and
Paterson[2] introduced a binding technique to bind a user’s public key with his private key.
In their binding scheme, the user first fixes his secret value and his public key and supplies
the KGC his public key. Then the KGC redefine the identity of the user to be the user’s
identity concatenated with his public key. By this binding scheme the KGC replacement of
a public key apparent, and equivalent to a CA forging a certificate in a traditional PKI.
Many certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement (CTAKA) protocols have
been proposed in the literature. In 2003 Al-Riyami and Paterson [2] proposed the first
CTAKA protocol. Then, more CTAKA protocols have been proposed for example [63, 89,
57, 93, 42, 86, 60, 17, 100, 68] and [96].
All the above mentioned certificateless two-party key agreement protocols are from bilin-
ear pairing. The relative computation cost of a pairing is approximately twenty times higher
than that of a scalar multiplication over elliptic curve group [17]. To improve the perfor-
mance, several CTAKA protocols without pairings have been proposed in the literature for
example [15, 29, 41, 26, 95, 35, 37, 33] and [36].
6.3.2 He and Chen CTAKA protocol
In 2011 He and Chen [36] Proposed an efficient CTAKA protocol without paring and they
proved its security in the random oracle model under the the following Computational Diffie-
Hellman (CDH) problem.
Definition 6.3.1 Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: Given a generator P of a
group of elliptic curve point G and (aP, bP ) for unknown a, b ∈ Z∗n, compute abP . The CDH
assumption states that the probability of any polynomial-time algorithm to solve the CDH
problem is negligible.
He and Chen protocol consists of six polynomial-time algorithms. They are described as
follows:
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• Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter k as in put, and returns system
parameters and a master key. Given k , KGC does the following:
– chooses a k -bit prime p and determines the tuple (Fp, E(Fp), G, P ).
– chooses the master private key s ∈ Z∗n, and computes the master public key pub
Ppub = sP .
– chooses two cryptographic secure hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ −→ Z∗n and H2 :
{0, 1}∗ −→ Z∗n.
– publishes params (Fp, E(Fp), G, P, Ppub, H1, H2) as system parameters and secretly
keeps the master key s .
• Set-Secret-Value: The user with identity IDi picks randomly xi ∈ Z∗n, computes
Pi = xiP and sets xi as his secret value.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This algorithm takes master key, a user’s identifier,
Pi , system parameters as input, and returns the user’s ID-based private key. With
this algorithm, for each user with identifier IDi, KGC works as follows:
– KGC chooses a random number ri ∈ Z∗n, computesRi = riP and hi = H1{IDi, Ri, Pi}.
– KGC computes si = ri +his mod n and issues {si, Ri} to the users through secret
channel.
The user’s partial private key is si and he can validate his private key by checking
whether the equation siP = Ri + hiPpub holds.
• Set-Private-Key: The user with identity IDi takes the pair ski = (xi, si) as its
private key.
• Set-Public-Key: The user with identity IDi takes pki = (Pi, Ri) as its public key.
• Key-Agreement: Assume that an entity A with identity IDa has private ska =
(xa, sa) and public key pka = (Pa, Ra) and an entity B with identity IDb has private
skb = (xb, sb) and public key pkb = (Pb, Rb) want to establish a session key, they can
do as follows:
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– A chooses a random number a ∈ Z∗n and computes Ta = aP , then A send
M1{IDa, Ta} to B.
– After receiving M1, B chooses a random number b ∈ Z∗n and computes Tb = bP ,
then B send M2{IDb, Tb} to A.
Then both A and B can compute the shared secrets as follows.
– A computes K1AB = (xa+sa)Tb+a(Pb+Rb+H(IDb, Rb, Pb)Ppub) and K
2
AB = aTb.
– B computes K1BA = (xb+sb)Ta+b(Pa+Ra+H(IDa, Ra, Pa)Ppub) and K
2
BA = bTa.
It is very clear that K2AB = K
2
BA, however, K
1
AB = K
1
BA as shown below:
K1AB = (xa + sa)Tb + a(Pb +Rb +H(IDb, Rb, Pb)Ppub)
= (xa + sa)Tb + a(Pb + sbP )
= (xa + sa)Tb + a(xbP + sbP ) = (xa + sa)Tb + (xb + sb)Ta
by symmetry
K1BA = (xb + sb)Ta + (xa + sa)Tb
Thus the agreed session key for A and B can be computed as:
sk = H2(IDa||IDb||Ta||Tb||K1AB||K2AB)
or
sk = H2(IDa||IDb||Ta||Tb||K1BA||K2BA)
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Conclusion and Remarks
The scalar multiplication is the most time consuming operation in elliptic curve cryptography.
In this thesis we have focused in optimizing the elliptic curve scalar multiplication. In the
last decades, it has been shown that pre-computations of elliptic-curve points improve the
performance of scalar multiplication especially in cases where the elliptic-curve point P is
fixed. Therefore, in this thesis we mainly have focused in optimizing fixed-base comb method.
We presented four contributions:
• We have proved that Tsaur and Chou method is not more efficient than Lim and Lee
method as authors claimed.
• We have proposed an improvement of Tsaur and Chou method. Our proposed method
makes a significant reduction in terms of number of elliptic-curve point addition oper-
ation. By comparing our method with previous work, it shows that when h = ω = 2
our proposed method and Tsaur-Chou method are identical, when h = ω = 3 the worst
cost of our proposed method is equal to the average cost of Tsaur-Chou method, and
when h = ω > 3 the worst cost of our proposed method is less than the average cost
of Tsaur-Chou method. For pre-computations, if storage space is disregarded, our pro-
posed method is the best choice and we can define h ≥ ω, otherwise ω = h. There is
always a suitable choice for h and v which make our method best. In practice, a speed
improvement by 33 % to 38 % is achieved.
• We have proposed two efficient regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication
methods using fixed base comb method. The first method ”Regular SPA resistant
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fixed-base comb method” represents the scalar k in m = 2ω (where ω > 1) radix
representation using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent and divide the scalar into v
blocks. Compared to left-to-right 2ω ary method using Joye and Tunstall’s regular
recoding, when v = 1, left-to-right 2ω ary method and our proposed regular fixed-
base comb methods are identical. However, when v > 1 our proposed fixed-base comb
method is more efficient than left-to-right 2ωary method using Joye and Tunstall’s
regular recoding method.
The second method ”Improved Regular SPA resistant fixed-base comb method” is more
efficient than the first one, the scalar k is represented in base 2 using Joye and Tunstall
regular exponent-recoding and is divided into ω × v blocks according to the method
of Lim and Lee. Both of our regular methods have a constant run time which ensures
the resistance against timing attacks. In addition to that, the proposed methods does
not make use of any dummy operations and is therefore resistant to safe-error fault
attacks. Moreover, by using randomization techniques and changing the randomization
of each pre-computed point after getting the point in the table our proposed methods
is even resistant to DPA and second-order DPA attacks. Also, by using randomized
linearly transformed coordinate our regular methods are resistant to RPA, ZPA and
Geiselmann-Steinwandt’s attacks. Compared to related work, the cost of second regular
method , Hedabou et al. [38, 39], , Feng et al. [25] are equal and greater then the cost of
Feng et al. [25] by one point doubling, but the method of Feng et al. [16] uses dummy
operation so it might lead to safe error fault attacks. On the other hand we replace
a by a − 1 for our proposed method if the case l´ = l − 1 and l´ divide ω occurs and
in that case our proposed method is more efficient than all of the SPA methods given
in Table 5.3.2. However, we noticed that even there is no enough memory it is better
to choose small value of ω and bigger value of v, and when v > ω, our second regular
method is more efficient than all other method.
Our future work will continue in improving scalar multiplication for both unknown point
and fixed point. Also, since scalar multiplication is performed through a combination
of point additions and doublings, many research have been done to enhance point
addition and doubling, and more can be done. Moreover, we will obtain optimal values
for the constants a, b, v and ω for fixed key size(examples 160,256,512,1024 bits) for the
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Improved Regular Fixed-base Comb Method for SPA-Resistant Scalar Multiplication.
Attractive area of research is certificateless public key cryptography or to be precisely
certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement (CTAKA) protocols. Until be-
ginning of 2009 all CTAKA were from bilinear pairing, however, the relative cost of
a pairing is twenty times of scalar multiplication. Therefore, many CTAKA without
pairing have been proposed in the literature. Our future research will also focus in
constructing CTAKA that can be computed efficiently from a few numbers of scalar
multiplication.
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Appendix A
Examples and Pairings
A.1 Examples
Example 1 Improved Fixed-base Comb Method
In order to illustrate our method, we select at random a positive integer k = 1065142573068
and choose ω = 3. First, we represent k in width-3 NAF,
k = (0100001¯000000000001¯001¯001001¯00300000000300).
Then, we divide from up-to-down to a = d413 e = 14 blocks of size 3, such that
k =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1¯ 0 0 0 1¯ 1¯ 1 1¯ 3 0 0 3
 .
Then, from right-to-left we divide the 3×14 blocks to 3×7 blocks, each of size b = d147 e =
2, such that
k =

00 00 00 00 00 00 00
10 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 1¯0 00 1¯1¯ 11¯ 30 03
 .
86
APPENDIX A. EXAMPLES AND PAIRINGS
Next, we compute and store the following values. For pre-computed values G[0][sd], where
s ∈ {1, 2, 4} and d ∈ {1, 3}:
G[0][1] = P,G[0][2] = 2P,G[0][4] = 4P,G[0][3] = 3P,G[0][6] = 6P,G[0][12] = 12P.
For pre-computed values G[j][sd], where s ∈ {1, 2, 4}, d ∈ {1, 3} and 0 < j ≤ 6:
G[j][1] = 26jP,G[j][2] = 26j(2P ), G[j][4] = 26j(4P ),
G[j][3] = 26j(3P ), G[j][6] = 26j(6P ), G[j][12] = 26j(12P ).
Next, compute Ij,t = (e2,2j+te1,2j+te0,2j+t)2 for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 6 as follows:
I0,0 = (e2,0e1,0e0,0)NAF3 = (300)NAF3 = 12,
I1,0 = (e2,2e1,2e0,2)NAF3 = 0,
I2,0 = (e2,4e1,4e0,4)NAF3 = (1¯00)NAF3 = −4,
I3,0 = (e2,6e1,6e0,6)NAF3 = (1¯00)NAF3 = −4,
I4,0 = (e2,8e1,8e0,8)NAF3 = 0,
I5,0 = (e2,10e1,10e0,10)NAF3 = 0,
I6,0 = (e2,12e1,12e0,12)NAF3 = 0,
I0,1 = (e2,1e1,1e0,1)NAF3 = 0,
I1,1 = (e2,3e1,3e0,3)NAF3 = (300)NAF3 = 12,
I2,1 = (e2,5e1,5e0,5)NAF3 = (100)NAF3 = 4,
I3,1 = (e2,7e1,7e0,7)NAF3 = (1¯00)NAF3 = −4,
I4,1 = (e2,9e1,9e0,9)NAF3 = 0,
I5,1 = (e2,11e1,11e0,11)NAF3 = (1¯00)NAF3 = −4,
I6,1 = (e2,13e1,13e0,13)NAF3 = (010)NAF3 = 2.
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Finally, we can compute kP by using above values as follows:
kP = G[0][12] +G[1][0]−G[2][4]−G[3][4] +G[4][0] +G[5][0] +G[6][0] +
23(G[0][0] +G[1][12] +G[2][4]−G[3][4] +G[4][0]−G[5][4] +G[6][2]).
Example 2 Regular Fixed-base Comb Method
In order to illustrate our method, we choose an odd integer k = 1065142573063 and
ω = 3. Using Algorithm 18, we obtain 23-ary representation of k as
k = (173777355¯557¯7¯1)23 .
we have a = 14 is the length of 23-ary representation of k and we take b = 2. We can rewrite
k as
k =

1 7 3 7 7 7 3 5 5¯ 5 5 7¯ 7¯ 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 .
Then, we divide from right-to-left to v = dab e = 7 blocks of size b, such that
k =

17 37 77 35 5¯5 57¯ 7¯1
00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 .
Next, we compute and store the following values. For pre-computed values G[0][s], where
s ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7} :
G[0][1] = P,G[0][3] = 3P,G[0][5] = 5P,G[0][7] = 7P.
For pre-computed values G[j][s], where s ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7} and 0 < j ≤ 6:
G[j][1] = 26jP,G[j][3] = 26j(3P ),
G[j][5] = 26j(5P ), G[j][7] = 26j(7P ).
Finally, we can compute kP by using above values as follows:
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kP =
b−1∑
t=0
2tω(
v−1∑
j=0
G[j][kjb+t])
= G[0][k0] +G[1][k2] +G[2][k4] +G[3][k6] +G[4][k8] +G[5][k10] +G[6][k12] +
23(G[0][k1] +G[1][k3] +G[2][k5] +G[3][k7] +G[4][k9] +G[5][k11] +G[6][k13]).
= G[0][1]−G[1][7] +G[2][5] +G[3][5] +G[4][7] +G[5][7] +G[6][7] +
23(−G[0][7] +G[1][5]−G[2][5] +G[3][3] +G[4][7] +G[5][3] +G[6][1]).
Example 3 Regular Fixed-base Comb Method2
In order to illustrate our method, we choose an odd integer k = 121455575 and choose
ω = 3. First, represent k in base 2 using Algorithm 18:
k = (11111¯1¯11111¯11¯11¯1¯1¯1¯11111¯11¯11)
Then, from right-to-left, we divide the scalar k into 3 blocks each of size 9 as follows:
k =

11111¯11¯11
11¯11¯11¯1¯1¯1¯
11111¯1¯111
 .
Then, from up-to-down we divide the 3 × 9 blocks to 3 × 3 blocks, each of size b = 93 = 3,
such that
k =

111 11¯1 1¯11
11¯1 1¯11¯ 1¯1¯1¯
111 11¯1¯ 111
 .
Next, we compute and store the following values. For pre-computed values G[0][s´], where
s´ = f(s), s = (e2e1e0) and ei ∈ {−1, 1}. We only need to compute positive values of s´ (i.e.,
s´ ∈ {261631, 261633, 262655, 262657})
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G[0][262657] = (218 + 29 + 1)P,G[0][262655] = (218 + 29 − 1)P,
G[0][261633] = (218 − 29 + 1)P,G[0][261631] = (218 − 29 − 1)P.
For pre-computed values G[j][s´], where s´ ∈ {261631, 261633, 262655, 262657} and 0 ≤ j ≤ 2:
G[j][262657] = 23j(218 + 29 + 1)P,G[j][262655] = 23j(218 + 29 − 1)P,
G[j][261633] = 23j(218 − 29 + 1)P,G[j][261631] = 23j(218 − 29 − 1)P.
Next, we compute ´Ij,t = f(Ij,t) = e2,3j+t2
2a+e1,3j+t2
a+e0,3j+t for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 2
as follows:
´I0,0 = f(e2,0e1,0e0,0) = f(11¯1) = 261633,
´I1,0 = f(e2,3e1,3e0,3) = f(1¯1¯1) = −262655,
´I2,0 = f(e2,6e1,6e0,6) = f(111) = 262657,
´I0,1 = f(e2,1e1,1e0,1) = f(11¯1) = 261633,
´I1,1 = f(e2,4e1,4e0,4) = f(1¯11¯) = −261633,
´I2,1 = f(e2,7e1,7e0,7) = f(11¯1) = 261633,
´I0,2 = f(e2,2e1,2e0,2) = f(11¯1¯) = 261631,
´I1,2 = f(e2,5e1,5e0,5) = f(11¯1) = 261633,
´I2,2 = f(e2,8e1,8e0,8) = f(111) = 262657,
Finally, we can compute kP by using the above values as follows:
kP = G[0][261633]−G[1][262655] +G[2][262657] +
2(G[0][261633]−G[1][261633] +G[2][261633]) +
22(G[0][261631] +G[1][261633] +G[2][262657]).
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A.2 Bilinear pairings
This section introduces some elementary background on pairings. We refer the reader to [3,
4, 5, 85, 83, 84] and [65] for further details.
Pairings in elliptic curve cryptography are functions which map a pair of elliptic curve
points to an element of the multiplicative group of a finite field. Let l be a prime num-
ber, G1 =< P > be additive groups of order l with identity element O, and let GT be a
multiplicative group of order l with identity 1. A bilinear pairing e on (G1, GT ) is a function
e : G1 ×G1 −→ GT
that satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinearity: For all R,S, T ∈ G1, e(R + S, T ) = e(R, T )e(S, T ) and e(R,S + T ) =
e(R,S)e(R, T ).
• Non-degeneracy: e(P, P ) 6= 1.
• Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈ G1.
The security of many pairing-based protocols is dependent on the intractability of Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP) which is defined below.
Definition A.2.1 Let e be a bilinear pairing on (G1, GT ). The Bilinear Diffie- Hellman
Problem (BDHP) is the following: Given P, aP, bP, cP , compute e(P, P )abc.
Hardness of the BDHP implies the hardness of the DHP in both G1 and GT .
Definition A.2.2 Given quadruple (P, aP, bP, cP ) of elements in G1, Decisional Diffie-
Hellman problem (DDHP) in G1 is to decide whether cP = abP .
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ABSTRACT
Since the invention of public -key cryptography, numerous public-key cryptographic systems
have been proposed. Public key cryptography based their security in solving hard mathemat-
ical problems. Elliptic curve cryptography, independently introduced by Koblitz and Miller
in the 80’s. Elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) based their security in solving the elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem(ECDLP). The absence of sub-exponential-time algorithm
for ECDLP benefit ECC to offer the same security level compared with traditional public
key cryptosystems such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exechange and Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) with much smaller key bit size. This advantages is more attractive on
constrained environments, since shorter key sizes leads to less computing times, less power
and storage requirements. Among the most time consuming operation of ECC is the scalar
multiplication and it dominates the execution time of any ECC. It has been shown that pre-
computations of elliptic-curve points improve the performance of the scalar multiplication
especially in cases where the elliptic-curve point P is fixed.
In this thesis, we propose three improvements for fixed-base comb scalar multiplications
methods. Based on the work of Lim and Lee, and Tsaur and Chou, we propose an improve-
ment of Tsaur and Chou method. We make use of a width-ω non-adjacent form representation
and restrict the number of rows of the comb to be greater than or equal ω. On the other
hand, based on the work of Joye and Tunstall, we proposed two efficient regular SPA resis-
tant elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithms using fixed base comb method. The first
method represents the scalar k in m = 2ω (where ω > 1) radix representation using Joye and
Tunstall regular exponent and divide the scalar into v blocks. The second method represents
the scalar k in base 2 using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent-recoding and the scalar is
divided into ω × v blocks according to the method of Lim and Lee.
i
As a result, our improvement of Tsaur and Chou shows a significant reduction in the
number of required elliptic-curve point addition operation. The computational complexity
is reduced by 33 % to 38 % compared to Tsaur and Chou method even for devices that have
limited resources. Moreover, we proved that Tsaur and Chou method is not more efficient
than lim and lee method.
Both of our regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithms have a
constant run time which ensure the resistance a gainst timing attacks. Moreover, the proposed
algorithms does not make use of any dummy operations which provides additional resistance
against safe-error fault attacks. In addition to that, by using randomization techniques and
change the randomization of each pre-computed point after getting the point in the table
our proposed methods are resistance to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and second order
DPA attacks. Moreover, by using randomized linearly transformed coordinate our regular
methods are resistant to RPA, ZPA and Geiselmann-Steinwandt’s attacks. Compared to
related work, our second regular method provides best performance.
ii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Public key cryptosystems based their security on the difficulty of solving a mathematical prob-
lem. Examples of such problems are Integer Factorization Problem (IFP), Discrete Logarithm
Problem (DLP), and Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). The Progress in
computing finite field discrete logarithms and in factoring integers force public key cryp-
tosystems based on IFP or DLP to be implemented using longer and even longer key size.
On the other hand, based on the difficulty of ECDLP in 1987 Koblitz [52] and Miller [66]
independently proposed using the group of points on elliptic curves defined over a finite
field to implement the discrete logarithm cryptosystems. Two advantages they found that
for each prime power there is only one multiplicative group, but there are many elliptic
curve groups, and the absence of sub-exponential-time algorithm for elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem (if the elliptic curve E is suitably chosen) [53].
The absence of sub-exponential-time algorithm for ECDLP benefit the elliptic curve cryp-
tosystems (ECC) to offer the same security level compared with traditional public key cryp-
tosystems such as RSA [80], DH [23], and DSA [47] with much smaller key bit size. For
example, an elliptic curve over a 160-bit field gives the same level of security as a 1024-bit
RSA modulus or Diffie-Hellman prime. As the security level increases the difference be-
comes even more exciting. For example, 512-bit ECC is currently equivalent in security to
15,360-bit RSA/DH/DSA. Table 1.0.1 compares the key sizes for three different approaches
to encryption for comparable levels of security against brute-force attacks.
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Table 1.0.1: Key sizes for equivalent security levels (in bits) against Burte-force attacks.
Symmetric Encryption RSA and Diffie-Hellman Elliptic Curve
80 1024 160
112 2048 224
128 3072 256
192 7680 384
256 15360 512
(source:Avi Kak, lecture 14, Lecture Notes on Computer and Network Security, June 9,
2010)
Statement of the Problem
Given a positive integer k and a point P on an elliptic curve E over a finite field Fq, the
problem (scalar multiplication problem) is to compute Q = kP . A single scalar/point multi-
plication is performed through a combination of point additions and doublings.
Cryptosystem based on elliptic curve, such as key agreement, signature generation, signing
and verification involves scalar multiplication. Computing elliptic-curve scalar multiplication
is the most time consuming operation in any elliptic-curve cryptosystem. Thus, the speed of
scalar multiplication plays an important role in the efficiency of whole system [34] [53].
Motivation and Objective
Since ECC offer the same security level compared with traditional public key cryptosystems
with a smaller key size, ECC can be implemented with much smaller parameters. This
advantages is more attractive on constrained environments, since shorter key sizes leads to
less computing times, less power and storage requirements. To have significant performance,
elliptic curve scalar multiplication must be implemented efficiently. The efficiency of ECC
has been improved over decades and still an active area of research.
The implementation of ECC on constrained devices can lead to side channel analy-
sis (SCA) attacks if the elliptic curve scalar multiplication is not resistant to SCA [38] [69].
The aims of this thesis are to propose an efficient elliptic curve scalar multiplication method,
and an efficient and simple power analysis and safe error fault attacks resistant elliptic curve
scalar multiplication method based on existing methods.
2
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Methodology
In the last decades, it has been shown that pre-computations of elliptic-curve points improve
the performance of scalar multiplication especially in cases where the elliptic-curve point P
is fixed. Based on the work of Lim and Lee [59], and Tsaur and Chou [92] we prove that
Tsaur and Chou method is not more efficient than Lim and Lee [59] method as the authors
claimed. Moreover, we propose an improvement to Tsaur and Chou method. Our proposed
method makes use to a fixed-base comb technique, represents the scalar k in a width-ω NAF
representation and we restrict the number of rows of the comb to be greater than or equal ω.
On the other hand, based on the work of Joye and Tunstall [48], we proposed two efficient
regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithm using fixed base comb
method. The first method represents the scalar k in m = 2ω (where ω > 1) radix representa-
tion using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent and divide the scalar into v blocks. The second
method represents the scalar k in base 2 using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent-recoding
and the scalar is divided into ω × v blocks according to the method of Lim and Lee.
Thesis Layout
We begin this thesis with basics and description of previous work related to this research.
Thus, Chapter 2 summarizes description of elliptic curve , main elliptic curve operations and
provide most of basic elliptic curve scalar multiplication methods found in the literature. In
addition, recent research in scalar multiplication that act as basis for Chapter 3, Chapter 4
and Chapter 5 is introduced.
In Chapter 3, we prove that Tsaur and Chou method is not more efficient than Lim and
Lee method as the authors claimed. Moreover, we propose an improvement of Tsaur and
Chou method. Regarding constraint devices we give a suitable choices for the number of the
rows h and v that make our method best if the storage is available for 2 to 50 elliptic curve
points.
In Chapter 4, we propose an efficient regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multi-
plication algorithm using fixed base comb method. Our method makes use of a fixed-base
comb technique and represents the scalar k in m = 2ω radix representation using Joye and
Tunstall [48] regular exponent recoding method. Our proposed method is resistant against
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SPA, timing, and safe-error fault attacks. Moreover, by using randomization techniques our
proposed method is even resistant to DPA attacks.
In Chapter 5, we propose a more efficient regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multi-
plication algorithm using fixed base comb method. In our method the scalar k is represented
in base 2 using Joye and Tunstall [48] regular exponent-recoding. Then, the scalar is divided
into ω× v blocks according to the method of Lim and Lee[59]. Also as our method in Chap-
ter 4, our proposed method is resistant against SPA, timing, and safe-error fault attacks.
Moreover, by using randomization techniques our proposed method is even resistant to DPA
attacks. Compared to related work, our method in this chapter provides best performance.
To the best of our knowledge our methods in Chapter 5 and this chapter are the only regular
SPA resistant fixed-base scalar multiplication methods.
Chapter 6 is an application chapter, we make use of our proposed methods in Chapter 3,
Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 to implement Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm(ECDSA),
Tripartite DiffieHellman key exchange(TDH) and Certificateless Two-party Authenticated
Key Agreement (CTAKA) protocol without pairings.
In Chapter 7, we give our conclusions about our overall work, and makes suggestions for
future work. Finally, in the appendix, we give examples to illustrate our methods, and basics
background on bilinear pairings. .
4
Chapter 2
Basics and Literature Review
This chapter provides formal definition for a general elliptic curve defined over a field Fq in
Weierstrass form. The group law of points forming an elliptic curve make the points forming
an elliptic curve into additively abelian group. The group law is defined by a chord -and-
tangent rule for adding two point in E(Fq) to give a third point in E(Fq). Also, in this
chapter the elliptic curve scalar multiplication, the core operation in any ECC is presented,
and most of the basics methods that were introduced in the literature to enhance the scalar
multiplication are presented.
This research has considered curves over Fp. In the finite field Fp multiplication, inversion,
addition, and subtraction have different computational costs. Following the literature, in this
thesis we assume that M represent the cost of one field multiplication, S the cost of one field
doubling and I the cost of one field inversion. Also, when p is a large prime, it is often
assumed that (i) I ∼ 100M , (ii) S = 0.8M , and (iii) the cost of field additions/subtractions
can be neglected [6, 32].
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: in Section 2.1 we introduce Weierstrass
form. Group law of point on an elliptic curve is presented in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3
different coordinates of an elliptic curve that used to represent elliptic curve points are
presented. An overview of most of existing elliptic curve scalar multiplication are presented
in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 provides an introduction to side channel attacks. Finally, in
Section 2.7 recent elliptic curve scalar multiplication methods are presented.
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2.1 Weierstrass Form
Definition 2.1.1 An elliptic curve E over a field Fq is defined by a generalized Weierstrass
equation
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x+ a6 (2.1.1)
where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ Fq. Weierstrass equation is non-singular if and only if for all x1, y1 ∈
F¯q 1 satisfying equation (2.1.1), the partial derivatives 2y1 + a1x1 + a3 and 3x21 + 2a2x1 +
a4 − a1y1 do not vanish simultaneously. The discriminant2 of the elliptic curve E is zero if
and only if the elliptic curve E is singular. If L is any extension field of Fq, then the set of
L-rational points on E is
E(L) = {(x, y) ∈ L× L : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6} ∪O
where O is the point at infinity(it serves as the identity of the group of points E(Fq )).
Simplified equation of generalized Weierstrass equation can be obtained depending on the
characteristic3 of the field Fq. If the characteristic of the field Fq is not 2, then we can divide
by 2 and complete the square to get
y21 = x
3 + a´2x
2 + a´4x+ a´6
where y1 = y +
a1x
2 +
a3
2 and with some constants a´2, a´4, a´6. If the characteristic is also
not 3, then we can let x1 = x+
a´2
3 and obtain the simplified Weierstrass equation
y21 = x
3
1 + ax1 + b (2.1.2)
(for more details we refer the reader to [94]).
In the rest of this thesis we consider simplified Weierstrass equation , so for simplicity we
refer to equation (2.1.2) as Weierstrass equation.
1Algebraic closure of Fq
2 Discriminant of a polynomial is the product of squares of the differences of the polynomial roots.
3Characteristic of a field K is the number of times that we must add the multiplicative identity element
in order to get the additive identity element of the field K
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2.2 Group Law
In this section we give a complete addition algorithm for a general elliptic curve given in
Weierstrass form over Fq, standard references are[87],[34],[94].
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over a field Fq. Adding two points in Fq is defined by
chord-and-tangent rule to give a third point in Fq. To obtain addition and doubling formula
for affine coordinate, we assume that P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2) (non of the points is
the infinity) are two points on an elliptic curve E given by the equation y2 = x3 + ax + b,
addition of P1 and P2 is obtained by drawing a line L throw P1 and P2, it will intersect the
curve E in a third point P´3, reflect P´3 across the x-axis to obtain P3. We define
P1 + P2 = P3
Addition of the two points P1 and P2 is shown graphically for a curve over the real number
in Figure 2.2. To double a point P1 we draw a tangent line throw P1, it will intersect the
Figure 2.2.1: Adding Points on an Elliptic Curve
(source: [94])
curve E in another point P´3, reflect P´3 across the x-axis to obtain P3. We define
2P1 = P3
Now, we summarize the group law as follows:
• Identity: the infinity point O is the identity and it satisfies P +O = O + P = P .
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• Negation(or inversion): if P = (x, y) ∈ E(Fq), then (x, y) + (x,−y) = O, so the
point (x,-y) is the inverse of P and is denoted as −P .
• Addition: let P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2) ∈ E(Fq). If P1 6= ±P2, then P1 + P2 =
(x3, y3), where
x3 = (
y2 − y1
x2 − x1 )
2 − x1 − x2 and y3 = ( y2 − y1
x2 − x1 )(x1 − x3)− y1. (2.2.1)
• Doubling: let P = (x1, y1) ∈ E(Fq), where P 6= −P . Then 2P = (x3, y3) where
x3 = (
3x1
2 + a
2y1
)2 − 2x1 and y3 = (3x1
2 + a
2y1
)(x1 − x3)− y1. (2.2.2)
It can easily be seen that point doubling cost 1I + 2M + 2S, whereas addition of two
points cost 1I + 2M + 1S [34].
A complete addition algorithm (algorithm that can handel all pair of input points) on
all elliptic curve defined by Weierstrass equation E : y2 = x3 + ax + b over E(Fq) with
charE(Fq) 6= 2, 3 can be given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Complete addition law for short Weierstrass form in affine coordinates
Require: P1, P2 ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: P1 + P2.
1: If P1 = O return P2.
2: Else if P2 = O return P1.
3: Else if x1 = x2.
4: If y1 6= y2 return O.
5: Else if y1 = 0 return O.
6: Else m = (3x21 + a)/(2y1).
7: Else m = (y1 − y2)/(x1 − x2).
8: x3 = m
2 − x1 − x2.
9: y3 = m(x1 − x3)− y1.
10: Return (x3, y3)
Algebraic proof of associativity law is given in projective coordinate in [94]. Therefore, the
addition law, negation law and the point at infinity (as considered as the identity elements)
make the elliptic curve point E(Fq) an additive abelian group.
The addition formula and the doubling formula of elliptic curve on a general Weierstrass
form are different operations and so can be distinguished from side-channel analysis as we will
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see later. However, in 2002 Brier and Joye [13] introduced the first unified4 addition formula.
In the same year Izu and Takagi [46] proposed a chosen ciphertext attack combined with the
side channel attack to the ELGamal cryptosystems using Briers-Joye’s formula. Therefore,
Briers-Joye’s formula has no longer use.
Definition 2.2.1 Group order: Let E be an elliptic curve over a field Fq, order of E over
Fq is the number of points in E(Fq), and is denoted as #E(Fq).
Theorem 2.2.1 Hasse: Let E be an elliptic curve defined over Fq. Then
q + 1− 2√q ≤ #E(Fq) ≤ q + 1 + 2√q.
The interval [q + 1− 2√q, q + 1 + 2√q] is called Hasse interval. (For proof see ref [94] )
Definition 2.2.2 Order of point: Let E be an elliptic curve over a field Fq and P ∈ E(Fq),
order of P over Fq is the smallest positive integer 1 ≤ r ≤ #E(Fq) such that rP = O, and
is denoted as ordE(P ). (rP is the process of adding P to itself r times, it is known as scalar
multiplication)
2.3 Coordinates of an Elliptic Curve
When elliptic curve points are represented in Affine coordinate [87] ((x, y) coordinate), both
elliptic curve operations(addition or doubling) require inversion over a field Fp, the relative
cost of inversion over a field Fp is significantly more expensive than multiplication, there-
fore, different coordinate system which requires a greater number of multiplication but no
inversion is used and the speed of point addition and doubling is different from one coordi-
nate system to another. Example of such system are Homogenous projective coordinate[56],
Jacobian coordinate([18], [21]), Chudnovsky Jacobian coordinate [18] and Modified Jacobian
coordinate [20].
In the following subsections, we give details of these systems, standard references are [87],[34],
and [94].
4Unified formula in which the same formula apply equally to add two different points or to double a point.
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Theorem 2.3.1 Isomorphism classes of elliptic curve: Let K = Fq be a finite field with
char(K)6= 2 or 3, the elliptic curves:
E1 : y
2 = x3 + ax+ b
E2 : y
2 = x3 + a´x+ b´
defined over K are isomorphic over K if and only if there exists u ∈ K∗ such that u4a´ = a
and u6b´ = b. The admissible change of variables (x, y)→ (u2x, u3y) transform E1 to E2.
Definition 2.3.1 Let K be a field and let c and d be positive integers, an equivalence relation
∼ on the set K3 \ {(0, 0, 0)} of nonzero triples over K is defined by
(X1, Y1, Z1) ∼ (X2, Y2, Z2)
if there exist λ ∈ K∗ such that X1 = λcX2, Y1 = λdY2 and Z1 = λZ2.
The equivalence class containing (X,Y, Z) ∈ K3 \ {(0, 0, 0)} is
(X : Y : Z) = {(λcX,λdY, λZ) : λ ∈ K∗}
(X : Y : Z) is called a projective point and (X,Y, Z) is called a representative of the
projective point (X : Y : Z). Since any element in the equivalence class can serves as its a
representative, then if Z 6= 0, then ( XZc , YZd , 1) is the only representative with Z−coordinate
equal to 1 of the projective point (X : Y : Z). Thus we have a one to one correspondence
between the set of projective points
P ∗(K) = {(X : Y : Z) : X,Y, Z ∈ K,Z 6= 0}
and the set of affine points
A(K) = {(x, y) : x, y ∈ K}
where x = XZc and y =
Y
Zd
.
The set of projective points
P (K)0 = {(X : Y : Z) : X,Y, Z ∈ K,Z = 0}
10
CHAPTER 2. BASICS AND LITERATURE REVIEW
is called the line at infinity.
2.3.1 Homogenous projective coordinates
In this system each point (x, y) on the curve y2 = x3 + ax+ b is represented with the triplet
(X,Y, Z) which corresponds to the affine point (X/Z, Y/Z) with Z 6= 0. These triples satisfy
the homogenous projective equation ZY 2 = X3 + aXZ2 + bZ3. The identity element is
represented by (0 : 1 : 0), it is obtained by setting Z = 0 in the homogenous projective
equation. The negative of (X : Y : Z) is (X : −Y : Z). For all nonzero number λ,
(X : Y : Z) = (λX : λY : λZ). Addition and doubling formula are obtained by substituting
x = X/Z and y = Y/Z in the addition and doubling formula in affine coordinate and clearing
denominators.
2.3.2 Jacobian coordinates
In this system each point (x, y) on the curve y2 = x3 + ax+ b is represented with the triplet
(X,Y, Z) which corresponds to the affine point (X/Z2, Y/Z3) with Z 6= 0. These triples
satisfy the projective equation Y 2 = X3 + aXZ4 + bZ6. The identity element is represented
by (1 : 1 : 0). The negative of (X : Y : Z) is (X : −Y : Z). For all nonzero number λ,
(X : Y : Z) = (λ2X : λ3Y : λZ). Addition and doubling formula are obtained by substituting
x = X/Z2 and y = Y/Z3 in the addition and doubling formula in affine coordinate and
clearing denominators. Chudnovsky and Chudnovsky [18] presented an explicit formulas for
group operations in Jacobian coordinates. Chudnovsky and Chudnovsky noted that, when
a = −3 doubling is faster. Jacobian coordinates offer a faster doubling and a slower addition
than projective coordinates.
Bernstein and Lange [6] built an updated database of explicit formula that are reported
in the literature together with their own optimizations.
2.3.3 Chudnovsky Jacobian coordinates
In Jacobian coordinate, in order to make an addition faster the Jacobian point (X : Y : Z)
is internally represented by (X : Y : Z : Z2 : Z3) and is named as Chudnovsky Jacobian
coordinate [18].
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2.3.4 A Modified Jacobian coordinates
In Jacobian coordinate, a fastest doubling can be yield when the jacobian point(X : Y : Z)
is represented by (X : Y : Z : aZ4). This representation named as A Modified Jacobian
coordinate [21].
2.4 Scalar Multiplication
The scalar multiplication is the most time consuming operation in elliptic curve cryptography
based protocol, which compute kP for a given point P ∈ E(Fq) and a scalar k such that
1 ≤ k < ordE(P ). It is performed throw a combination of point addition and doubling.
There are many proposals given in literature which provide improvements for different kind
of scenarios: (1) both the scalar and the base point are unknown, (2) the scalar is fixed, and
(3) the base point is fixed [19, 34].
In the following sections, we describe methods where both the point P and the multiplier
k are unknown in a prior, followed by methods where the scalar is fixed. Standard references
are [19] [34] and [30].
In the rest of this chapter we assume that A and D represent the costs for elliptic curve
point addition and doubling, respectively.
2.4.1 Binary method
The Binary method also often referred as (double-and-add). It is based on the equality
[(kl−1...ki+1ki)2]P = 2[(kl−1...ki+1)2]P ) + [ki]P. It scans the binary bits of the scalar k either
from left-to-right or right-to-left. A point doubling operation is performed at every loop
iteration whereas point addition is only performed if the scalar bit value ki is 1. It therefore
achieves a density of 1/2 which results in a computational complexity of l2A+lD. Algorithm 2
is used to compute kP using left to right binary method.
2.4.2 2r-ary Method
2r-ary method is a generalization of the binary method. It has been proposed by Brauer [11]
in 1939. The idea is to slice the representation of the scalar k into pieces and to process r
digits at a time. For this, k is represented in a base 2r where r > 1. The method scans
12
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Algorithm 2 Left-to-right binary method
Require: k = (kl−1...k0)2, P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: kP .
1: Q = O.
2: For i = l − 1 downto 0 do.
3: Q = 2Q.
4: If ki = 1 then Q = Q+ P .
5: ReturnQ.
Algorithm 3 Left-to-right 2r-ary method
Require: A parameter r ≥ 1, a nonnegative integer k = (kl−1...k0)2r , and P ∈ E(Fq)
Ensure: kP
1: Compute Pi = iP for all i ∈ {1, 3, ..., 2r − 1}.
2: Q = O and i = l − 1.
3: While i ≥ 0 do
4: (s, u) = σ(ki)
5: For j = 1 to r − s do Q = 2Q.
6: If ki 6= 0 then Q = Q+ Pu.
7: For j = 1 to s do Q = 2Q.
8: i = i− 1.
9: Return Q.
the bits either from left-to-right or from right-to-left. It requires extra memory(for pre-
computation of all Pi = iP for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3..., 2r}) but it significantly improve the speed
of scalar multiplication. To reduce the a mount of pre-computation define a function σ by
σ(0) = (r, 0) and σ(z) = (s, u), where z = 2su and u is an odd integer, then using the fact
that 2s(2r−sQ+ uP ) = 2rQ+ kiP , algorithm 3 from [19] can be used to compute kP using
2r-ary method.
2.4.3 Sliding window method
An efficient variant of the 2r−ary method is the sliding window method introduced by
Thurber [90] in 1973. By pre-computing iP for i ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7, ..., 2ω − 1}, one can move a
width-ω window across the scalar k and search for the first non-zero bit. After finding the
bit, the window is placed such that the value of the window is odd, skipping consecutive zero
entries after a nonzero bit ki is processed.
Algorithm 4 from [19] is used to compute kP using sliding window method. In Algo-
rithm 4, in the while loop in the body of else statement the index i is fixed while the loop
finds the longest substring (ki...ks) of length less than or equal to ω such that u = (ki...ks)
13
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Algorithm 4 Sliding window method
Require: A parameter ω ≥ 1, a nonnegative integer k = (kl−1...k0)2, and P ∈ E(Fq)
Ensure: kP
1: Compute Pi = iP for all i ∈ {1, 3, ..., 2ω − 1}.
2: Q = O ; i = l − 1.
3: While i ≥ 0 do .
4: If ki = 0 then Q = 2Q and i = i− 1.
5: Else.
6: s = max{i− ω + 1, 0}.
7: While ks = 0 do s=s+1.
8: For j = 1 to i− s+ 1 do Q = 2Q.
9: u = (ki...ks)2.
10: Q = Q+ Pu; i = s− 1.
11: Return Q.
is odd, and since i− s+ 1 is less than ω, then u belongs to the set of pre-computed values.
2.4.4 Non-Adjacent Form (NAF) Representations
The density of the prior described methods can be further reduced by using a signed-digit
representation. The advantage of this representation is that the cost of computing the inverse
of elliptic-curve points, e.g. −P , comes almost for free. Booth [9] proposed in 1951 to expand
the coefficients in the representation of the scalar k from {0, 1}. to {−1, 0, 1}. However,
the disadvantage of his proposal has been that the representation is not unique. Thus,
Reitwiesner [78] proposed to apply a Non-Adjacent Form (NAF) representation in 1960. A
NAF representation of a positive integer k is k =
∑l−1
i=0 ki2
i where ki ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, each
nonzero coefficient ki is odd , kl−1 6= 0 and no two consecutive digits ki are nonzero. It is a
canonical representation with the fewest number of non-zero digits for a given scalar k. The
expected number of non-zero bits in a NAF is l/3 as shown by Morain and Olivos [72]. The
runtime complexity of a binary NAF method is therefore approximately l3A+ lD (cf. [10] and
[72]).
A generalization of NAF is the width-ω NAF, proposed by Solinas [88] in 2000. For the
width-ω NAF, the scalar k is represented by
k =
l−1∑
i=0
ki2
i (2.4.1)
In this representation |ki| < 2ω−1, each nonzero coefficient ki is odd, kl−1 6= 0, and at
14
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Algorithm 5 Width-ω NAF representation of a positive integer k
Require: Window width w and a positive integer k.
Ensure: Width-ω NAF(k).
1: i = 0.
2: While k > 0 do
3: If k is odd then
4: b ≡ k mod 2ω.
5: If b ≥ 2ω−1 then
6: b = b− 2ω.
7: k = k − b.
8: Else b = 0.
9: ki = b; i = i+ 1; k = k/2.
10: Return (ki−1, ki−2, ..., k1, k0).
most one of any ω consecutive digits is nonzero. Algorithm 5 can be used to obtain the
width-ω NAF of a positive integer k and is denoted by NAFω(k)(NAF2(k)=NAF(k)).
In order to perform the scalar multiplication using width-ω NAF, the points P, 3P, ..., (2ω−1−
1)P are pre-computed and the scalar multiplication is performed in the evaluation phase as
shown in Algorithm 6. The average density of non-zero bits among all width-ω NAFs is
asymptotically 1/(1 + ω) [72]. The expected runtime of Algorithm 6 is therefore
[1D + [2ω−2 − 1]A] + [ l
ω + 1
A+ lD]. (2.4.2)
2.4.5 Fractional window method
A common drawback of sliding window method and window method is that, the number
of pre-computed value may be dictated by memory limitations. The window method need
Algorithm 6 Width-ω NAF method for scalar multiplication
Require: Window width-ω, positive integer k and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: Q = kP .
1: Use Algorithm 5 to compute NAFω(k) =
∑l−1
i=0 ki2
i.
2: Compute Pi = iP for all i ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7, ..., 2ω−1 − 1}.
3: Q = O.
4: For i = l − 1 downto 0 do
5: Q = 2Q.
6: If ki 6= 0 then
7: If ki > 0 then Q = Q+ Pki .
8: Else Q = Q− P−ki .
9: Return (Q).
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storage for 2ω−2 element, hence memory may be wasted if the available memory is not a
power of 2. Mo¨ller [70] introduced Fractional window method which eliminate this problem by
making use of space that remain unused in sliding window and window methods. To describe
Mo¨ller [70] method, let ω ≥ 2 be an integer and m an odd integer such that 1 ≤ m ≤ 2ω − 3.
The signed fractional window representation for a positive integer k is
k =
l−1∑
i=0
ki2
i
where ki ∈ {0}
⋃
B,where B = {±1,±3, ...,±(2ω +m)}.
Let the mapping digit: {0, 1, 2, ..., 2ω+2} → B⋃{0} be defined as follows:
1. If x is even, then digit(x)=0.
2. else if 0 < x ≤ 2ω +m, then digit(x) = x
3. else if 2ω +m < x < 3.2ω −m, then digit(x) = x− 2ω+1
4. else let digit(x) = x− 2ω+2.
Algorithm 7 from [70] is used to represent a positive integer k into signed fractional window
representation.
Algorithm 7 Fractional window representation of a positive integer k
Require: Window width ω, odd integer 1 ≤ m ≤ 2ω − 3, positive integer k and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: Fractional window representation of k.
1: d = k mod 2ω+2.
2: c = bk/2ω+2c.
3: i = 0.
4: While d 6= 0 ∨ c 6= 0 do.
5: ki=digit(d).
6: d = d− ki.
7: i = i+ 1.
8: d = (c mod 2) .2ω+1 + d/2.
9: c = bc/2c.
10: Return (ki−1, ki−2, ..., k1, k0).
Mo¨ller [70] showed that the average density of non zero digit using fractional window
representation with parameters ω and m is
1
ω + m+12ω + 2
(2.4.3)
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Algorithm 8 Fractional window method for scalar multiplication
Require: Window width ω, odd integer 1 ≤ m ≤ 2ω − 3, positive integer k and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: kP .
1: Use Algorithm 7 to compute fractional window representation Fω,m(k) =
∑l−1
i=0 ki2
i.
2: Compute Pi = iP for all i ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7, ..., 2ω +m}.
3: Q = O.
4: For i = l − 1 downto 0 do
5: Q = 2Q.
6: If ki 6= 0.
7: If ki > 0 then Q = Q+ Pki .
8: else Q = Q− P−ki .
9: ReturnQ.
The expected running time of Algorithm 8 is
l
ω + m+12ω + 2
A+ lD. (2.4.4)
2.4.6 Montgomery scalar multiplication
In 1987 Montgomery [71] described a technique for a special type of curve (Montgomery
curve)in large characteristic.
Definition 2.4.1 Montgomery form: Let EM be an elliptic curve expressed in Montgomery
form, that is
EM : By
2 = x3 +Ax2 + x
Montgomery’s technique is based on the fact that the sum of two points whose difference
is a known point can be calculated without the y-coordinate of the two points. Therefore, the
arithmetic on EM relies on an efficient x-coordinate only computation, and the y-coordinate
is recovered by a simple formula [71]. In 2002 Brier and Joye [14] generalized Montgomery’s
idea to any curve in short Weierstrass equation.
Let P1 = (x1, y1) and P2 = (x2, y2) two points on elliptic curve E : y
2 = x3 + ax+ b and
D = P2 − P1 = (xD, yD). Let (x3, y3) be the sum of P1 + P2, then x3 is given by
x3 =
−4b(x1 + x2) + (x1x2 − a)2
x(x1 − x2)2 (2.4.5)
Furthermore, if y1 6= 0 then the the x−coordinate of 2P1, say x4, can be expressed from the
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Algorithm 9 Montgomery ladder method for computing x(kP )
Require: k = (kl−1...k0)2, P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: x(kP ).
1: R0 = O;R1 = P .
2: For i = l − 1 downto 0 do.
3: b = ki;x(R1−b) = x(R1−b +Rb)
4: x(Rb) = x(2Rb).
5: Return R0.
x−coordinate of P1 as
x4 =
(x21 − a)2 − 8bx1
4(x31 + ax1 + b)
(2.4.6)
Using Algorithm 9 we can compute the x−coordinates of kP (registerR0) and the x-coordinates
of (k + 1)P (register R1). To recover y-coordinate of kP , let (x1, y1) the coordinates of
Q = kP, (xD, yD) the coordinates of P and x2 the x-coordinate of (k + 1)P , if yD 6= 0, then
we have
y1 =
2b+ (a+ xDx1)(xD + x1)− x2(xD − x1)2
2yD
(2.4.7)
From Algorithm 9, it can easily seen that Montgomery ladder implicitly offers security
against simple power analysis attacks [54, 55, 64], since it performs the same curve operations
in every loop iteration. In addition to that, the Montgomery ladder has a very regular
structure and does not use dummy operations, this prevents fault-injection based safe-error
attacks [98, 99].
For a field of characteristic 2, in 1999, Lopez and Dahab [61] showed that all curve can
be turned into Montgomerys.
2.4.7 Fixed base windowing methods
When the base point P is fixed, the efficiency of scalar multiplication can be improved
by pre-computations. The first idea which was proposed by Yao [97] in 1976 is to pre-
compute every multiple 2iP where 0 < i < l . If theoretically all 2iP points are pre-
computed, the complexity of scalar multiplication is reduced to only l2A (without the need
of any doublings). A slightly improved form is the fixed-base windowing technique that was
proposed by Brickell et al. (BGMW) [12]. In BGMW method the scalar k is represented in
18
CHAPTER 2. BASICS AND LITERATURE REVIEW
base 2ω (i.e k = (Kd−1, ...,K1,K0)2ω), d = dl/ωe, where l is the bit length of the scalar k.
Therefore, we can write kP as
kP =
d−1∑
i=0
Ki2
ωiP =
2ω−1∑
j=1
(j
d−1∑
i:Ki=j
2ωiP ) =
2ω−1∑
j=1
jQj ,
where Qj =
∑
i:Ki=j
2ωiP for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2ω − 1. The value of ∑2ω−1j=1 jQj can be
efficiently computed as follows:
2ω−1∑
j=1
jQj = Q2ω−1 + (Q2ω−1 +Q2ω−2) + ...+ (Q2ω−1 +Q2ω−2 + ...+Q1)
Algorithm 10, from [34] can be used to compute scalar multiplication. The runtime complexity
is reduced to (2ω + d− 3)A.
Algorithm 10 Fixed base windowing method for scalar multiplication
Require: Window width ω, d = dl/ωe, k = (Kd−1, ...,K1,K0)2ω and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: kP .
1: Compute Pi = 2
ωiP , 0 ≤ i ≤ d− 1.
2: A = O;B = O.
3: For j = 2ω − 1 downto 1 do .
4: For each i for which Ki = j do :B = B + Pi.
5: A = A+B.
6: Return(A).
Similarly, a NAF windowing technique can be applied which further reduces the com-
plexity to approximately (2
ω+1
3 + d − 2)A, where d = d(l + 1)/ωe. Algorithm 11, from [34]
can be used to compute scalar multiplication using Fixed base NAF windowing method for
scalar multiplication.
2.4.8 Fixed-Base Comb Methods
The main idea of fixed-base comb methods is to represent the scalar k as a binary matrix of
h rows and v columns. The matrix is then processed column-wise from right-to-left or from
left-to-right.
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Algorithm 11 Fixed base NAF windowing method for scalar multiplication
Require: Window width ω, positive integer k and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: kP .
1: Compute Pi = 2
ωiP , 0 ≤ i ≤ d(l + 1)/ωe.
2: Compute NAF(k) =
∑l−1
i=0 ki2
i.
3: d = dl/ωe.
4: By padding NAF(k) on the left with zeros if necessary, write (kl−1, ..., k1, k0) =
Kd−1||...||K1||K0 where each Ki is a {0,±1}−string of length d.
5: If ω is even then I = (2ω+1 − 2)/3; else I = (2ω+1 − 1)/3
6: A = O,B = O.
7: For j = I downto 1 do .
8: For each i for which Ki = j do :B = B + Pi.
9: For each i for which Ki = −j do :B = B − Pi.
10: A = A+B.
11: Return(A).
Lim and Lee Method
In 1994, Lim and Lee [59] introduced a comb technique that divides the scalar k into h blocks
Ki from right-to-left, for 0 ≤ i ≤ h − 1, of equal size a = d lhe (we pad zeros if necessary).
Then, subdivide each block Ki from up-to-down into v subblocks ki,j of equal size b = dav e,
where 0 ≤ j ≤ v − 1. We can rewrite the h blocks of k in terms of a binary matrix, i.e.
k =

K0
...
Ki
...
Kh−1

=

k0,v−1 · · · k0,j · · · k0,0
...
...
...
ki,v−1 · · · ki,j · · · ki,0
...
...
...
kh−1,v−1 · · · kh−1,j · · · kh−1,0

=
v−1∑
j=0
h−1∑
i=0
ki,j2
jb2ia, (2.4.8)
Let P0 = P and Pi = 2
aPi−1 = 2iaP for 0 < i < h. Then, we can rewrite kP as
kP =
v−1∑
j=0
h−1∑
i=0
ki,j2
jb2iaP =
v−1∑
j=0
h−1∑
i=0
ki,j2
jbPi,
Since Ki is of size a, we can let Ki = ei,a−1...ei,1ei,0 be the binary representation of Ki
for all 0 ≤ i < h, and hence ki,j = ei,jb+b−1...ei,jb+1ei,jb is the binary representation of ki,j ,
therefore
20
CHAPTER 2. BASICS AND LITERATURE REVIEW
kP =
b−1∑
t=0
2t(
v−1∑
j=0
h−1∑
i=0
ei,jb+t2
jbPi),
Suppose that the following values are pre-computed and stored for all 1 ≤ s < 2h and
1 ≤ j ≤ v − 1,
G[0][s] = eh−1Ph−1 + ...+ e1P1 + e0P0,
G[j][s] = 2b(G[j − 1][s]) = 2jbG[0][s],
(2.4.9)
where the index s is equal to the decimal value of eh−1...e1e0. Therefore, we can rewrite
kP as follows
kP =
b−1∑
t=0
2t(
v−1∑
j=0
G[j][Ij,t]), (2.4.10)
where Ij,t is the decimal value of eh−1,jb+t...e0,jb+t (0 ≤ t < b).
Now we can use the left-to-right binary method to compute kP using these pre-computed
values. The number of elliptic-curve operations in the worst case is a+ b− 2, and since Ij,t is
of size h, we may assume that the probability of Ij,t being zero is
1
2h
and Ij,t occurs a times,
thus the expected number of elliptic-curve operations is reduced to (1− 1
2h
)a+ b− 2.
2.4.9 Direct doubling method.
When the multiplier k is a power of 2, Sakai and Sakurai [81] introduced an efficient method
to compute kP = 2rP (r ≥ 1) on elliptic curves over Fp. Given a point P = (x1, y1) ∈ Fp,
their method compute 2rP directly. Algorithm 12 from [81] illustrates their method in affine
coordinates.
In Table 2.4.1 and Table 2.4.2 we give a comparison of required numbers of multipli-
cation(M), squaring (S)and Inversion (I) required to performed the scalar multiplication
k = 2rP between direct doubling and separate r doublings methods in both affine and Jaco-
bian coordinates [81].
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Algorithm 12 Sakai-Sakurai method for direct doubling
Require: A positive integer r such that k = 2r and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: k = 2rP
1: A1 = x1, B1 = 3x
2
1 + a and C1 = −y1.
2: For i = 2 to r.
3: Ai = B
2
i−1 − 8Ai−1C2i−1.
4: Bi = 3A
2
i + 16
i−1a(
∏i−1
j=1Cj)
4.
5: Ci = −8C4i−1 −Bi−1(Ai − 4Ai−1C2i−1).
6: Compute Dr = 12ArC
2
r −B2r .
7: Compute x2r =
B2r−8ArC2r
(2r
∏r
i=1 Ci)
2 .
8: Compute y2r =
8C4r−BrDr
(2r
∏r
i=1 Ci)
3 .
9: Return x2r and y2r .
Table 2.4.1: Complexity Comparison between doubling and direct doubling in affine coordi-
nates
Method S M I
Direct Doubling 4r + 1 4r + 1 1
Separate r Doubling 2r 2r r
2.5 Side Channel Attacks
Side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks have been first introduced by Kocher et al. [54, 55, 64]
in 1996. By monitoring physical characteristics of a given implementation, e.g. the power
consumption or the timing behavior, an attacker is able to extract secret information such as
the ephemeral key or private key in asymmetric primitives. In this section we will present the
Simple Power Analysis(SPA), Differential Power Analysis(DPA), second order DPA, RPA,
ZPA and Geiselmann-Steinwandt’s attacks.
2.5.1 Simple Power Analysis attacks (SPA)
Simple Power Analysis attacks are based on the analysis of a single execution of the algo-
rithm. This type of attack is particularly efficient on elliptic curve cryptosystems, because
Table 2.4.2: Complexity Comparison between doubling and direct doubling in Jacobian co-
ordinates
Method S M
Direct Doubling 4r 4r − 2
Separate r Doubling 4r 4r
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the operations of doubling and addition of points are intrinsically different. Several counter-
measures against the SPA are proposed in the literature. They can mainly be put in four
categories.
• Repeating the same pattern of instructions, whatever the processed data. In [22], Coron
proposes the use double-and-add always method as a simple countermeasure. Corn’s
method involves a use of dummy point addition operation if the scalar bit is set to
0 in the binary method. In [98, 99] it has been shown that Coron’s double-and-add
always method actually prevents SPA attacks but becomes vulnerable to safe-error
fault attacks.
• The use of curves of specific form. Such countermeasures have been proposed for the
Hessian form [49], for the Jacobi form [58, 8], for the Montgomery form [74, 75] and for
the Edward form [24, 7]. The disadvantage, it is not fully general for example Jacobi
and Edward forms have always a point of order 4 and Hessian form a point of order
3. This implies that the order of the corresponding elliptic curve is a multiple of 4 and
3 respectively, while standard curve recommended by American National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) or [SECG00] are curves of prime cardinality over a
large prime field.
• The use of a unified addition formula on Weierstrass form [45, 14, 8, 27].
• The countermeasures based on Montgomery ladder method [51, 14, 91]
2.5.2 Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
Differential Power Analysis(DPA) attacks are based on statistical analysis of the execution
of the algorithm several times. Elliptic curve cryptosystem have the advantage of almost
always using a new random ephemeral secrete integer in the double and add algorithm for
each run of a protocol, thus, DPA attack on ECC is harder to mount[58]. To completely
secure ECC against DPA several countermeasures are proposed in the literature. They can
mainly be put in four categories.
• Adding a multiple of the order of the curve before performing the scalar multiplication.
• Using different key-expansion methods [77, 44, 50]
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• Randomize points representation [22, 50].
• Randomize the underlying curve [22, 50].
2.5.3 Second Order(DPA)
A Second order DPA was proposed by Okeya and Sakurai [73], is the side channel attack which
uses two different leaked data that correspond to two different intermediate values during the
execution. Okey and Sakurai’s attacks against Mo¨ller’s [69] window method finds out the use
of same elliptic points, and restricts candidates of the secret scalar value. To secure ECC a
gainst second order DPA, Hedabou et al.[38] suggested to change the randomization of each
pre-computed point after getting the point in the table.
2.5.4 RPA, ZPA and Geiselmann-Steinwandt’s attacks
The Refined Power Analysis(RPA) attack was proposed by Goubin [31]. He discovered that
for many elliptic curves, the previously mentioned DPA countermeasure of the scalar mul-
tiplication are not sufficient if an attacker can choose the point P to enter into the point
multiplication algorithm. Goubin uses special points, which are often exists in the standard
curves to deduce the bits of the secret key. He noted that randomizing points with zero
coordinate ((x, 0) or (0, y)) yields points that still possess a zero coordinate.
The Zero value Point Analysis (ZPA) attack was proposed by Akishita and Takagi [1]
as an extension of Goubin’s [31] attack. They noted that even if a point has no zero-value
coordinate, the auxiliary registers might take zero-value, when the adding and doubling
operations are performed by the scalar multiplication. They investigated that these zero-
value registers cannot be randomized in Jacobian coordinates or in the isomorphic class, and
some conditions required for the zero-value attack depend on the explicit implementation of
the addition formula. Also, they mentioned that in order to resist ZPA attacks, we have to
care how to implement the addition formula.
In [43] Itoh et al., proposed two countermeasures, the Randomized Linearly-transformed
Coordinates (RLC) and the Randomized Initial Point (RIP) against DPA including RPA and
ZPA. Then, Mamiay et al. [62] improved the efficiency. Later, Itoh et al. [101] improved RIP
in another direction. Generally RIP works as follow, make use of a random initial point R,
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computes dP +R, subtracts R, and gets dP . Therefore, by using a RIP at each execution of
exponentiation, any point or any register used in addition formulae changes at each execution.
In [28], Geiselmann and Steinwandt proposed attack which exploit the points with a zero
coordinate. Geiselmann and Steinwandt’s attacks breaks the SPA-resistant width-ω method,
and will be efficient against the fixed base comb method, since it uses a precomputated table,
even if the usual randomization techniques are used [39].
2.6 Countermeasures for Preventing Comb Method Against
SCA attacks
SPA attacks on a fixed base comb method such as proposed by Lim and Lee [59] , and Tsaur
and Chou [92] allow to detect some information on the bits of the secret scalar. All of this
methods perform an addition and doubling operation for a non zero column. Therefore, it is
expected that an attacker can determine the zero column by observing a suitable side channel
(e.g., the power consumption) during the execution of the algorithm.
In this section we present the countermeasures for preventing fixed base comb method
proposed by Hedabou et al. [38, 39] and Feng et al. [25, 16]. To simplify the comparison with
the original method of Lim and Lee[59], we rewrite the algorithm of Lim and Lee when the
scalar k =
∑l−1
i=0 ki2
i with ki ∈ {0, 1} is represented by a matrix of ω rows and d = d lω e
column. Also, when P being an elliptic curve point, for all (bω−1, .., b1, b0) ∈ Zω2 , we define
[bω−1, .., b1, b0]P = b0 + b12d + b222d + ...+ bω−12(ω−1)d.
Algorithm 13 from [38] illustrate Lim and Lee method.
2.6.1 HPB’S Comb Method
Hedabou et al. [38] proposed the first SCA resistant fixed-base comb method that is based
on the work of Lim and Lee [59]. Their main idea is to construct a new sequence of bits
representing the scalar k from its bit-string as introduced by Lim and Lee, so that all the
new bit strings are different from zero. For an odd scalar k, their method represent the scalar
k as in the original method of Lim and Lee as k = Kω−1||...||K1||K0, then, they initialized
s0 = 1, and generated a new sequence of bit strings (Ki, si) as
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Algorithm 13 Lim and Lee method
Require: A positive integer k = (kl−1, ..., k1, k0)2, an elliptic curve point P and a window
width ω such as ω ≥ 2 .
Ensure: kP
1: d = d lω e.
2: Precomputation: compute [bω−1, .., b1, b0]P for all (bω−1, .., b1, b0) ∈ Zω2 .
3: By padding k on the left with 0’s if necessary, write k = Kω−1||...||K1||K0,
where each Kj is a bit-string of length d. Let Kji denote the i-th bit of K
j .
4: Q = [Kω−1l−1 , ...,K
1
l−1,K
0
l−1]P .
5: For i from d− 2 to 0 do
6: Q = 2Q.
7: Q = Q+ [Kω−1i , ...,K
1
i ,K
0
i ]P .
8: Return Q.
(Ki, si) = (Ki−1, si−1)
(Ki−1, si−1) = (Ki−1,−si−1)
if Ki = 0 and
(Ki, si) = (Ki, si−1)
(Ki−1, si−1) = (Ki−1, si−1)
otherwise.
Since all the new sequence are different from 0, then, their algorithm perform addition
and doubling in each iteration.
In [39], Hedabou et al. proposed a second SPA resistant fixed base method. Their method
also assume an odd scalar k, and represent k as k =
∑l−1
i=0 ki2
i with ki ∈ {−1, 1} by exploiting
the facts 1 = 11¯1¯...1¯, where 1¯ = −1, and applies the original comb method to the new
representation. The new sequence generated by this method can be represented by Ki =
[bω−1, .., b1, b0], where bi ∈ {−1, 1}, 0 ≤ i < ω.
Hedabou et al. [38, 39] suggested to replace k´ = k+ 1 if the scalar k is even and subtract
P from the result. Also, they suggested to replace k by k´ = k + 2 when k is odd and to
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Table 2.6.1: Runtime complexity and storage cost of Hedabou et al. [38, 39] methods.
Method d Average cost Storage cost
Hedabou et al.[38] d lω e dA+ dD 2ω − 1
Hedabou et al.[39] d lω e dA+ dD 2ω−1
Table 2.6.2: Runtime complexity and storage cost of Feng et al. [25, 16] methods.
Method d Average cost Storage cost
Feng et al. [25] d l+1ω e dA+ dD 2ω−1
Feng et al. [16] d lω e dA+ (d− 1)D 2ω−1
subtract 2P from the result so as to make the algorithm regular. In Table 2.6.1, we give
average cost and storage cost for Hedabou et al. methods. Compared with the original comb
method, Hedabou et al. [39] stores about half of precomputed points, but the time cost in
the precomputation stage is a little higher(which in not a problem since precomputation is
performed once, because the base point is fixed in the comb methods).
2.6.2 Feng et al.’s Comb Method
In [25, 16] Feng et al. proposed a novel comb-recoding algorithm which converts an integer
to a sequence of signed odd-only comb bit-columns, then, they proposed several comb meth-
ods, both SPA-nonresistant and SPA-resistant, for point multiplication. Their methods [25]
(which can be referred to as signed LSB-set), generate a signed sequenceKi = ±[cω−1, .., c1, 1],
where ci ∈ {0, 1}, 0 ≤ i < ω. By adding dummy operations, they modified their method to
SPA resistant method.
Feng et al. [16] method which is known as signed MSB-set generates a signed sequence
Ki = ±[cω−1, .., c1, c0], where cω−1 ∈ {−1, 1} and ci ∈ {0, cω−1}, 0 ≤ i < ω−1. In Table 2.6.2
we give the average cost and storage cost for Feng et al. methods. Compared with the
original comb method, Feng et al. [25, 16] methods stores about half of precomputed points,
and the signed MSB-set is more efficient than the signed LSB-set if l is divisible by ω.
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2.7 Recent Advances
In [92] Tsaur and Chou proposed a new fixed-base comb method by using a Non-Adjacent
Form (NAF) representation for the scalar and applying the Sakai and Sakurai [81] method
for direct doubling. Tsaur and Chou [92] claimed that their method is more efficient than
Lim and Lee [59] method. However, in this thesis, in Chapter 3 we prove that Tsaur and
Chou method is not more efficient than Lim and Lee method. Moreover, we propose an
improvement of Tsaur and Chou method by using width-ω NAF representation. Our pro-
posed method provides a significant reduction in the number of required elliptic-curve point
addition operations. In practice, a speed improvement by 33 % to 38 % is achieved. Consid-
ering side channel attacks, our proposed method in Chapter 3 is not resistant to side channel
attacks.
Various countermeasures against side channel analysis attacks have been proposed in the
literature such as [22, 98, 99, 49, 58, 8, 74, 75, 24, 7, 45, 14, 27]. More countermeasures were
proposed by using recoding representation of the scalar. In [69], Mo¨ller proposed an SPA
resistant window method based on 2ω-ary window method where each digit that is equal
to zero is replaced with −2ω, and the next most significant digit is incremented by one.
In [76], Okey and Takagi proposed a SPA resistant scalar multiplication based on width-ω
NAF method. They generated a scalar sequence with fixed pattern. However, In [82], Sakai
and Sakura proposed methods of attacks on the exponent recoding for width-ω NAF [88] and
signed/unsigned fractional window representation [70]. They noted that to achieve a regular
exponentiation algorithm(or scalar multiplication algorithm) any recoding that is used also
needs to be regular.
Recently, in [48], Joye and Tunstall proposed methods of recoding exponent/scalar to
allow for regular implementations of m-ary algorithm. Their proposed method make use of
both signed and unsigned exponent/scalar digits. In this thesis, in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5
we propose two efficient regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithm
using fixed base comb method. In Chapter 4 we represents the scalar k in m = 2ω (where
ω > 1) radix representation using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent and divide the scalar
into v blocks. Whereas, in Chapter 5 we represents the scalar k in base 2 using Joye and
Tunstall [48] regular exponent recoding and the scalar is divided into ω× v blocks according
to the method of Lim and Lee.
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Improved Fixed-base Comb
Method
Computing elliptic-curve scalar multiplication is the most time consuming operation in any
elliptic-curve cryptosystem. In the last decades, it has been shown that pre-computations
of elliptic-curve points improve the performance of the scalar multiplication especially in
cases where the elliptic-curve point P is fixed. The first suggestion was made by Yao [97]
in 1976, and improved by Brickell, Gordon, McCurley, and Wilson (BGMW) [12]. Another
improvement was proposed by Lim and Lee [59] in 1994. They proposed a more flexible pre-
computation technique for speeding up the computation of exponentiation. Later in 2005,
Tsaur and Chou [92] proposed a new fixed-base comb method by using a Non-Adjacent Form
(NAF) representation for the scalar and applying the Sakai and Sakurai [81] method for direct
doubling. Tsaur and Chou claimed that their method is more efficient than Lim and Lee [59]
method.
In this chapter, we review Tsaur and Chou method and prove that Tsaur and Chou
method is not more efficient than Lim and Lee method. Moreover, we propose an improve-
ment of Tsaur and Chou method. Our proposed method makes use of a fixed-base comb
technique and represents the scalar k in a width-ω NAF representation. Furthermore, we
restrict the number of rows of the comb to be greater than or equal ω. As a result, our
proposed method provides a significant reduction in the number of required elliptic curve
point additions operations. In practice, a speed improvement by 33 % to 38 % is achieved.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1 we review Tsaur and
Chou method. In Section 3.2 we give a comparison of Lim-Lee and Tsaur-Chou methods
and we prove that Tsaur and Chou method is not more efficient than Lim and Lee method.
We introduce our proposed Improved Fixed-base Comb Method for Scalar Multiplication in
Section 3.3. Discussion and results of our method compared with Tsaur-Chou method are
presented in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5 we give a conclusion. Finally, in Example 1 in the
Appendix we give example to illustrate our method.
3.1 Tsaur and Chou Method
In 2005, Tsaur and Chou [92] proposed a fixed-base comb method as an enhancement of
Lim-Lee [59] by applying a NAF representation of the scalar k. Furthermore, they divided
the scalar k into h × v blocks from up-to-down and then from right-to-left. Moreover, they
used a special doubling operation proposed by Sakai and Sakurai [81] which increases the
performance in addition.
To introduce Tsaur and Chou method, let k be an l-bit scalar represented in NAF. First,
we divide k from up-to-down into a blocks of equal size h = d lae. Thus we can write k as
follows
k = ca−1ca−2...c1c0 =
a−1∑
z=0
cz2
zh, (3.1.1)
Then, from right to left we divide the h× a blocks into h× v blocks, each of size b = dav e.
Let P0 = P and Pj = 2
hbPj−1 = 2jhbP for 0 < j < v. Therefore we can rewrite kP as
follows
kP = ca−1ca−2...c1c0P =
a−1∑
z=0
cz2
zhP =
b−1∑
t=0
2th(
v−1∑
j=0
cjb+t2
jhbP ), (3.1.2)
where cjb+t = eh−1,jb+t...e1,jb+te0,jb+t is the NAF representation. Suppose that the fol-
lowing values are precomputed and stored for all 1 ≤ i ≤∑dh2 ei=1 2h−2i+1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ v − 1
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G[0][i] = eh−12h−1P + eh−22h−2P + ...+ e0P,
G[j][i] = 2hb(G[j − 1][i])
= 2jhbG[0][i],
where the index i is equal to the decimal value of eh−1...e1e0. Therefore, we can rewrite
kP as follow
kP =
b−1∑
t=0
2th(
v−1∑
j=0
G[j][Ij,t]), (3.1.3)
where Ij,t is the decimal number of eh−1,jb+t...e1,jb+te0,jb+t (0 ≤ t < b).
Algorithm 14 from [92] can be use to compute the Scalar multiplication kP .
We know that NAF is always sparse, hence in the worst case the probability of Ij,t being
zero is 1
2h
and Ij,t occurs a times, thus the number of elliptic-curve operations in the worst
case is
(1− 1
2h
)a+ b− 2. (3.1.4)
And the expected number of elliptic-curve operations required is
(1− (2
3
)h)a+ b− 2 (3.1.5)
on average.
3.2 Comparison between Lim-Lee and Tsaur-Chou Methods
In Table 3.2.1 we give a comparison between Lim-Lee and Tsaur-Chou methods in the average
cost, worst cost and number of pre-computation as given by Tsaur and Chou [92] .
Tsaur and Chou wrote their cost in term of number of elliptic curve point operations as
Lim and Lee, it seems that Tsaur and Chou consider direct doubling as doubling. However,
the elliptic curve operations of Lim-Lee method are additions and doublings, whereas in
Tsaur-Chou method are additions and direct doubling (computation of Q = 2hQ using Sakai
and Sakurai [81]). The cost of a doubling and direct doubling of Q = 2hQ are not equal(in
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Algorithm 14 Tsaur and Chou method for scalar multiplication
Require: Positive integers h, v, k = (kl−1, ..., k1, k0)NAF and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: Q = kP .
1: a = d lhe and b = dav e.
2: Compute G[0][i] and G[j][i] for all 1 ≤ i ≤∑dh2 ei=1 2h−2i+1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ v − 1.
3: Q = O.
4: For t = b− 1 downto 0 do
5: If h = 1 then
6: Q = 2Q.
7: Else
8: Use Algorithm 12 to compute Q = 2hQ.
9: For j = v − 1 downto 0 do
10: Ij,t = (eh−1,jb+t...e1,jb+te0,jb+t)NAF .
11: If Ij,t > 0 then
12: Q = Q+G[j][Ij,t].
13: Else if Ij,t < 0
14: ´Ij,t = −Ij,t.
15: Q = Q−G[j][ ´Ij,t].
16: Return (Q).
Table 3.2.1: Runtime complexity of Lim-Lee and Tsaur-Chou methods.
Method Worst cost Average cost Storage cost
Lim-Lee [59] a+ b− 2 (1− (12)h)a+ b− 2 (2h − 1)v
Tsaur-Chou [92] (1− (12)h)a+ b− 2 (1− (23)h)a+ b− 2
∑dh
2
e
i=1 2
h−2i+1v
both affine or projective coordinates), so the comparison can not be made in term of number
of elliptic curve operations, we must obtain the cost in term of elliptic curve operations
(addition, doubling and direct doubling).
The average cost of Lim-Lee [59] in term of point additions and doublings is given by
((1− (1
2
)h)a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D. (3.2.1)
Now, the average cost of Tasur-Chou [92] method in term of additions and direct doubling
is given by
((1− (2
3
)h)a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D∗ (3.2.2)
where D∗ is the cost of one direct doubling Q = 2hQ, which is more efficient than separate
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h doublings.
D∗ = (4h+ 1)S + (4h+ 1)M + 1I. (3.2.3)
To simplify the comparison let v = 1, so we have a = b. Now, the difference between Lim-Lee
and Tsaur-Chou methods in the average cost is given by
Difference of average(lim-Tasur) = ((
2
3
)h − (1
2
)h)aA+ (a− 1)(D −D∗) (3.2.4)
Now, substitute the costs A = 2M + 1S + 1I, D = 2M + 2S + 1I and D∗ = (4h + 1)S +
(4h+ 1)M + 1I, moreover assume M = S
Difference of average(lim-Tasur) = ((
2
3
)h − (1
2
)h)(3M + 1I)a+ (a− 1)((4M + 1I)− ((8h+ 2)M + 1I))
= ((
2
3
)h − (1
2
)h)(3M + 1I)a+ (a− 1)(2− 8h)M (3.2.5)
When h = 1, Tsaur-Chou method is identical to classical NAF method and Lim-Lee is
identical to the binary method, therefor Tsaur-Chou method is more efficient than Lim and
Lee method and the difference between the two methods is in the number of points addition
and is given by
Difference of average(lim-Tasur) = ((
2
3
)− (1
2
))(3M + 1I)a (3.2.6)
In Table 3.2.2 we give the difference between Lim-Lee and Tsaur-Chou methods in the
average cost for a 160-bit scalar multiplication. The difference is given for 2 ≤ h ≤ 16, and
for 1I = 100, 80, 70, 65, 60M .
By having a look at Table 3.2.2 we notice that when h = 2 the difference is negative when
I ≤ 65M . However, when h ≥ 3 the difference is negative for all values of I against M and
so we can conclude that Tsaur-Chou method is not more efficient than Lim-Lee method as
the authors claimed.
In our comparison when didn’t consider the storage required for pre-computation. It is
very clear from Table 3.2.1 the storage cost is reduced in Tsaur-Chou method. Therefore in
limited environment we must consider the storage cost in the comparison.
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Table 3.2.2: The difference between Lim-Lee and Tsaur-Chou methods in the average cost
for a 160-bit scalar multiplication.
h I=100M I=80M I=70M I=65M I=60M
2 496.2222222 185.1111111 29.55555556 -48.22222222 -126
3 -213.25 -398.25 -490.75 -537 -583.25
4 -613.6728395 -721.6975309 -775.7098765 -802.7160494 -829.7222222
5 -846.9588477 -911.2386831 -943.3786008 -959.4485597 -975.5185185
6 -995.3049769 -1034.274884 -1053.759838 -1063.502315 -1073.244792
7 -1067.855778 -1091.184753 -1102.849241 -1108.681484 -1114.513728
8 -1105.668884 -1119.713761 -1126.736199 -1130.247418 -1133.758638
9 -1145.394299 -1154.0556 -1158.386251 -1160.551576 -1162.716901
10 -1143.030534 -1148.267323 -1150.885718 -1152.194915 -1153.504113
11 -1186.892619 -1190.21444 -1191.875351 -1192.705807 -1193.536262
12 -1211.238057 -1213.327755 -1214.372603 -1214.895028 -1215.417452
13 -1217.283361 -1218.587563 -1219.239663 -1219.565714 -1219.891764
14 -1205.841537 -1206.649006 -1207.05274 -1207.254607 -1207.456474
15 -1177.447192 -1177.942883 -1178.190728 -1178.314651 -1178.438574
16 -1132.447605 -1132.749041 -1132.899759 -1132.975118 -1133.050477
3.3 Improved Fixed-base Comb Method
In this section we propose an enhancement of Tsaur-Chou [92] method. In our proposed
method, the scalar k is represented in NAFω. Furthermore, it is divided into ω × v blocks
from up-to-down and then from right-to-left as in the method of Tsaur-Chou. In order
to illustrate our method, let k be represented in NAFω with size l. First, we divide k into
a = d lω e blocks of equal size ω (we pad the last block with aω−l zeros if necessary), therefore,
we can write k as follows
k = Ka−1Ka−2...K1K0 =
a−1∑
d=0
Kd2
dω, (3.3.1)
where 0 ≤ d < a.
Then, each block Kd is a column of ω bits (K0 represents the first ω bits, K1 the second
ω bits, ... , and Ka−1 the last ω bits), i.e.
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k =
[
Ka−1...Kd...K0
]
=

ka−1,(a−1)ω · · · kd,dω · · · k0,0
...
...
...
ka−1,(a−1)ω+i · · · kd,dω+i · · · k0,i
...
...
...
ka−1,(a−1)ω+(ω−1) · · · kd,dω+(ω−1) · · · k0,ω−1

. (3.3.2)
Note that, for each element kd,dω+i in the matrix the first subscript d indicates the column,
whereas the second subscript dω+ i indicates the exact bit index from NAFω(k). To simplify
the notation in the following we write kd,dω+i as kd,i.
From right to left we divide the ω × a blocks into ω × v blocks, each of size b = dav e, i.e.
k =
[
Ka−1...Ka−b · · · Kjb+b−1...Kjb · · · Kb−1...K0
]
=

ka−1,0...ka−b,0 · · · kjb+b−1,0...kjb,0 · · · kb−1,0...k0,0
...
...
...
ka−1,i...ka−b,i · · · kjb+b−1,i...kjb,i · · · kb−1,i...k0,i
...
...
...
ka−1,ω−1...ka−b,ω−1 · · · kjb+b−1,ω−1...kjb,ω−1 · · · kb−1,ω−1...k0,ω−1

.
kP = Ka−1Ka−2...K1K0P =
v−1∑
j=0
b−1∑
t=0
(Kjb+t2
tω)2jbωP =
b−1∑
t=0
2tω
v−1∑
j=0
Kjb+t2
jbωP, (3.3.3)
where Kjb+t = kjb+t,ω−1...kjb+t,0 is width-ω NAF representation. The maximum value of
Kjb+t is (2
ω−1 − 1)2ω−1.
Suppose that the following values are pre-computed and stored for all s ∈ {1, 2, 22, 23, ..., 2ω−1}, 0 <
j ≤ v − 1 and d ∈ {1, 3, ..., 2w−1 − 1}
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Algorithm 15 Proposed width-ω NAF method for scalar multiplication
Require: Positive integers ω, v, k = (kl−1, ..., k1, k0)NAFω and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: Q = kP .
1: a = d lω e and b = dav e.
2: Compute G[0][sd] and G[j][sd] for all s ∈ {1, 2, 22, 23, ..., 2ω−1}, 0 < j ≤ v − 1 and
d ∈ {1, 3, 5, ..., 2w−1 − 1}.
3: Q = O.
4: For t = b− 1 downto 0 do
5: If ω = 1 then
6: Q = 2Q.
7: Else
8: Use Algorithm 12 to compute Q = 2ωQ.
9: For j = v − 1 downto 0 do
10: Ij,t = (kjb+t,ω−1...kjb+t,0)NAFω .
11: If Ij,t > 0 then
12: Q = Q+G[j][Ij,t].
13: Else if Ij,t < 0
14: Q = Q−G[j][−Ij,t].
15: Return (Q).
G[0][sd] = eω−12ω−1P + eω−22ω−2P + ...+ e0P = sdP,
G[j][sd] = 2ωb(G[j − 1][sd])
= 2jωbG[0][sd] = 2jωbsdP,
where the index sd is equal to the decimal value of (eω−1...e1e0). Therefore, we can
rewrite kP as follows
kP =
b−1∑
t=0
2tω(
v−1∑
j=0
G[j][Ij,t]) (3.3.4)
where Ij,t is the decimal value of kjb+t,ω−1...kjb+t,0. Algorithm 15 can be used to compute
kP using the proposed method.
From [72], we know that the average density of non-zero digits among all width-ω NAF
of length l is approximately 1/(ω + 1), therefore, we can assume that the probability of Ij,t
being zero on average is (ω/(ω + 1))ω, hence the average cost of our proposed method is
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Table 3.4.1: Runtime complexity of Tsaur-Chou, and our proposed method.
Method Worst cost Average cost Storage cost
Tsaur-Chou [92] (1− (12)h)a+ b− 2 (1− (23)h)a+ b− 2
∑dh
2
e
i=1 2
h−2i+1v
Proposed (1− (ω−1ω )ω)a+ b− 2 (1− ( ωω+1)ω)a+ b− 2 ω2ω−2v
(1− ( ω
ω + 1
)ω)a+ b− 2. (3.3.5)
On the other hand, the density of non-zero digits among all width-ω NAF of length l in
the worst case is 1/ω, therefore, we can assume that the probability of Ij,t being zero is at
most ((ω − 1)/ω)ω, hence the cost of our proposed method in the worst case is
(1− (ω − 1
ω
)ω)a+ b− 2. (3.3.6)
3.4 Discussion and Results
In Table 3.4.1, we give a runtime-complexity comparison of Tsaur-Chou, and our proposed
method. We compare the runtime in terms of worst-runtime cost, average-runtime cost, and
memory-storage cost. By having a look at the table, one can notice that when h = ω = 2, our
proposed method and Tsaur-Chou method are identical. When h = ω = 3, the worst cost
of our proposed method is equal to the average cost of Tsaur-Chou method. Furthermore,
when h = ω > 3, the worst cost of our proposed method is less than the average cost of
Tsaur-Chou method. For fixed values of h and v, the term b − 2 is fixed for both methods
for fixed key-bit size of the scalar in average cost and worst cost.
In Table 3.4.2 and Figure 3.4.1, we analyze the number of non-zero columns for Tsaur-
Chou, and our proposed method. Values are given for different block sizes h and a 160-bit
scalar multiplication. For our method and in order to simplify the comparison, we have
chosen h = ω. It shows that our method performs best in both the average-cost and the
worst-cost scenario. In particular, by evaluating the performance for all possible block sizes
2 ≤ h ≤ 15, we obtain an improvement by 33 % to 38 % (for the worst and average case).
For a fixed value of h, we noticed that the number of pre-computations (storage cost) is
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increased in our proposed method. In devices with limited resources (memory), in most cases
we found a suitable choice of h, the window size ω and v, which makes our method best. In
order to illustrate this, we assume that the scalar has a bit size of 160 bits. First, we will fix
the window size ω to be equal h and then, depending on the available memory, we choose
h and v. For example, if storage is available for 5 elements and if we apply the Tsaur-Chou
method, we have two choices: (1) h = 2 and v = 2 (the cost1 is 84), or (2) h = 3 and v = 1
(the cost is 90). Now, using our proposed method, we have only one choice, i.e. h = 2 and
v = 2 (the cost is 84). This coincides with what we previously noted.
If storage is available for 18 elements and if we use the Tsaur-Chou method, one can
choose between three choices: (1) h = 2 and v = 9 (the cost is 52), (2) h = 3 and v = 3 (the
cost is 49), or (3) h = 4 and v = 1 (the cost is 72). For our proposed method, there are only
two choices, i.e. (1) h = 2 and v = 9 (the cost is 52) or (2) h = 3 and v = 3 (the cost is 48).
Thus, we will choose h = 3 and v = 3 which has a minimum cost of 48. In Table 3.4.3, we
give the suitable choices of h and v when the available storage vary from 2 to 50 elements.
1The cost is measured in terms of number of elliptic-curve point addition operation.
Table 3.4.2: Number of non-zero columns for different block sizes h of Tsaur-Chou, and our
proposed method for a 160-bit scalar multiplication.
h Tsaur-Chou Tsaur-Chou Proposed Proposed
worst average worst average
2 61 45 61 45
3 48 38 38 32
4 39 33 29 25
5 32 29 23 20
6 27 25 18 17
7 23 22 16 14
8 21 21 14 13
9 18 18 12 12
10 17 17 12 11
11 15 15 10 10
12 14 14 10 9
13 13 13 9 9
14 12 12 8 8
15 11 11 8 7
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Figure 3.4.1: Comparison of Tsaur-Chou [92], and our proposed method for a 160-bit scalar
multiplication.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proved that Tsaur-Chou [92] method is not more efficient than Lim-
Lee method, moreover we have proposed an improvement of Tsaur and Chou method. By
comparing our method with previous work, it shows that when h = ω = 2 our proposed
method and Tsaur-Chou method are identical, when h = ω = 3 the worst cost of our
proposed method is equal to the average cost of Tsaur-Chou method, and when h = ω > 3
the worst cost of our proposed method is less than the average cost of Tsaur-Chou method.
Our proposed method made a significant reduction in the number of required elliptic curve
point addition operations. In practice, a speed improvement by 33 % to 38 % is achieved.
For pre-computations, if storage space is disregarded, our proposed method is the best
choice and we can define h ≥ ω, otherwise ω = h. There is always a suitable choice for h and
v which make our method best. In Table 3.4.3, we gave the suitable choices of h and v when
the available storage vary from 2 to 50 elements.
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Table 3.4.3: Runtime complexity of Tsaur-Chou and our proposed method for different
available storage elements (2-50) and suitable choices of h and v for 160-bit key size.
Available Tsaur-Chou Proposed
storage method method
elements h v costs AUSa h v costs AUSa
2-3 2 1 124 2 2 1 124 2
4-5 2 2 84 4 2 2 84 4
6-7 2 3 70 6 2 3 70 6
8-9 2 4 64 8 2 4 64 8
10-11 2 5 60 10 2 5 60 10
12-13 2 6 57 12 2 6 57 12
3 2 57 12
14 2 7 55 14 2 7 55 14
15 3 3 54 15 2 7 55 14
16-17 2 8 54 16 2 8 54 16
18-19 2 9 52 18 3 3 48 18
20-23 3 4 50 20 3 3 48 18
24 3 4 50 20 3 4 44 24
25-29 3 5 47 25 3 4 44 24
30-34 3 6 45 30 3 5 41 30
35 3 7 44 35 3 5 41 30
36-39 3 7 44 35 3 6 39 36
40-41 4 4 42 40 3 6 39 36
42-47 4 4 42 40 3 7 38 42
45 3 9 42 45
48-49 4 4 42 40 3 8 37 48
50 4 5 40 50 3 8 37 48
aThe term AUS is referred to the number of elements actually used to store.
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Chapter 4
Regular SPA resistant Fixed-base
Comb Method
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks allow an adversary to reveal the secret key in a cryp-
tographic device by observing side-channel information such as the computing time or the
power consumption. In elliptic-curve cryptography, a particular target of an SPA attack is
the secret scalar k used within the scalar-multiplication algorithm. In this chapter we pro-
pose a regular SPA resistant fixed-base comb method. In our proposed method the scalar is
represented using Joye and Tunstall [48] regular exponent recoding method, then is divided
into v blocks. The proposed algorithm has a constant run time which ensures the resistance
against timing attacks. Moreover, the proposed method does not make use of any dummy
operations which provides additional resistance against safe-error fault attacks.
4.1 Introduction
Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attacks are a kind of side-channel attacks and are amongst
the most powerful attacks on elliptic curve cryptography based implementations. An attack
can target the scalar multiplication to extract the secret scalar bit-by-bit by exploiting the
run time of the algorithm or specific power-consumption patterns that are caused by the
implementation. A common way to implement the scalar multiplication is the fixed-base
comb method, which is typically used in applications where the base point is fixed.
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SPA attacks on a fixed base comb method such as proposed by Lim and Lee [59] ,Tsaur
and Chou [92] and our proposed method(MHH) in [67] allow to detect some information on the
bits of the secret scalar. All of this methods perform an addition and doubling operation for
a non zero column. Therefore, it is expected that an attacker can determine the zero column
by observing a suitable side channel (e.g., the power consumption) during the execution of
the algorithm.
Various countermeasures against side-channel analysis attacks have been proposed in the
literature such as [22, 98, 99, 49, 58, 8, 74, 75, 24, 7, 45, 14, 27]. Hedabou et al. [38] proposed
the first SCA resistant fixed-base comb method that is based on the work of Lim and Lee [59].
Then, more SCA resistant fixed-base comb methods were proposed such as Hedabou et al. [39]
and Feng et al. [25, 16] methods.
More countermeasures have been proposed by using recoding representations of the scalar.
In [69], Mo¨ller proposed an SPA-resistant window method based on the 2ω-ary window
method, where each digit that is equal to zero is replaced with −2ω, and the next most
significant digit is incremented by one. Also in [76], Okeya and Takagi proposed a SCA re-
sistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication based on width-ω NAF method. However, in [82],
Sakai and Sakura pointed that the known side channel attacks and countermeasures for
public key cryptosystems were against the main stage of the modular exponentiation (or
the point multiplication on an elliptic curve). They proposed methods of attacks on the
exponent(scalar) recoding for width-ω NAF [88] and signed/unsigned fractional window rep-
resentation [70]. They noted that to achieve a regular exponentiation algorithm(or scalar
multiplication algorithm) any recoding that is used also needs to be regular.
In order to resist a SCA attacks in a point multiplication algorithm, the algorithm must
be regular and the recoding algorithm also must be regular. A regular algorithm execute
the same instructions in the same order for any input value. In this chapter, we propose
a regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithm using fixed base comb
method. Our method makes use of a fixed-base comb technique and represents the scalar k
in m = 2ω radix representation using Joye and Tunstall [48] regular recoding method, then
the multiplier is divided into v blocks. The proposed method has a constant run time which
ensure the resistance against timing attacks, moreover, the proposed method dose not make
use of any dummy operation. Therefore, it is resistant to safe-error fault attacks.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we review some of scalar
recoding methods. In Section 4.3, we review Joye and Tunstall [48] regular exponent recoding
method. We propose a SPA resistant fixed-base comb method in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5,
we convert our proposed method in section 4.4 to a regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar
multiplication algorithm. In Section 4.6, we compare our method with related methods.
Conclusions are drawn in Section 4.7. Finally, in Example 2 in the appendix we give an
example to illustrate our method.
4.2 Scalar Recoding Methods
Various countermeasures against side channel analysis attack have been proposed in the
literature, we described some of them in Chapter 2. More countermeasures were proposed by
using recoding representation of the scalar. In this section we review some of exponent/scalar
recoding algorithm found in the literature.
In [69], Mo¨ller proposed an SPA resistant window method based on 2ω-ary window method,
where each digit that is equal to zero is replaced with −2ω, and the next most significant digit
is incremented by one. For an integer k =
∑a−1
i=0 di2
iω with di ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2ω − 1}, Mo¨ller’s
method converts the representation of the scalar k to
k =
a´−1∑
i=0
d´i2
iω with d´i ∈ B = {−2ω,±1,±2, ...,±(2ω − 1)}.
where a´ = a or a+ 1.
The recoding algorithm is expressed recursively with two auxiliary values ci and ti, 0 ≤
ci ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ ti ≤ 2ω + 1. Set c0 = 0, and for 0 ≤ i ≤ a+ 1 let
ti = di + ci
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Algorithm 16 2ω-ary method using Mo¨ller’s recoding method
Require: Window width-ω, nonnegative integer k and P ∈ E(Fq)
Ensure: kP
1: Compute k = (d´a´−1, ..., d´1, d´0)2ω using Mo¨ller’s recoding method.
2: Compute Pi = iP for all i ∈ {−2ω, 1, 2, ..., 2ω−1 − 1, 2ω−1}.
3: Q = O.
4: For i = a´− 1 to 0 do .
5: Q = 2ωQ.
6: d´ = |d´i|
7: If d´i > 0 then Q = Q+ Pd´
8: else Q = Q− Pd´.
9: Return Q.
and
(ci+1, d´i) = {
(1,−2ω) if ti = 0
(0, ti) if 0 < ti ≤ 2ω−1
(1,−2ω + ti) if 2ω−1 < ti < 2ω
(2,−2ω) if ti = 2ω
(1, 1) if ti = 2
ω + 1
Note that the equation ci+1.2
ω + d´i = ti.
Algorithm 16 can be used to compute kP using Mo¨ller’s recoding method [69].
The cost of Algorithm 16 is
(a− 1)A+ ω(a− 1)D if a´ = a
or
aA+ ωaD if a´ = a+ 1.
and the number of pre-computation is 2ω−1 + 1.
In [76], Okeya and Takagi proposed a SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication
based on width-ω NAF method. They generated a scalar sequence with fixed pattern. Their
recoding representation make use of an odd digits B = {±1,±3, ...,±2ω − 1} and it assume
an odd scalar . For an odd scalar k, Okeya and Takagi’s method convert the representation
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Algorithm 17 SPA Resistant Odd Only m−ary Recoding Algorithm for Odd Scalar
Require: An odd n-bit integer k =
∑a−1
i=0 di2
iω with di ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2ω − 1} and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: k =
∑a−1
i=0 d´i2
iω with d´i ∈ B = {±1,±3, ...,±(2ω − 1)}.
1: For i = 0 to a− 1 do
2: if di is odd then d´i = di.
3: if di is even then d´i = di + 1 and d´i−1 = d´i−1 − 2ω.
4: Return (d´a−1, ...d´1, d´0)2ω .
of the scalar k =
∑a−1
i=0 di2
iω with di ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2ω − 1} to
k =
a−1∑
i=0
d´i2
iω with d´i ∈ B = {±1,±3, ...,±(2ω − 1)}.
The recoding works in right to left and it consist, at step i, substitute d´i = di + 1 and
d´i−1 = d´i−1 − 2ω whenever di is even. Since by assumption d0 is odd and the recoding work
from the least to most significant digits, d´i−1 is always odd and greater than zero at step i.
Therefore, if at step i, di is even then the updated value of d´i−1 = d´i−1 − 2ω ∈ B.
Okeya and Takagi’s recoding method is equivalent to the recoding method developed
independently by Feng et al. [25]. Feng et al. method is explained in Algorithm 17.
In [82], Sakai and Sakura proposed methods of attacks on the exponent recoding for width-
ω NAF [88] and signed/unsigned fractional window representation [70]. They noted that to
achieve a regular exponentiation algorithm(or scalar multiplication algorithm) any recoding
that is used also needs to be regular.
In [48], Joye and Tunstall proposed methods of recoding exponent/scalar to allow for
regular implementations of m-ary algorithm. Their proposed method make use of both
signed and unsigned exponent/scalar digits.
4.3 Joye and Tunstall Singed Digit Recoding Method
As presented in [48], the recoding method of Joye and Tunstall assumes an odd integer, which
is not a loss of generality as an even scalar k can be replaced by k + r where r is the group
order (which is usually a prime). Joye and Tunstall recoding method takes some scalar k
and computes its m = 2ω radix representation (dl−1, ..., d1, d0)m with digits that takes odd
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Algorithm 18 Joye and Tunstall (Odd) Signed-Digit Recoding Algorithm
Require: Odd positive integer k and a positive integer ω.
Ensure: k = (da−1, ..., d1, d0)2ω with di ∈ {±1,±3, ...,±(2ω − 1)} and di odd.
1: i = 0.
2: While (k > 2ω) do
3: di = (k mod 2
ω+1)− 2ω.
4: k = (k − di)/2ω.
5: i = i+ 1.
6: Return (da−1, ..., d1, d0)2ω .
values in {−(m− 1), ...,−1, 1, ...,m− 1},
k =
l−1∑
i=0
dim
i with di ∈ B = {±1,±3, ...,±(m− 1)} and di odd.
The recoding method rely on the observation that any odd integer in the range [0, 2m) can
be written as
1 = m+ (−(m− 1))
3 = m+ (−(m− 3))
...
m− 1 = m+ (−1)
m+ 1 = m+ (1)
...
2m− 3 = m+ (m− 3)
2m− 1 = m+ (m− 1)
The algorithm is given in Algorithm 18. Algorithm 19 shows the scalar multiplication to
compute kP for an odd positive integer k. The cost of Algorithm 19 is
(a− 1)A+ (a− 1)ωD.
and the number of required pre-computations is 2ω−1.
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Algorithm 19 Left-to-right 2ω-ary method using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent-
recoding method.
Require: Odd positive integer k, window width ω and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: kP .
1: Compute k = (da−1, ..., d1, d0)2ω using Algorithm 18.
2: Compute Pi = iP for all i ∈ {1, 3, ..., 2ω − 1}.
3: Q = O.
4: For i = a− 1 to 0 do
5: Q = 2ωQ.
6: d = |di|.
7: If di > 0 then Q = Q+ Pd
8: else Q = Q− Pd.
9: Return Q.
4.4 SPA Resistant Fixed-base Comb Method
In this section we propose an SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithm using
fixed base comb method by using regular scalar representation. A regular representation of
the scalar k is obtained by using signed digit recoding method of Joye and Tunsall’s [48]
described in Algorithm 18.
k = (da−1...di...d0)2ω =
a−1∑
i=0
di2
iω with di ∈ B = {±1,±3, ...,±(m− 1)} and di odd.
Since Joye and Tunsall regular signed digit representation of the scalar k is in base 2ω,
we can treat any digit di for all 0 ≤ i ≤ a − 1 as a column of ω bits. Only the first bit is
non zero and hold the value of di. In this case we can assume that the multiplier is already
is divided into ω × a blocks. We can rewrite the blocks of k in terms of a matrix, i.e.,
k =

da−1 · · · di · · · d0
...
...
...
0 · · · 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
0 · · · 0 · · · 0

. (4.4.1)
Then, as in the method Tasur and Chou [92] from right-to-left we divide the ω× a blocks
into ω × v blocks each of size b. Variables b and v are chosen such that a = b ∗ v(so as to
a void any padding, since padding with zeros will result in a zero column which destroy the
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regularity of the algorithm) i.e.
k =

da−1...da−b · · · djb+b−1...djb · · · db−1...d0
...
...
...
0 · · · 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
0 · · · 0 · · · 0

. (4.4.2)
kP = Dv−1Dv−2...D1D0P =
v−1∑
j=0
Dj2
jωbP
where
Dj = (djb+b−1...djb)2ω =
b−1∑
t=0
djb+t2
tω
Let P0 = P and Pj = 2
ωbPj−1 = 2jωbP for 0 < j < v. Therefore, we can rewrite kP as
follows
kP = Dv−1Dv−2...D1D0P =
v−1∑
j=0
Dj2
jωbP =
b−1∑
t=0
2tω(
v−1∑
j=0
djb+t2
jωbP ) =
b−1∑
t=0
2tω(
v−1∑
j=0
djb+tPj),
(4.4.3)
The maximum value of djb+t is (2
ω − 1). Suppose that the following values are pre-
computed and stored for all 1 ≤ s ≤ 2ω − 1 and 0 < j ≤ v − 1 :
G[0][s] = sP,
G[j][s] = 2ωb(G[j − 1][s])
= 2jωbG[0][s],
Therefore, we can rewrite kP as follows
kP =
b−1∑
t=0
2tω(
v−1∑
j=0
G[j][djb+t]) (4.4.4)
Algorithm 20 can be used to compute kP using the proposed method.
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Algorithm 20 SPA resistant fixed-base comb method.
Require: Odd positive integer k, window width ω and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: Q = kP .
1: Compute 2ω-digit regular representation k =
∑a−1
i=0 di2
iω with di ∈ B =
{±1,±3, ...,±(2ω − 1)} and di odd using Algorithm 18.
2: Choose two positive integers b and v such that a = bv.
3: Compute G[0][s] and G[j][s] for all s ∈ {1, 3, 5, ..., 2ω − 1} and 0 < j ≤ v − 1.
4: Q = O.
5: For t = b− 1 downto 0 do
6: Q = 2ωQ.
7: For j = v − 1 downto 0 do
8: d = |djb+t|.
9: If djb+t > 0 then Q = Q+G[j][d]
10: Else Q = Q−G[j][d].
11: Return (Q).
The cost of Algorithm 20 is
(a− 1)A+ (b− 1)ωD.
and the number of pre-computation is 2ω−1v.
4.5 Regular SPA Resistant Fixed-base Comb Method
Algorithm 20 is constrained for odd positive integers and also it is not fully regular because
it uses an if condition. In fact, such conditions allow safe-error attacks to be performed to
reveal bits of the secret key. In this section, we generalize it to any positive integer and
rewrite it in a regular way.
Hedabou et al. [39] suggested to replace k´ = k + 1 if the scalar k is even and subtract P
from the result. Also, they suggested to replace k by k´ = k+2 when k is odd and to subtract
2P from the result so as to make the algorithm regular. Notice that bit length of k´ will be
greater than or equal to bit length of k. To avoid the growth of k´ bit length, we prefer to
replace k by k´ = k − 1 if k is even and by k´ = k − 2 otherwise, and to add P or 2P to the
result. Because k is a large integer, k´ = k − 1 or k − 2 is greater than zero.
In order to avoid the conditional statement in the loop iteration of Algorithm 20, as
suggested in [79], we can replace Lines 9 and Lines 10 in Algorithm 20 by
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si = sign(djb+t)
G[j][d] = (−1)si⊕sn[j][d]G[j][d]
sn[j][d] = si
Q = Q+G[j][d].
Where sign(x) = 1 if x < 0 and 0 otherwise, and sn[j][d] is a binary variable to keep track
of the current sign of G[j][d] for every d ∈ {1, 3, 5, ..., 2ω − 1} and 0 < j ≤ v − 1, sn[j][d] are
initialize to zeros.
Also, as suggested in [79] we can implement P = (−1)bP , where b ∈ {0, 1} in a regular
form without using any dummy operation with a cost of 3 field additions.
R0 = Y
R1 = −Y
Y = Rb +R1−b −R1⊕b
Algorithm 21 is a regular version of algorithm 20 that can be used to compute kP using the
proposed method.
The cost of Algorithm 21 is
a´A+ ((b− 1)ω + 1)D (4.5.1)
In the same way we rewrite Algorithm 19 in a regular way as explained in Algorithm 22.
The cost of Algorithm 22 is
a´A+ ((a´− 1)ω + 1)D (4.5.2)
In order to prevent DPA attacks, we further make use of randomization techniques as
proposed by Coron [22]. Further note, since we are using a pre-computed table, Okeya and
Sakurai’s second-order DPA attack [73] can be applicable to our method. To prevent our
proposed method against this attack, we change the randomization of each pre-computed
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Algorithm 21 Regular SPA resistant fixed-base comb method.
Require: Positive integer k, window width ω and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: Q = kP .
1: r = k(mod2).
2: k´ = k − 2r
3: Compute 2ω-digit regular representation k´ =
∑a´−1
i=0 di2
iω with di ∈ B =
{±1,±3, ...,±(2ω − 1)} and di odd using Algorithm 18.
4: Choose two positive integers b and v such that a´ = bv.
5: Compute G[0][s] and G[j][s] for all s ∈ {1, 3, 5, ..., 2ω − 1} and 0 < j ≤ v − 1.
6: Q = O.
7: For t = b− 1 downto 0 do
8: Q = 2ωQ.
9: For j = v − 1 downto 0 do
10: d = |djb+t|.
11: si = sign(djb+t)
12: G[j][d] = (−1)si⊕sn[j][d]G[j][d].
13: sn[j][d] = si.
14: Q = Q+G[j][d].
15: Compute G[0][2].
16: Q=Q+G[0][r+1]
17: Return (Q).
point after getting the point in the table as suggested by Hedabou et al.[38]. Moreover, by
using randomized linearly transformed coordinate as proposed by Itoh el al. [43] and suggested
for fixed-base comb method by Hedabou et al. [39], our proposed method is resistance to RPA,
ZPA and Geiselmann-Steinwandt’s attacks.
4.6 Comparison with Related Work
In this section we compare our proposed method with related methods. In Table 4.6.1 we
give a comparison between Mo¨ller, Okeya-Takagi, left-to-right 2ωary method using Joye and
Tunstall regular recoding and our proposed regular fixed-base comb methods. We compare
the average-runtime cost, memory-storage cost, resistant to SPA and regularity of the algo-
rithm. By having a look at the table, When v = 1, Okeya-Takagi, left-to-right 2ωary using
Joye and Tunstall regular recoding and our proposed regular fixed-base comb methods are
identical in the average cost and storage cost. On the other hand, when v > 1 our proposed
fixed-base comb method is more efficient than the other methods. Left-to-right 2ωary using
Joye and Tunstall regular recoding and our proposed regular fixed-base comb methods are
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Algorithm 22 Regular left-to-right 2ω-ary method using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent
recoding method
Require: Positive integer k, window width ω and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: kP
1: r = k(mod2).
2: k´ = k − 2r
3: Compute k = (dl−1, ..., d1, d0)2ω using Algorithm 18.
4: Compute Pi = iP for all i ∈ {1, 3, ..., 2ω − 1}.
5: Q = O.
6: For i = l − 1 to 0 do .
7: Q = 2ωQ.
8: d = |di|
9: si = sign(di).
10: Pd = (−1)si⊕sn[d].
11: sn[d] = si.
12: Q = Q+ Pd.
13: Compute P2 = 2P
14: Q = Q+ P1+r
15: Return Q.
regular. Although we notice that the number of pre-computations (storage cost) is increased
in our proposed regular fixed-base comb method, in devices with limited resources (memory),
in most cases we found a suitable choice of the window size ω and v, which makes our method
best. In order to illustrate this, we assume that the scalar has a bit size of 160 bits. For
example, if storage is available for 4 elements and if we apply the left-to-right 2ωary method
using Joye and Tunstall regular recoding method we will choose ω = 3 with cost 54A+160D.
Now, using our proposed method we choose ω = 2 and v = 2 with cost 80A+ 79D.
If storage is available for 12 elements and if we apply the left-to-right 2ωary method using
Joye and Tunstall regular recoding method we will choose ω = 4 with cost 40A+157D. Now,
using our proposed method we choose ω = 3 and v = 3 with cost 54A+52D. Also we noticed
that when using our proposed method depending on the available memory it is better to use
small value of ω and bigger value of v, a counter example is when the storage available for
12 elements, with our method when ω = 4 and v = 1 the cost is 40A+ 157D, and when we
choose ω = 3 and v = 3 the cost 54A+ 52D. Also, in left-to-right 2ωary method using Joye
and Tunstall regular recoding method we notice that memory may be wasted if the available
memory is not a power of 2.
In Table 4.6.2 we give a comparison of Lim-Lee [59], Tsaur-Chou [92], our method MHH [67],
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Table 4.6.1: Runtime complexity and storage cost of Mo¨ller, Okeya-Takagi, left-to-right 2ωary
method using Joye and Tunstall regular recoding and our proposed methods .
Method Average cost Storage cost Resistant to Regular
SPA
Mo¨ller [69] (a− 1)A+ (a− 1)ωD 2ω−1 + 1 Yes No
Okeya-Takagi [76] aA+ ((a− 1)ω + 1)D 2ω−1 Yes No
L-to-R 2ω-ary Joye aA+ ((a− 1)ω + 1)D 2ω−1 Yes Yes
and Tunstall [48]
Proposed aA+ ((b− 1)ω + 1)D 2ω−1v Yes Yes
Replacing a by a+ 1 for Mo¨ller method if the case a´ = a+ 1 occurs.
and a by a− 1 for our proposed and left-to-right methods if the case a´ = a− 1 occurs.
Hedabou et al. [38, 39], Feng et al. [25, 16], and our proposed regular SPA fixed-base comb
methods. We compare the average-runtime cost, memory-storage cost, and resistant to SPA.
By having a look at the table, we noticed that Lim-Lee, Tsaur-Chou and our MHH methods
were not SPA resistant. For fixed values of ω the cost of Hedabou et al. [38, 39], Feng et
al. [25, 16], is less than the cost of our proposed method. However, we noticed that even
there is no enough memory it is better to choose small value of ω and bigger value of v, and
when v > ω the cost of our proposed method is less than that of all other method.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed an efficient regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar
multiplication algorithm using fixed base comb method. In our proposed method the scalar
is represented using Joye and Tunstall’s regular exponent recoding method. Our proposed
method is resistant against SPA, timing, and safe-error fault attacks. Moreover, by using
randomization techniques and changing the randomization of each pre-computed point after
getting the point in the table our proposed method is even resistant to DPA and second-order
DPA attacks.
In Table 4.6.1 and Table 4.6.2, we gave a comparison between Mo¨ller, Okeya-Takagi, left-
to-right 2ωary method using Joye and Tunstall regular recoding, Lim-Lee, Tsaur-Chou, MHH,
Hedabou et al., Feng et al. and our proposed regular fixed-base comb methods. From the
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Table 4.6.2: Runtime complexity and storage cost of Lim-Lee, Tsaur-Chou, MHH, Hedabou
et al., Feng et al. and our proposed methods .
Method Average cost Storage cost Resistant to
SPA
Lim-Lee [59] ((1− (12)ω)a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D (2ω − 1)v No
Tsaur-Chou [92] ((1− (23)ω)a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D∗
∑dω
2
e
i=1 2
ω−2i+1v No
our method MHH [67] ((1− ( ωω+1)ω)a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D∗ ω2ω−2v No
Hedabou et al.[38] aA+ aD 2ω − 1 Yes
Hedabou et al.[39] aA+ aD 2ω−1 Yes
Feng et al. [25] aA+ aD 2ω−1 Yes
Feng et al. [16] aA+ (a− 1)D 2ω−1
Proposed aA+ ((b− 1)ω + 1)D 2ω−1v Yes
Replacing a by a− 1 for our proposed method if the case a´ = a− 1 occurs.
D∗ is the cost of 2hQ using Sakai and Sakurai [81] direct doubling method.
tables we conclude that left-to-right 2ωary method using Joye and Tunstall regular recoding
and our proposed method are the only regular methods. When v = 1, Okeya-Takagi, left-to-
right 2ωary method using Joye and Tunstall’s regular recoding and our proposed regular fixed-
base comb methods are identical. However, when v > 1 our proposed fixed-base comb method
is more efficient than Okeya-Takagi, left-to-right 2ωary method using Joye and Tunstall’s
regular recoding. For fixed values of ω the cost of Hedabou et al., Feng et al., is less than
the cost of our proposed method. However, we noticed that even there is no enough memory
it is better to choose small value of ω and bigger value of v, and when v > ω the cost of our
proposed method is less than that of all other method.
For pre-computations, if storage space is disregarded, our proposed method is the best
choice. However, in devices with limited storage there is always a suitable choice for ω and
v which make our method best.
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Chapter 5
Improved Regular SPA resistant
Fixed-base Comb Method
In this chapter, we propose a more efficient regular SPA resistant elliptic-curve scalar mul-
tiplication algorithm using the fixed-base comb method. Our method represents the scalar
k in base 2 using Joye and Tunstall [48] regular exponent-recoding. The scalar k is divided
into ω × v blocks according to the method of Lim and Lee[59]. The proposed algorithm has
a constant run time which ensures the resistance against timing attacks. In addition to that,
the proposed method does not make use of any dummy operations and is therefore resistant
to safe-error fault attacks. Moreover, by using randomization techniques [22], change the
randomization of each pre-computed point after getting the point in the table[38]. , and us-
ing randomized linearly transformed coordinate our proposed method is resistance to DPA,
second order DPA, RPA, ZPA and Geiselmann-Steinwandt’s attacks. Compared to related
work, our method provides best performance.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, we propose our improved
SPA-resistant elliptic-curve scalar multiplication algorithm using the fixed-base comb tech-
nique. In Section 5.2, we convert our proposed method in Section 5.1 to improved regular
SPA-resistant elliptic-curve scalar multiplication algorithm. In Section 5.3, we compare our
proposed method with related work. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.4. Finally, in the
appendix we give an example to illustrate our method.
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5.1 Improved SPA-Resistant Fixed-base Comb Method
In this section, we propose improved SPA-resistant elliptic-curve scalar multiplication al-
gorithm using fixed-base comb method. For this, we make use of the exponent-recoding
technique of Joye and Tunstall [48] and represent the scalar in base 2. Furthermore, we di-
vide the scalar into ω × v blocks from right-to-left and then from up-to-down according to
the proposal of Lim and Lee [59]. To illustrate our method, let k be represented in base 2
with size l, i.e.,
k =
l−1∑
i=0
ki2
i with ki ∈ {−1, 1}.
We divide the scalar k into ω blocks Ki from right-to-left, for 0 ≤ i ≤ ω − 1, of equal size
a = lω (ω is chosen such that l = aω to a void any padding with zero, although padding with
zero will just add zeros in the last row, and the value of the column will still be non zero).
Then, subdivide each block Ki from up-to-down into v subblocks ki,j of equal size b, where
0 ≤ j ≤ v − 1. b is chosen such that a = bv to avoid any padding with zero column. We can
rewrite the ω blocks of k in terms of a matrix, i.e.,
k =

K0
...
Ki
...
Kω−1

=

k0,v−1 · · · k0,j · · · k0,0
...
...
...
ki,v−1 · · · ki,j · · · ki,0
...
...
...
kω−1,v−1 · · · kω−1,j · · · kω−1,0

=
v−1∑
j=0
ω−1∑
i=0
ki,j2
jb2ia. (5.1.1)
Let P0 = P and Pi = 2
aPi−1 = 2iaP for 0 < i < ω. Then, we can rewrite kP as
kP =
v−1∑
j=0
ω−1∑
i=0
ki,j2
jb2iaP =
v−1∑
j=0
ω−1∑
i=0
ki,j2
jbPi.
Since Ki is of size a, we can let Ki = ei,a−1...ei,1ei,0 be the representation Ki using Joye
and Tunstall recoding in base 2 for all 0 ≤ i < ω, and hence ki,j = ei,jb+b−1...ei,jb+1ei,jb is
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Algorithm 23 Improved SPA-resistant fixed-base comb method.
Require: Odd positive integer k, positive integer ω and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: Q = kP .
1: Compute base 2 Joye and Tunstall regular representation k =
∑l−1
i=0 ki2
i with ki ∈ {−1, 1}
using Algorithm 18.
2: Set a = d lω e and choose two positive integers b and v such that a = bv.
3: Compute G[0][s] and G[j][s] for all 1 ≤ j ≤ v − 1 and all values of s, where s =
(eω−1eω−2...e0)2, ei ∈ {−1, 1} and eω−1 = 1.
4: Q = O.
5: For t = b− 1 downto 0 do
6: Q = 2Q.
7: For j = v − 1 downto 0 do
8: Ij,t = eω−1,jb+t...e1,jb+te0,jb+t.
9: I = |Ij,t|.
10: If Ij,t > 0 then Q = Q+G[j][I]
11: Else Q = Q−G[j][I].
12: Return (Q).
the Joye and Tunstall recoding in base 2 representation of ki,j , therefore
kP =
b−1∑
t=0
2t(
v−1∑
j=0
ω−1∑
i=0
ei,jb+t2
jbPi).
Suppose that the following values are pre-computed and stored for all 1 ≤ j ≤ v − 1 and
all values of s, where s = (eω−1eω−2...e0)2, ei ∈ {−1, 1} and eω−1 = 1:
G[0][s] = eω−1Pω−1 + eω−2Pω−2 + ...+ e0P0,
G[j][s] = 2b(G[j − 1][s]) = 2jbG[0][s],
(5.1.2)
Therefore, we can rewrite kP as follows
kP =
b−1∑
t=0
2t(
v−1∑
j=0
G[j][Ij,t]), (5.1.3)
where Ij,t = (eω−1,jb+t...e1,jb+te0,jb+t)2.
Now we can use the left-to-right binary method to compute kP using these pre-computed
values. Algorithm 23 can be used to compute kP using the proposed method.
57
CHAPTER 5. IMPROVED REGULAR SPA RESISTANT FIXED-BASE COMB
METHOD
From Algorithm 23, the value Ij,t is not equal to zero for all bit string (eω−1,jb+t...e1,jb+te0,jb+t)2,
thus, for every loop iteration one point doubling and one point addition is preformed. There-
fore, the cost of Algorithm 23 is
(a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D.
If the bit length l of the multiplier k is divisible by ω (i.e., no padding), then the number of
pre-computation is equal to 2ω−1v, otherwise it is (2ω−1 + 2ω−2)v.
5.2 Improved Regular SPA-Resistant Fixed-base Comb Method
Algorithm 23 is constrained for odd positive integers and also it is not fully regular because
it uses an if condition. In the same way as we did in Section 4.5 in Chapter 4 we generalize
our proposed method given in Algorithm 23 and rewrite it in a regular form.
We replace k by k´ = k − 1 if k is even and by k´ = k − 2 otherwise. We also, replace
Lines 10 and Lines 11 in Algorithm 23 by
si = sign(Ij,t)
G[j][I] = (−1)si⊕sn[j][I]G[j][I]
sn[j][I] = si
Q = Q+G[j][I],
where sign(x) = 1 if x < 0 and 0 otherwise, and sn[j][I] is a binary variable to keep track
of the current sign of G[j][I] for every I and 0 < j ≤ v − 1, sn[j][I] are initialized to zeros.
Also we implement P = (−1)bP , where b ∈ {0, 1} in a regular form as
R0 = Y
R1 = −Y
Y = Rb −R1⊕b +R1−b.
As we did in the previous chapter, in order to prevent Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
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Algorithm 24 Improved regular SPA-resistant fixed-base comb method.
Require: Positive integers k and ω, and P ∈ E(Fq).
Ensure: Q = kP .
1: r = k( mod 2).
2: k´ = k − 2r
3: Compute base 2 Joye and Tunstall regular representation k´ =
∑l´−1
i=0 ki2
i with ki ∈ {−1, 1}
using Algorithm 18.
4: Set a = d l´ω e and choose two positive integers b and v such that a = bv.
5: Compute G[0][s] and G[j][s] for all 1 ≤ j ≤ v − 1 and all values of s, where s =
(eω−1eω−2...e0)2, ei ∈ {−1, 1} and eω−1 = 1.
6: Q = O.
7: For t = b− 1 downto 0 do
8: Q = 2Q.
9: For j = v − 1 downto 0 do
10: Ij,t = eω−1,jb+t...e1,jb+te0,jb+t.
11: ´Ij,t = f(Ij,t).
12: I = | ´Ij,t|.
13: si = sign( ´Ij,t)
14: G[j][I] = (−1)si⊕sn[j][I]G[j][I].
15: sn[j][I] = si.
16: Q = Q+G[j][I].
17: Set G[0][1] = P and G[0][2] = 2P .
18: Q=Q+G[0][r+1]
19: Return (Q).
attacks, we further make use of randomization techniques as proposed by Coron [22], and since
we are using a pre-computed table, Okeya and Sakurai’s second-order DPA attack [73] can be
applicable to our method. To prevent our proposed method against this attack, we change the
randomization of each pre-computed point after getting the point in the table as suggested
by Hedabou et al.[38]. Moreover, by using randomized linearly transformed coordinate as
proposed by Itoh el al. [43] and suggested for fixed-base comb method by Hedabou et al. [39],
our proposed method is resistance to RPA, ZPA and Geiselmann-Steinwandt’s attacks.
Algorithm 24 is a regular version of Algorithm 23 that can be used to compute kP using
the proposed method.
The cost of Algorithm 24 is
aA+ bD. (5.2.1)
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Table 5.3.1: Runtime complexity and storage cost of Mo¨ller, Okey-Takagi, left-to-right 2ωary
method using Joye and Tunstall regular recoding, and our proposed method.
Method Average cost Storage cost SPA Regular
secure
Mo¨ller [69] (a− 1)A+ (a− 1)ωD 2ω−1 + 1 Yes No
Okey-Takagi [76] aA+ ((a− 1)ω + 1)D 2ω−1 Yes No
L-to-R 2ω-ary Joye aA+ ((a− 1)ω + 1)D 2ω−1 Yes Yes
and Tunstall [48]
Proposed aA+ bD 2ω−1v Yes Yes
Replacing a by a+ 1 for Mo¨ller method if the case a´ = a+ 1 occurs. Replacing a by a− 1
for our proposed method if the case l´ = l − 1 and l´ divide ω occurs.
5.3 Comparison with Related Work
In this section, we compare our proposed method with related methods. We compare the
average-runtime cost, memory-storage cost, resistance to SPA attacks, and the regularity of
the algorithm in general.
In Table 5.3.1, we give a comparison between Mo¨ller, Okey-Takagi, left-to-right 2ωary
method using Joye and Tunstall regular-recoding, and our proposed improved regular SPA-
Resistant fixed-base comb methods. By having a look at the table, all of the methods are
SPA resistant. When ω > 1, it is very clear from the table that the cost of our proposed
method is less than the cost of Mo¨ller, Okey-Takagi and the usual left-to-right 2ω-ary using
Joye and Tunstall regular-exponent methods even when v = 1.
The methods of Mo¨ller and Okey-Takagi are not regular because the recoding algorithms
used in both methods are not regular. So it may be possible to construct attacks on the
recoding algorithm as noted by Sakai and Sakura [82]. As opposed, our proposed method
and the usual left-to-right 2ω-ary method using Joye and Tunstall’s methods make use of a
regular-recoding algorithm and the scalar-multiplication algorithms as given in Algorithm 24
and Algorithm 22 are secured against those attacks.
In Table 5.3.2, we give a comparison of Lim-Lee [59], Tsaur-Chou [92], our method MHH [67],
Hedabou et al. [38, 39], Feng et al. [25, 16], our regular SPA resistant method in Chapter 4
in section 4.5, and our proposed method in this chapter. We compare the average-runtime
cost, memory-storage cost, and resistance to SPA attacks. By having a look at the table, we
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Table 5.3.2: Runtime complexity and storage cost of Lim-Lee, Tsaur-Chou, Hedabou et al.,
Feng et al. and our proposed methods.
Method Average cost Storage cost SPA
secure
Lim-Lee [59] ((1− (12)ω)a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D (2ω − 1)v No
Tsaur-Chou [92] ((1− (23)ω)a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D∗
∑dω
2
e
i=1 2
ω−2i+1v No
Our method MHH [67] ((1− ( ωω+1)ω)a− 1)A+ (b− 1)D∗ ω2ω−2v No
Hedabou et al.[38] aA+ aD 2ω − 1 Yes
Hedabou et al.[39] aA+ aD 2ω−1 Yes
Feng et al. [25] aA+ aD 2ω−1 Yes
Feng et al. [16] aA+ (a− 1)D 2ω−1 Yes
Our Regular aA+ ((b− 1)ω + 1)D 2ω−1v Yes
SPA resistant(Chapter 4)
Improved Regular(this chapter) aA+ bD 2ω−1v Yes
SPA resistant(this Chapter
Replacing a by a− 1 for our proposed method if the case l´ = l − 1 and l´ divide ω occurs.
D∗ is the cost of 2hQ for the direct-doubling method proposed by Sakai and Sakurai [81].
noticed that Lim-Lee, Tsaur-Chou , and our MHH methods are not SPA resistant. When
v = 1, the costs of Hedabou et al. [38, 39], Feng et al. [25], and our proposed method in this
chapter in section 5.2 are equal and greater then the cost of Feng et al. [25] by one point
doubling, but the method of Feng et al. [16] uses dummy operation so it might lead to safe
error fault attacks. On the other hand we replace a by a− 1 for our proposed method if the
case l´ = l − 1 and l´ divide ω occurs and in that case our proposed method is more efficient
than all of the SPA methods given in Table 5.3.2. Compared to our method in Chapter 4,
the cost of our proposed method in this chapter in section 5.2 is less than that of the our
proposed one in section 4.5.
5.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed an efficient regular SPA-resistant elliptic curve scalar-multiplication
algorithm using fixed-base comb method. In our proposed method the scalar is represented
in base 2 using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent-recoding method, then is divided into
ω × v blocks as in the method of Lim and Lee. Our proposed method is resistant against
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SPA, timing, and safe-error fault attacks. Moreover, by using randomization techniques and
changing the randomization of each pre-computed point after getting the point in the table
our proposed method is even resistant to DPA and second-order DPA attacks. In addition to
that, by using randomized linearly transformed coordinate our proposed method is resistant
to RPA, ZPA and Geiselmann-Steinwandt’s attacks.
In Table 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, we gave a comparison between our proposed method and related
work. From Table 5.3.1, we conclude that when ω > 1 our proposed method ” improved
regular SPA-Resistant fixed-base comb method” is more efficient than Mo¨ller, Okey-Takagi
and the usual left-to-right 2ω-ary using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent methods even
when v = 1.
From Table 5.3.2, we noticed that when v = 1, the costs of Hedabou et al. [38, 39], Feng
et al. [25], and our proposed method in this chapter in section 5.2 are equal and greater then
the cost of Feng et al. [25] by one point doubling, but the method of Feng et al. [16] uses
dummy operation so it might lead to safe error fault attacks. On the other hand we replace
a by a − 1 for our proposed method if the case l´ = l − 1 and l´ divide ω occurs and in that
case our proposed method is more efficient than all of the SPA methods given in Table 5.3.2.
Compared to our method in Chapter 4, the cost of our proposed method in this chapter in
section 5.2 is less than that of our proposed one in section 4.5.
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Chapter 6
Applications:Elliptic Curve
Cryptosystems
In this chapter we make use of our proposed methods in Chapter 3 , Chapter 4 and Chapter 5
in different elliptic curve cryptosystems. In every elliptic curve cryptosystem we must select
the domain parameters for the elliptic curve. For elliptic curve over prime field Fp the
domain parameter consist of p, a, b,G, n and h. Where p is the prime number defined for
finite field Fp, a and b are the parameters defining the curve given in short Weierstrass form
y2 = x3 + ax + b mod p, G = (xG, yG) is the generator point, n is the order of the elliptic
curve point G and h is the cofactor where h = #E(Fp)/n. #E(Fp) is the number of points
on an elliptic curve. The scalar for point multiplication is chosen as a number between 0 and
n− 1.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 6.1 we consider Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm(ECDSA). Tripartite Diffie Hellman key exchange(TDH) is pre-
sented in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3 we present a Certificateless Two-party Authenticated
Key Agreement (CTAKA) protocol without pairings.
6.1 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm(ECDSA)
Digital signature schemes are designed to provide the digital counterpart to handwritten sig-
natures. Security services provided by digital signature are data integrity (the assurance that
data has not been altered by unauthorized or unknown means), data origin authentication
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Algorithm 25 Key Pair Generation
Require: Elliptic curve domain parameter p, a, b,G, n and h.
Ensure: Public key Q and private key d.
1: Select a random or pseudo-random integer d in the interval [1, n− 1].
2: Compute Q = dG.
3: Return Q and d.
Algorithm 26 ECDSA Signature Generation
Require: Elliptic curve domain parameter p, a, b,G, n, h, private key d, and a message m.
Ensure: A signature (r, s) for the message m.
1: Select a random or pseudo-random integer k in the interval [1, n− 1].
2: Compute kG = (x1, y1) and convert x1 to an integer x¯1.
3: Compute r = x1 mod n. If r=0, then go to Line 1.
4: Compute k−1 mod n.
5: Compute SHA-1(m) and convert this bit string to an integer e.
6: Compute s = k−1(e+ dr) mod n. If s = 0 then go to Line 1.
7: Return (r, s).
(the assurance that the source of data is as claimed), and non-repudiation (the assurance
that an entity cannot deny previous actions or commitments).
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is the elliptic curve analogue of
the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). DSA was accepted in 1998 as an ISO (International
Standards Organization) standard (ISO 14888-3), accepted in 1999 as an ANSI (American
National Standards Institute) standard (ANSI X9.62), and accepted in 2000 as an IEEE
(Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) standard (IEEE 1363-2000) and a FIPS
standard (FIPS 186-2). [47].
ECDSA consist of three algorithms:
• Key pair generation(Algorithm 25): It generates two keys, private key which is a pseudo-
random integer d ∈ [1, n− 1] and public key Q = dG.
• Signature Generation(Algorithm 26): It uses the client’s private key d and a per signa-
ture random (or pseudo-random) integer to generate the signature.
• Signature Verification(Algorithm 27): It uses the client’s public key to verify the signa-
ture.
64
CHAPTER 6. APPLICATIONS:ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEMS
Algorithm 27 ECDSA Signature Verification
Require: Elliptic curve domain parameter p, a, b,G, n, h, public key Q, a message m, and a
signature (r, s).
Ensure: Accept the signature if and only if v = r.
1: Verify that r and s are integers in the interval [1, n− 1].
2: Compute SHA-1(m) and convert this bit string to an integer e.
3: Compute ω = s−1 mod n.
4: Compute u1 = eω mod n and u2 = rω mod n.
5: Compute X = u1G+ u2Q.
6: If X = O, then reject the signature. Otherwise, convert the x−coordinate x1 of X to an
integer x¯1, and compute v = x¯1 mod n.
7: Accept the signature if and only if v = r.
6.2 Tripartite Diffie-Hellman key exchange(TDH)
It is well known that Diffie-Hellman [23] key exchange enables two parties Alice and Bob to
agree on a shared key in one round. Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange is the elliptic
curve analogue of Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman protocols
can be viewed as a one-round protocol because the two exchanged messages are independent
of each other [65] as explained below:
• Alice and Bob agree on p, a, b,G, n and h as a domain parameters for Elliptic curve
and make the domain parameter public, for example posting it in a public directory.
• Alice picks a secret integer a ∈ {1, n− 1}, computes A = aG and sends A to Bob.
• Bob picks a secret integer b ∈ {1, n− 1}, computes B = bG and sends B to Alice.
• Finally, Bob and Alice again use their secret integers to compute the shared key k =
abG. Alice computes aB = abG, whereas Bob computes bA = baG = abG.
The protocol can easily be extended to three parties, as illustrated in the following two
rounds [65]:
Round 1
• Alice, Bob and Chris agree on p, a, b,G, n and h as a domain parameters for Ellip-
tic curve and make the domain parameter public, for example posting it in a public
directory.
• Alice picks a secret integer a ∈ {1, n− 1}, computes A = aG and sends A to Chris.
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• Chris picks a secret integer c ∈ {1, n− 1}, computes C = cG and sends C to Bob.
• Bob picks a secret integer b ∈ {1, n− 1}, computes B = bG and sends B to Alice.
Round 2
• Alice computes AB = aB = abG and sends AB to Chris.
• Chris computes CA = cA and sends CA = caG to Bob.
• Bob computes BC = bC = bcG and sends BC to Alice.
• Finally, Bob, Chris and Alice again use their secret integers to compute the shared key
k = abcG. Alice computes aBC = abcG, Bob computes bCA = bcaG = abcG, whereas
Chris computes cAB = cabG = abcG.
In 2000 Joux proposed the first pairing1 -based one-round tripartite key agreement pro-
tocol. However, in 2004 Verhuel modified Joux protocol. Joux and Verhuel used bilinear
pairing on (G1, GT ) for which the BDHP is intractable.
To describe the protocol, Alice, Bob and Chris agree on p, a, b,G, n and h as a domain
parameters for Elliptic curve. Also they agree on a modified bilinear pairing eˆl : G1 → GT ,
where G1 =< P > be additive groups of order l with identity element O, P ∈ E(Fp),
and GT be a multiplicative group of order l with identity 1. The point P is chosen such
that the ECDLP in G1 is not practically possible and assume there exists a distortion map
D : P → D(P ) such that P and D(P ) are independent. Then, the protocol is described as
follows:
• Alice randomly selects a secret integer a ∈ {1, l−1} and broadcasts the point QA = aP
to the other two parties.
• Similarly and simultaneously, Bob and Chris broadcast the points QB = bP and QC =
cP .
• Using the public points QA, QB and QC Alice can compute the shared key k =
eˆl(QB, QC)
a = eˆl(bP, cP )
a = eˆl(P, P )
abc, Bob computes the shared key k = eˆl(QA, QC)
b =
eˆl(aP, cP )
b = eˆl(P, P )
abc and Chris computes the shared key k = eˆl(QA, QB)
c =
eˆl(aP, bP )
b = eˆl(P, P )
abc.
1See the Appendix for background on pairing
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If an adversary can solve the DLP in Fp, then he can breaks tripartite Diffie-Hellman key
exchange [40]. For example, the adversary can use Alice’s public point QA and the public
point P to compute y = eˆl(QA, P ) and x = eˆl(P, P ). Notice that
y = eˆl(QA, P ) = eˆl(aP, P ) = eˆl(P, P )
a = xa
so, if the adversary can solve the DLP in Fp , the adversary can obtain the secret a, by
symmetry the adversary can obtain the secrets b and c, and hence the adversary can compute
the shared key k = eˆl(P, P )
abc. Therefor, the security of tripartite DiffieHellman key exchange
rely on the difficulty of the DLP in Fp.
6.3 Certificateless Two-party Authenticated Key Agreement
protocol(CTAKA)
All symmetric key encryption schemes rely on the use of shared key. Exchanging keys re-
main big problem in insecure networks. To eliminate the problem of exchanging keys, a lot
of key agreement schemes have been proposed in the literature. In this section we give a brief
introduction to certificateless public key cryptography, then we give some of existing certifi-
cateless key agreement protocols, moreover, we introduce He and Chen [36] certificateless key
agreement protocols.
6.3.1 Certificateless Public Key Cryptography (CL-PKC)
In 2003 Al-Riyami and Paterson [2] introduced the concept of Certificateless Public Key
Cryptography (CL-PKC) to overcome the key escrow limitation of the Identity-Based Pub-
lic Key Cryptography (ID-PKC) and certificate management in Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). In CL-PKC a trusted third party called Key Generation Center (KGC) supplies a user
with partial private key, the user then combine the partial private key with a secret value
(unknown to the KGC) to obtain his full private key. In this way the KGC does not know
users private keys. Then the user combines the same secret value with the KGC’s public
parameters to compute his public key.
Compared to identity based cryptography public key cryptography (ID-PKC), the trust
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assumptions made of the trusted third party in CL-PKC are much reduced. In ID-PKC,
users must trust the Private Key Generator (PKG) not to abuse its knowledge of private
keys in performing passive attacks, while in CL-PKC, users need only trust the KGC not to
actively propagate false public keys [2].
In CL-PKC users can generate more than one pair of key (private and public) for the same
partial private key. To guarantee that KGC does not replace user’s public keys Al-Riyami and
Paterson[2] introduced a binding technique to bind a user’s public key with his private key.
In their binding scheme, the user first fixes his secret value and his public key and supplies
the KGC his public key. Then the KGC redefine the identity of the user to be the user’s
identity concatenated with his public key. By this binding scheme the KGC replacement of
a public key apparent, and equivalent to a CA forging a certificate in a traditional PKI.
Many certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement (CTAKA) protocols have
been proposed in the literature. In 2003 Al-Riyami and Paterson [2] proposed the first
CTAKA protocol. Then, more CTAKA protocols have been proposed for example [63, 89,
57, 93, 42, 86, 60, 17, 100, 68] and [96].
All the above mentioned certificateless two-party key agreement protocols are from bilin-
ear pairing. The relative computation cost of a pairing is approximately twenty times higher
than that of a scalar multiplication over elliptic curve group [17]. To improve the perfor-
mance, several CTAKA protocols without pairings have been proposed in the literature for
example [15, 29, 41, 26, 95, 35, 37, 33] and [36].
6.3.2 He and Chen CTAKA protocol
In 2011 He and Chen [36] Proposed an efficient CTAKA protocol without paring and they
proved its security in the random oracle model under the the following Computational Diffie-
Hellman (CDH) problem.
Definition 6.3.1 Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: Given a generator P of a
group of elliptic curve point G and (aP, bP ) for unknown a, b ∈ Z∗n, compute abP . The CDH
assumption states that the probability of any polynomial-time algorithm to solve the CDH
problem is negligible.
He and Chen protocol consists of six polynomial-time algorithms. They are described as
follows:
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• Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter k as in put, and returns system
parameters and a master key. Given k , KGC does the following:
– chooses a k -bit prime p and determines the tuple (Fp, E(Fp), G, P ).
– chooses the master private key s ∈ Z∗n, and computes the master public key pub
Ppub = sP .
– chooses two cryptographic secure hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ −→ Z∗n and H2 :
{0, 1}∗ −→ Z∗n.
– publishes params (Fp, E(Fp), G, P, Ppub, H1, H2) as system parameters and secretly
keeps the master key s .
• Set-Secret-Value: The user with identity IDi picks randomly xi ∈ Z∗n, computes
Pi = xiP and sets xi as his secret value.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This algorithm takes master key, a user’s identifier,
Pi , system parameters as input, and returns the user’s ID-based private key. With
this algorithm, for each user with identifier IDi, KGC works as follows:
– KGC chooses a random number ri ∈ Z∗n, computesRi = riP and hi = H1{IDi, Ri, Pi}.
– KGC computes si = ri +his mod n and issues {si, Ri} to the users through secret
channel.
The user’s partial private key is si and he can validate his private key by checking
whether the equation siP = Ri + hiPpub holds.
• Set-Private-Key: The user with identity IDi takes the pair ski = (xi, si) as its
private key.
• Set-Public-Key: The user with identity IDi takes pki = (Pi, Ri) as its public key.
• Key-Agreement: Assume that an entity A with identity IDa has private ska =
(xa, sa) and public key pka = (Pa, Ra) and an entity B with identity IDb has private
skb = (xb, sb) and public key pkb = (Pb, Rb) want to establish a session key, they can
do as follows:
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– A chooses a random number a ∈ Z∗n and computes Ta = aP , then A send
M1{IDa, Ta} to B.
– After receiving M1, B chooses a random number b ∈ Z∗n and computes Tb = bP ,
then B send M2{IDb, Tb} to A.
Then both A and B can compute the shared secrets as follows.
– A computes K1AB = (xa+sa)Tb+a(Pb+Rb+H(IDb, Rb, Pb)Ppub) and K
2
AB = aTb.
– B computes K1BA = (xb+sb)Ta+b(Pa+Ra+H(IDa, Ra, Pa)Ppub) and K
2
BA = bTa.
It is very clear that K2AB = K
2
BA, however, K
1
AB = K
1
BA as shown below:
K1AB = (xa + sa)Tb + a(Pb +Rb +H(IDb, Rb, Pb)Ppub)
= (xa + sa)Tb + a(Pb + sbP )
= (xa + sa)Tb + a(xbP + sbP ) = (xa + sa)Tb + (xb + sb)Ta
by symmetry
K1BA = (xb + sb)Ta + (xa + sa)Tb
Thus the agreed session key for A and B can be computed as:
sk = H2(IDa||IDb||Ta||Tb||K1AB||K2AB)
or
sk = H2(IDa||IDb||Ta||Tb||K1BA||K2BA)
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Conclusion and Remarks
The scalar multiplication is the most time consuming operation in elliptic curve cryptography.
In this thesis we have focused in optimizing the elliptic curve scalar multiplication. In the
last decades, it has been shown that pre-computations of elliptic-curve points improve the
performance of scalar multiplication especially in cases where the elliptic-curve point P is
fixed. Therefore, in this thesis we mainly have focused in optimizing fixed-base comb method.
We presented four contributions:
• We have proved that Tsaur and Chou method is not more efficient than Lim and Lee
method as authors claimed.
• We have proposed an improvement of Tsaur and Chou method. Our proposed method
makes a significant reduction in terms of number of elliptic-curve point addition oper-
ation. By comparing our method with previous work, it shows that when h = ω = 2
our proposed method and Tsaur-Chou method are identical, when h = ω = 3 the worst
cost of our proposed method is equal to the average cost of Tsaur-Chou method, and
when h = ω > 3 the worst cost of our proposed method is less than the average cost
of Tsaur-Chou method. For pre-computations, if storage space is disregarded, our pro-
posed method is the best choice and we can define h ≥ ω, otherwise ω = h. There is
always a suitable choice for h and v which make our method best. In practice, a speed
improvement by 33 % to 38 % is achieved.
• We have proposed two efficient regular SPA resistant elliptic curve scalar multiplication
methods using fixed base comb method. The first method ”Regular SPA resistant
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fixed-base comb method” represents the scalar k in m = 2ω (where ω > 1) radix
representation using Joye and Tunstall regular exponent and divide the scalar into v
blocks. Compared to left-to-right 2ω ary method using Joye and Tunstall’s regular
recoding, when v = 1, left-to-right 2ω ary method and our proposed regular fixed-
base comb methods are identical. However, when v > 1 our proposed fixed-base comb
method is more efficient than left-to-right 2ωary method using Joye and Tunstall’s
regular recoding method.
The second method ”Improved Regular SPA resistant fixed-base comb method” is more
efficient than the first one, the scalar k is represented in base 2 using Joye and Tunstall
regular exponent-recoding and is divided into ω × v blocks according to the method
of Lim and Lee. Both of our regular methods have a constant run time which ensures
the resistance against timing attacks. In addition to that, the proposed methods does
not make use of any dummy operations and is therefore resistant to safe-error fault
attacks. Moreover, by using randomization techniques and changing the randomization
of each pre-computed point after getting the point in the table our proposed methods
is even resistant to DPA and second-order DPA attacks. Also, by using randomized
linearly transformed coordinate our regular methods are resistant to RPA, ZPA and
Geiselmann-Steinwandt’s attacks. Compared to related work, the cost of second regular
method , Hedabou et al. [38, 39], , Feng et al. [25] are equal and greater then the cost of
Feng et al. [25] by one point doubling, but the method of Feng et al. [16] uses dummy
operation so it might lead to safe error fault attacks. On the other hand we replace
a by a − 1 for our proposed method if the case l´ = l − 1 and l´ divide ω occurs and
in that case our proposed method is more efficient than all of the SPA methods given
in Table 5.3.2. However, we noticed that even there is no enough memory it is better
to choose small value of ω and bigger value of v, and when v > ω, our second regular
method is more efficient than all other method.
Our future work will continue in improving scalar multiplication for both unknown point
and fixed point. Also, since scalar multiplication is performed through a combination
of point additions and doublings, many research have been done to enhance point
addition and doubling, and more can be done. Moreover, we will obtain optimal values
for the constants a, b, v and ω for fixed key size(examples 160,256,512,1024 bits) for the
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Improved Regular Fixed-base Comb Method for SPA-Resistant Scalar Multiplication.
Attractive area of research is certificateless public key cryptography or to be precisely
certificateless two-party authenticated key agreement (CTAKA) protocols. Until be-
ginning of 2009 all CTAKA were from bilinear pairing, however, the relative cost of
a pairing is twenty times of scalar multiplication. Therefore, many CTAKA without
pairing have been proposed in the literature. Our future research will also focus in
constructing CTAKA that can be computed efficiently from a few numbers of scalar
multiplication.
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Appendix A
Examples and Pairings
A.1 Examples
Example 1 Improved Fixed-base Comb Method
In order to illustrate our method, we select at random a positive integer k = 1065142573068
and choose ω = 3. First, we represent k in width-3 NAF,
k = (0100001¯000000000001¯001¯001001¯00300000000300).
Then, we divide from up-to-down to a = d413 e = 14 blocks of size 3, such that
k =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1¯ 0 0 0 1¯ 1¯ 1 1¯ 3 0 0 3
 .
Then, from right-to-left we divide the 3×14 blocks to 3×7 blocks, each of size b = d147 e =
2, such that
k =

00 00 00 00 00 00 00
10 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 1¯0 00 1¯1¯ 11¯ 30 03
 .
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Next, we compute and store the following values. For pre-computed values G[0][sd], where
s ∈ {1, 2, 4} and d ∈ {1, 3}:
G[0][1] = P,G[0][2] = 2P,G[0][4] = 4P,G[0][3] = 3P,G[0][6] = 6P,G[0][12] = 12P.
For pre-computed values G[j][sd], where s ∈ {1, 2, 4}, d ∈ {1, 3} and 0 < j ≤ 6:
G[j][1] = 26jP,G[j][2] = 26j(2P ), G[j][4] = 26j(4P ),
G[j][3] = 26j(3P ), G[j][6] = 26j(6P ), G[j][12] = 26j(12P ).
Next, compute Ij,t = (e2,2j+te1,2j+te0,2j+t)2 for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 6 as follows:
I0,0 = (e2,0e1,0e0,0)NAF3 = (300)NAF3 = 12,
I1,0 = (e2,2e1,2e0,2)NAF3 = 0,
I2,0 = (e2,4e1,4e0,4)NAF3 = (1¯00)NAF3 = −4,
I3,0 = (e2,6e1,6e0,6)NAF3 = (1¯00)NAF3 = −4,
I4,0 = (e2,8e1,8e0,8)NAF3 = 0,
I5,0 = (e2,10e1,10e0,10)NAF3 = 0,
I6,0 = (e2,12e1,12e0,12)NAF3 = 0,
I0,1 = (e2,1e1,1e0,1)NAF3 = 0,
I1,1 = (e2,3e1,3e0,3)NAF3 = (300)NAF3 = 12,
I2,1 = (e2,5e1,5e0,5)NAF3 = (100)NAF3 = 4,
I3,1 = (e2,7e1,7e0,7)NAF3 = (1¯00)NAF3 = −4,
I4,1 = (e2,9e1,9e0,9)NAF3 = 0,
I5,1 = (e2,11e1,11e0,11)NAF3 = (1¯00)NAF3 = −4,
I6,1 = (e2,13e1,13e0,13)NAF3 = (010)NAF3 = 2.
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Finally, we can compute kP by using above values as follows:
kP = G[0][12] +G[1][0]−G[2][4]−G[3][4] +G[4][0] +G[5][0] +G[6][0] +
23(G[0][0] +G[1][12] +G[2][4]−G[3][4] +G[4][0]−G[5][4] +G[6][2]).
Example 2 Regular Fixed-base Comb Method
In order to illustrate our method, we choose an odd integer k = 1065142573063 and
ω = 3. Using Algorithm 18, we obtain 23-ary representation of k as
k = (173777355¯557¯7¯1)23 .
we have a = 14 is the length of 23-ary representation of k and we take b = 2. We can rewrite
k as
k =

1 7 3 7 7 7 3 5 5¯ 5 5 7¯ 7¯ 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 .
Then, we divide from right-to-left to v = dab e = 7 blocks of size b, such that
k =

17 37 77 35 5¯5 57¯ 7¯1
00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00
 .
Next, we compute and store the following values. For pre-computed values G[0][s], where
s ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7} :
G[0][1] = P,G[0][3] = 3P,G[0][5] = 5P,G[0][7] = 7P.
For pre-computed values G[j][s], where s ∈ {1, 3, 5, 7} and 0 < j ≤ 6:
G[j][1] = 26jP,G[j][3] = 26j(3P ),
G[j][5] = 26j(5P ), G[j][7] = 26j(7P ).
Finally, we can compute kP by using above values as follows:
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kP =
b−1∑
t=0
2tω(
v−1∑
j=0
G[j][kjb+t])
= G[0][k0] +G[1][k2] +G[2][k4] +G[3][k6] +G[4][k8] +G[5][k10] +G[6][k12] +
23(G[0][k1] +G[1][k3] +G[2][k5] +G[3][k7] +G[4][k9] +G[5][k11] +G[6][k13]).
= G[0][1]−G[1][7] +G[2][5] +G[3][5] +G[4][7] +G[5][7] +G[6][7] +
23(−G[0][7] +G[1][5]−G[2][5] +G[3][3] +G[4][7] +G[5][3] +G[6][1]).
Example 3 Regular Fixed-base Comb Method2
In order to illustrate our method, we choose an odd integer k = 121455575 and choose
ω = 3. First, represent k in base 2 using Algorithm 18:
k = (11111¯1¯11111¯11¯11¯1¯1¯1¯11111¯11¯11)
Then, from right-to-left, we divide the scalar k into 3 blocks each of size 9 as follows:
k =

11111¯11¯11
11¯11¯11¯1¯1¯1¯
11111¯1¯111
 .
Then, from up-to-down we divide the 3 × 9 blocks to 3 × 3 blocks, each of size b = 93 = 3,
such that
k =

111 11¯1 1¯11
11¯1 1¯11¯ 1¯1¯1¯
111 11¯1¯ 111
 .
Next, we compute and store the following values. For pre-computed values G[0][s´], where
s´ = f(s), s = (e2e1e0) and ei ∈ {−1, 1}. We only need to compute positive values of s´ (i.e.,
s´ ∈ {261631, 261633, 262655, 262657})
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G[0][262657] = (218 + 29 + 1)P,G[0][262655] = (218 + 29 − 1)P,
G[0][261633] = (218 − 29 + 1)P,G[0][261631] = (218 − 29 − 1)P.
For pre-computed values G[j][s´], where s´ ∈ {261631, 261633, 262655, 262657} and 0 ≤ j ≤ 2:
G[j][262657] = 23j(218 + 29 + 1)P,G[j][262655] = 23j(218 + 29 − 1)P,
G[j][261633] = 23j(218 − 29 + 1)P,G[j][261631] = 23j(218 − 29 − 1)P.
Next, we compute ´Ij,t = f(Ij,t) = e2,3j+t2
2a+e1,3j+t2
a+e0,3j+t for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 2 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 2
as follows:
´I0,0 = f(e2,0e1,0e0,0) = f(11¯1) = 261633,
´I1,0 = f(e2,3e1,3e0,3) = f(1¯1¯1) = −262655,
´I2,0 = f(e2,6e1,6e0,6) = f(111) = 262657,
´I0,1 = f(e2,1e1,1e0,1) = f(11¯1) = 261633,
´I1,1 = f(e2,4e1,4e0,4) = f(1¯11¯) = −261633,
´I2,1 = f(e2,7e1,7e0,7) = f(11¯1) = 261633,
´I0,2 = f(e2,2e1,2e0,2) = f(11¯1¯) = 261631,
´I1,2 = f(e2,5e1,5e0,5) = f(11¯1) = 261633,
´I2,2 = f(e2,8e1,8e0,8) = f(111) = 262657,
Finally, we can compute kP by using the above values as follows:
kP = G[0][261633]−G[1][262655] +G[2][262657] +
2(G[0][261633]−G[1][261633] +G[2][261633]) +
22(G[0][261631] +G[1][261633] +G[2][262657]).
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A.2 Bilinear pairings
This section introduces some elementary background on pairings. We refer the reader to [3,
4, 5, 85, 83, 84] and [65] for further details.
Pairings in elliptic curve cryptography are functions which map a pair of elliptic curve
points to an element of the multiplicative group of a finite field. Let l be a prime num-
ber, G1 =< P > be additive groups of order l with identity element O, and let GT be a
multiplicative group of order l with identity 1. A bilinear pairing e on (G1, GT ) is a function
e : G1 ×G1 −→ GT
that satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinearity: For all R,S, T ∈ G1, e(R + S, T ) = e(R, T )e(S, T ) and e(R,S + T ) =
e(R,S)e(R, T ).
• Non-degeneracy: e(P, P ) 6= 1.
• Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈ G1.
The security of many pairing-based protocols is dependent on the intractability of Bilinear
Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP) which is defined below.
Definition A.2.1 Let e be a bilinear pairing on (G1, GT ). The Bilinear Diffie- Hellman
Problem (BDHP) is the following: Given P, aP, bP, cP , compute e(P, P )abc.
Hardness of the BDHP implies the hardness of the DHP in both G1 and GT .
Definition A.2.2 Given quadruple (P, aP, bP, cP ) of elements in G1, Decisional Diffie-
Hellman problem (DDHP) in G1 is to decide whether cP = abP .
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